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

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RECOLLECTIONS

AND

REFLECTIONS,

PERSONAL AND POLITICAL,

AS CONNECTED WITH

Public Affairs,

DURING THE

REIGN OF GEORGE III.

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BY

JOHN NICHOLLS, ESQ.

Member of the House of Commons in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth Parliaments of Great Britain.

London:

PRINTED FOR JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

1820.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

The following Recollections and Reflections were written during a residence at Toulouse, in France, between the 20th of November 1819, and the 10th of April 1820.

The Author is aware that there are expressions which may be unacceptable to the partisans both of Mr. Pitt and of Mr. Fox; but he has spoken with the integrity of an historian.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

From the Accession of George III. in October 1760, *to the Dissolution of Parliament in March* 1784 . . . . . Page 1

CHAPTER II.

From the Meeting of Parliament in March 1784, *to the Commencement of the French Revolution in July* 1789 . . . . . Page 61

CHAPTER III.

Causes of the French Revolution . . . Page 73

CHAPTER IV.

On the Consequences likely to follow from the French Revolution . . . . . Page 111

CHAPTER V.

Effects produced by the French Revolution in England.—Mr. Pitt's Conduct till his Death in 1806 . . . . . Page 128

CHAPTER VI.

On the Causes which contributed to the Extinguishment of feudal Burdens in England Page 175

CHAPTER VII.

Reform of Parliament . . . . . Page 181

CHAPTER VIII.

On the State of Parties in England . Page 201

CHAPTER IX.

On the Duration of Papal Power . Page 219

CHAPTER X.

On the Consequences likely to result from the Establishment of the United States of America Page 230

CHAPTER XI.

On the Effects likely to be produced by the French Revolution on other Nations . . . . Page 237

CHAPTER XII.

On the British Possessions in India . Page 243

CHAPTER XIII.

Impeachment of Mr. Hastings . . . Page 251

CHAPTER XIV.

On Mr. Edmund Burke . . . . . Page 295

CHAPTER XV.

On the Slave Trade . . . . . Page 304

CHAPTER XVI.

Will Revolution produce an Increase of Happiness to Mankind? . . . . . Page 316

CHAPTER XVII.

On the Consequences of the Revolution in Spain Page 320

CHAPTER XVIII.

On the Consequences of the Transition from an agricultural to a commercial and manufacturing State . . . . . Page 334

CHAPTER XIX.

On the Consequences of a King of Great Britain being a German Sovereign . . . . . Page 349

CHAPTER XX.

Characters of George II. and Queen Caroline Page 357

CHAPTER XXI.

Reflections on an intended Marriage between Frederick Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer . . . . . Page 371

CHAPTER XXII.

On the Consequences produced by the personal Character of George III. . . . . . Page 381

CHAPTER XXIII.

On the three Kings of the Brunswick Race Page 405

RECOLLECTIONS,

&c.

CHAPTER I.

From the Accession of George the Third in October 1760, *to the Dissolution of Parliament in March* 1784.

GEORGE II. died suddenly about the close of October 1760. At that time I was nearly sixteen years old; so that the active part of my life has all been passed during the reign of George III.

My father was physician to George II. This circumstance led me to see in early life, people who were about the Court. I cannot say that the nation much regretted the death of George II. During the last three years of his reign the war against France

had been carried on with much success; but this was attributed to the energy of Mr. Secretary Pitt, who was known to be Minister against the wishes of the King.

The nation hailed with pleasure the accession of a Prince born in the country; they persuaded themselves that the interests of England would no longer be sacrificed to the interests of Hanover; and much advantage of this circumstance was taken in the first speech of the young King to Parliament. "Born and educated in this country, I glory in the name of Briton:" the old Earl of Hardwicke, the Ex-chancellor, censured this expression, saying that it was an insult to the memory of the late King; but the nation was pleased with the expression. The young King (for he was at that time little more than twenty-two years of age) was of a good person, sober, temperate, of domestic habits, addicted to no vice, swayed by no passion—what had not the nation to expect from such a character? There was another circumstance which much increased his popularity: during the reigns of George I. and George II. a considerable part of the

nation had been as it were proscribed, under the name of Tories. The imputation against these men was, that they were attached to the family of Stuart: probably some of them were attached to that family; but very many were included under the denomination of Tories, solely because they had disapproved of the corrupt and feeble Administrations of Sir Robert Walpole and the Pelhams. It was soon remarked, that the Pelham party did not possess the partiality of George III. in the same manner as they had possessed that of George II.; and the Tories saw with pleasure the removal of that proscription by which they had been so long oppressed. In one word, the nation was intoxicated with loyalty. But those who approached the Court more nearly, perceived circumstances which filled them with apprehensions.

I recollect the expression used to my father by Mr. Pratt, at that time Attorney General, afterwards better known by the name of Lord Camden, within four months after the King's accession: "I see already, that this will be a weak and an inglorious

reign." I recollect also the relation which a friend of my father's gave to him of a conversation which he had had with Charles Townshend: "I said to Charles Townshend, I don't want to know any state secrets, but do tell me what is the character of this young man?" After a pause, Charles Townshend replied, "He is very obstinate." It was also observed that the Princess Dowager of Wales had kept the young Prince from having any confidential intimacy with any person except herself and the Earl of Bute: the pretence for this was the preservation of his morals. In truth, they had blockaded all approach to him. A notion has prevailed, that the Earl of Bute had suggested political opinions to the Princess Dowager; but this was certainly a mistake. In understanding, the Princess Dowager was far superior to the Earl of Bute; in whatever degree of favour he stood with her, he did not suggest, but he received, her opinions and her directions. The late Marquis of Bute told me, that at the King's accession, his father, the Earl of Bute, had no connexion beyond the pale of Leicester House. He added, "I never lived with my

father, nor did any of his children." Could such a man be fit to be a Minister?

The Princess Dowager of Wales was a woman of a very sound understanding, and was considered as such by all who had occasion to converse with her. But she had been educated in the Court of her father, the Duke of Saxe Gotha; here she had received her ideas of sovereign power, and she could never bring herself to feel the necessity, that sovereign power should be exercised by a King of Great Britain with different sentiments, and in a manner different from that in which she had seen it exercised at Saxe Gotha.

Few Englishmen have occasion to see the interior of the Court of a petty German Prince; it may therefore be difficult to bring Englishmen to comprehend the character of such a Court. A petty German Sovereign is not a *magistrate;* he is rather the proprietor of the soil, and of the inhabitants. His Ministers exist by his breath; they are liable to no responsibility except to their

master; they fall into insignificance when his favour is removed: he resembles more a Polish or Hungarian Noble, than a British Sovereign. He has an interest that his lands should be well cultivated, and his people not driven from his territory; because, if the lands remained uncultivated, his revenues would be lessened; but he collects all the revenue which he can, consistently with this attention to his interest, and spends it all in vanity or personal gratifications.

When the Princess of Wales came to the Court of St. James, she found the British Sovereign a very different character from that which she had seen at Saxe Gotha. She found him controlled by his Ministers, indulged in petty gratifications, but compelled to submit to their opinions on all important subjects. We cannot be surprised that she was disgusted at this; and it is well known that she ever impressed upon the King from his early years this lesson, "George, be King." And this lesson seems to have influenced the King's conduct through the whole of his life. Extreme apprehension that his Ministers or others might encroach upon

his power, an earnest wish that he might exercise his power personally, or, in other words, that he might be his own Minister, have in a very singular manner marked his conduct during the whole of his reign.

At his accession, he found the Pelham party in possession of the Administration; much strengthened by its alliance with Mr. Secretary Pitt, and popular from his successful conduct of the war. It was perilous to attempt to change such an Administration. The late Marquis of Rockingham told me, that about the end of February 1761, he received a message from the Duke of Newcastle, requesting him to be at Newcastle House that evening. He went there: on his entering the room, the Duke of Newcastle ran up to him and said, "We have received a message from the King, of great importance; he wishes that the Earl of Holdernesse may resign the place of Secretary of State for the Northern Department, and receive in lieu of it the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports, and that the Earl of Bute may be appointed Secretary of State for the Northern Department, in the place

of the Earl of Holdernesse." When this subject was discussed, the Earl of Hardwicke strongly recommended that the King's wishes should be complied with without opposition. He said, " that this was the first instance in which the King had interfered in the nomination of Ministers; and that resistance to his wishes might excite an ill-will which they might afterwards regret." The Marquis of Rockingham told me, that he himself rather objected, and desired them to consider, whether, " if they admitted, in February 1761, that the Earl of Bute was fit to be a Secretary of State, they could say in the following year that he was not fit to be a Prime Minister?" But the Earl of Hardwicke's opinion prevailed, and the Earl of Bute was appointed Secretary of State.

In the autumn of 1761, Mr. Pitt was removed from the office of Secretary of State, and every tool of Government employed to run down his character and destroy his popularity.

The old Duke of Newcastle was as much rejoiced at the removal of Mr. Pitt as any man. He had always felt himself fettered and oppressed by the superior mind of Mr. Pitt; and on Mr. Pitt's removal he was weak enough to imagine that he should possess the same degree of power as he had possessed before Mr. Pitt's advancement to office. But early in the spring 1762, the Duke was himself removed from his situation, and the Earl of Bute appointed First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister in his room. During the year 1761 there had been a negotiation for peace, and M. Bussy had come to London for the purpose of conducting the negotiation; but the negotiation failed, and I think, that whoever carefully and impartially examines the papers that passed on that occasion, will be of opinion that Mr. Secretary Pitt did not wish for peace. But the young King was anxious for it: and in the course of the year 1762, the Earl of Bute opened a new negotiation with the Court of France. Peace was the result of this negotiation: but the terms of the peace were universally abused, though I think it would be difficult to show what

greater advantages could have been obtained; every thing which we did retain, was either injurious or of little benefit. The acquisition of Canada, and the extension of the limits of our American Colonies, have been injurious to us; the cession of Grenada, and of the neutral West India islands, has been of little importance; and as it has been since decided, that the Slave Trade ought to be abandoned, acquisitions on the coast of Africa could not be of much use. But the language of the nation was, "After a most successful war, see how little we have gained." People did not perceive, that the war had been continued without a British object; solely to support George the Second's German interests, and gratify the ambition of Mr. Pitt. But the peace was odious; the pageant of a *boot* and *petticoat* paraded through the streets of London, frightened the Earl of Bute into a resignation; and the King appointed George Grenville his successor. But before I examine the Administration of Mr. George Grenville, I will make a few observations on the transactions which took place from the accession of the King to the retirement of the Earl of Bute.

Mr. Edmund Burke has said, in one of his political works, that the plan of an interior Cabinet was formed during the life of Frederic Prince of Wales. I doubt the correctness of this assertion. I think that it must be at least adopted with great allowances. I believe the Princess Dowager of Wales had suggested to the King, from his earliest years, to be his own Minister, and to resist the control of those who were in office. She had seen the manner in which the Ministers had, at different times, thwarted the wishes of George II. Perhaps even George II. himself had sometimes felt and been indignant at this control: he was a foreigner, and feared the return to power of the Stuart family. But the Princess Dowager of Wales wished her son to be a King, such as she had been educated to believe a King ought to be; viz. a King after the model of a Duke of Saxe Gotha; and this was the object of that lesson which she was continually inculcating to him, "George, be King." But I do not see any reason for believing that there was any original intention of forming an interior Cabinet. I believe that the plan of the interior Cabinet grew out

of circumstances which afterwards arose. The first wish was, that the Earl of Bute should be advanced to be Prime Minister; and while he was Minister, there was certainly no desire to form an interior Cabinet. Most probably the interior Cabinet arose on his retirement from office. When the Earl of Bute was made Secretary of State for the Northern Department, he found in that office Mr. Charles Jenkinson, a man of family, though in the inferior situation of a volunteer clerk. The Earl of Bute discovered this gentleman's abilities; and when he was made First Lord of the Treasury, removed Mr. Jenkinson with him to his new office, and made him Secretary of the Treasury. When the Earl of Bute resigned, Mr. Jenkinson was the channel through which confidential communications were conveyed from the King to the Princess Dowager and the Earl of Bute; and this was most probably the origin of the interior Cabinet.

The King, at his accession, had two objects; the first was to destroy the Pelham faction, the second was to put an end to

the war. For his attempts to effect those objects, he was more abused than for any other act of his life; although perhaps those objects were the most judicious and the most meritorious of his reign. But the Pelham faction was very powerful. Many individuals, not acting under the direction of that faction, indulged themselves in gross abuse of the Princess Dowager and the Earl of Bute, and even of the King himself. This gave occasion to measures dictated more by resentment than by judgment, and ultimately produced a sort of personal contest between the Princess Dowager and the King on one side, and John Wilkes on the other. The generous character of the English nation naturally led them to take part with the individual whom they thought oppressed, and the King was injured by the victory. I do not believe that the King ever wished to reinstate the Earl of Bute. He saw the Earl's want of courage: probably he saw his incapacity, and his unfitness to serve his views: but it is possible that the Princess Dowager of Wales might still retain a wish that the Earl of Bute should be replaced in the office of Prime

Minister. However this might be, whenever the new Minister, Mr. Grenville, resisted the wishes of the King and the Princess Dowager, he was recalled to obedience by a negotiation being opened with Mr. Pitt. This negotiation was not concealed; on the contrary, there was a wish on the part of the King and the Princess Dowager that it should be generally known: for their object was to bring back Mr. Grenville to obedience, by showing him the danger of his being removed, in case he resisted their wishes. And while Mr. Grenville remained Minister, these negotiations happened not unfrequently.

But the great measure of Mr. Grenville's Administration was the Stamp Act. This was an attempt to raise taxes in the American Colonies by the vote of a British Parliament; all taxes in the British Colonies having, down to that period, been ever voted by their several Colonial Assemblies. This measure has produced consequences so important, not solely to Great Britain, but also to so many other states, that one cannot pass over it without deep reflection.

I have heard it doubted, whether the measure originated with Mr. George Grenville. I have heard it intimated, that the measure originated with the King, that is to say, with the King's secret advisers; and that Mr. Grenville acceded to the plan with considerable reluctance. I have no means of knowing whether the measure originated with Mr. Grenville or with the King. But from the unremitted obstinacy with which the King persevered in the wish to impose taxes on the Colonies by a British Parliament, every man must see that it may fairly be called the favourite measure of his reign. I will examine the subject more fully at another time.

About the beginning of the year 1765, the King fell ill; I know it has been said that his illness was a mental derangement; but I do not believe it. On his recovery, it occurred to Mr. Grenville and the other Ministers, that if the King had died, there would have been considerable difficulty in appointing a Regent; and as the Prince of Wales was then only two years and a half old, a Regency, and for a long conti-

nuance, would have been necessary. They therefore determined to bring into Parliament a Bill enabling the King to appoint a Regent by his will. But Mr. Grenville did not choose that the Princess Dowager of Wales should be the Regent; and he probably thought that the Princess Dowager would be the person whom the King would be most disposed to select: for during the Princess Dowager's life, the Queen does not appear to have had much influence over the King. He therefore suggested to the King, that his power of appointment must be confined to the Queen, and the descendants of George II. The King resisted this, as he saw that by such a limitation he should be precluded from nominating the Princess Dowager. Mr. Grenville persevered; telling the King, that he could not undertake to carry the Bill through the House of Commons, except His Majesty's power were thus limited. The King at length yielded; and as the Bill was already in the House of Lords, he consented that the Earl of Halifax, Secretary of State, should be sent down to the House of Lords with a message to the Earl of Northington, at that time Chancel-

lor, signifying that it was the King's pleasure that his power of appointment should be confined to the Queen, and the descendants of George II. I have been told, and from good authority, that the Earl of Northington replied, "Your Lordship astonishes me; I should not have given credit to such a message if it had not been brought to me by one of His Majesty's Secretaries of State." But the Bill was framed agreeably to this message, and sent down in that shape to the House of Commons. After the Bill had thus passed the Lords, the Earl of Northington waited on the King to inform him what had been done; adding, that in obedience to the message which he had received through the Earl of Halifax, His Majesty would not have the power of appointing the Princess Dowager of Wales. The King replied, "Mr. Grenville tells me, that if my power of appointment had been extended to the Princess Dowager, he could not have undertaken to carry the Bill through the House of Commons."—"Would your Majesty have wished to have had the power of appointing the Princess Dowager?"—"Most certainly; provided the introduc-

tion of such a power would not have provoked a debate painful to the Princess Dowager herself." The Earl of Northington said no more; but on his retirement from the King's closet, sent for Mr. John Morton, Member for Abingdon. To Mr. Morton he gave these instructions: "When the Bill in your House is in a Committee, jump up, and move to insert the name of the Princess Dowager of Wales, and in the mean time keep the design to yourself." Mr. Morton followed the Earl of Northington's directions. The Opposition, not expecting such an amendment, was not prepared to oppose it. It would have been indecent in the Ministers to oppose it, and the amendment was adopted without one dissenting voice. Mr. Morton was an intimate friend of my father, and related this anecdote to him.

It will easily be supposed, that the Princess Dowager was highly indignant at the affront which Mr. Grenville had attempted to put on her; and the King immediately decided to dismiss him. I have been told, that the King did not conceal the

ground of his displeasure with Mr. Grenville; openly saying, " When Mr. Grenville told me, that, if the Princess Dowager's name were inserted in the Bill, he could not undertake to carry it through the House of Commons, either Mr. Grenville did not know the disposition of the House of Commons, or he practised a deception on me; in either case he is not fit to be my Minister."

On the removal of Mr. Grenville, the King appointed the Marquis of Rockingham Prime Minister. This Nobleman was a man of high honour and the strictest integrity; from his accession to office to the day of his death, he was never accused of being influenced by motives of personal interest: his understanding was sound, though not brilliant; but he had never before held any public situation, nor had he been much conversant in business: his friends saw, that with such habits, it would be advantageous that he should always have near him a man acquainted with political subjects, and accustomed to laborious application. They selected for this purpose Mr. Edmund Burke.

When William Gerard Hamilton (generally known by the name of Single-speech Hamilton) went to Ireland as Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, Mr. Edmund Burke attended Mr. Hamilton as his private Secretary: he was rewarded for this service with a pension of 300*l.* a year; which, as I have heard, he soon after sold to relieve his immediate necessities.

At the time when Mr. Burke was selected to be the private Secretary to the Marquis of Rockingham, he was an author in the service of Mr. Dodsley the bookseller; he had conducted for that gentleman the Annual Register, a work of considerable reputation and merit, first established in the year 1758; and I believe that it was conducted under the direction of Mr. Burke to a very late period of his life. The political knowledge of Mr. Burke might be considered almost as an Encyclopædia: every man who approached him received instruction from his stores; and his failings (for failings he had) were not visible at that time; perhaps they did not then exist; perhaps they grew up in the progress of his political life. When

Mr. Burke entered into the service of the Marquis of Rockingham he was not rich, but the munificent generosity of that Nobleman immediately placed him in an affluent situation. Mr. Burke purchased a beautiful villa, at Beaconsfield, which was paid for by the Marquis of Rockingham. When Dr. Johnson, who, like Mr. Burke, had subsisted by his labours as an author, visited his friend at his new purchase, he could not help exclaiming with the shepherd in Virgil's Eclogue,

"Non equidem invideo, miror magis."

But the Marquis of Rockingham's liberality was not confined to the person of Mr. Burke; he procured for Mr. William Burke, his cousin, and most confidential connexion, the employment of Under Secretary of State to General Conway; and he gave to Mr. Edmund Burke's brother, Richard Burke, the place of Collector of the Customs at Grenada. I mention these circumstances to show, that Lord Rockingham was fully entitled to that devoted attachment which Mr. Edmund Burke ever paid him to the end of that Noble Lord's life.

Let me pause to reflect on the transactions of that year in which Lord Rockingham was Minister. I can discover no faults in the administration of public affairs during that year; the conduct of Government was wise and upright: by the repeal of the Stamp Act, they put an end to a civil dissension, which had been unnecessarily excited. Had the measures adopted by Lord Rockingham been persevered in, Great Britain, I might almost add, Europe itself, would not have experienced that misery, relief from which she now finds so difficult. Lord Rockingham repealed the Stamp Act; and from that hour the King determined to remove him. Lord Rockingham himself told me, that the King never showed him such distinguished marks of kindness, as after he had secretly determined to get rid of him. The Marquis of Rockingham accompanied the repeal of the Stamp Act with another Act, declaratory of the right. I know that he has been much censured for this measure. Mr. Pitt recommended that the Stamp Act should be repealed by an Act declaring that the claim of the British Parliament was unconstitu-

tional and illegal. This would most certainly have been the bolder measure; but we must recollect the situation of Lord Rockingham when he proposed to Parliament the repeal of the Stamp Act. In his front he had a formidable opposition; in his rear the household troops, ready to declare against him; it was his duty to consider what measures were practicable; I will even go one step further, it was his duty not unnecessarily to offend the King. The plan which he brought forward, of an Act declaratory of the right, while it relinquished the exercise of that right, had been formerly adopted on a dispute with Ireland, of a nature somewhat similar. When the civil dissension with America had been put an end to, who could imagine that the King and the interior Cabinet would wish to renew it?

The Administration of Lord Rockingham lasted one year, and, I believe, a few days more. On his removal, the King sent for the Ex-Secretary Mr. Pitt, and requested him to form an Administration. From the reports circulated at that time, it seems as

if Mr. Pitt had been the dupe of those apparent marks of kindness which the King knew so well how to practise whenever he thought them necessary. Mr. Pitt thought that he possessed the entire confidence of the King, and acted as if the selection of his colleagues depended wholly upon himself. This occasioned a breach between him and his brother-in-law, Earl Temple; and, as Mr. Burke has remarked in a pamphlet subsequently published, "When Mr. Pitt had formed his Cabinet, he was no longer Minister." It is much to be regretted, that when the Marquis of Rockingham formed his Administration, in 1765, he did not feel the advantage which would have been derived from Mr. Pitt being in his Cabinet. Lord Rockingham must at that time have fully known the King's character; he must have been sensible of the difficulty which every Administration would have in restraining the King from pursuing his own private views, in opposition to the opinion of his ostensible Ministers. The experienced mind, the popularity, the venerable character of that great Statesman Mr. Pitt, would have added strength to his government. What

a different Cabinet would it have been, if, instead of that contemptible old man the Duke of Newcastle, he had made Mr. Pitt Lord Privy Seal! But, although an apparent union had subsisted, from 1757 to 1761, between the Pelham party and Mr. Pitt, yet the Pelham party had always hated Mr. Pitt; they felt themselves oppressed by the superiority of his mind, and perhaps he had sometimes unnecessarily made them sensible of their inferiority. Lord Rockingham had been educated from early life in this party; and, from that circumstance, most probably, felt no inclination to be united with Mr. Pitt.

In forming his Cabinet, Mr. Pitt made the Duke of Grafton First Lord of the Treasury. His own health disqualified him from holding that office, and he chose for himself the office of Lord Privy Seal, with an earldom. But he admitted into his Cabinet so many persons not sincerely attached to him or to his measures, that, whenever ill health compelled him to absent himself from the Cabinet, measures were adopted wholly repugnant to Mr. Pitt's views. His removal

to the House of Lords deprived him of a great portion of his power. From this circumstance, Charles Townshend remained indisputably the first speaker in the House of Commons. Mr. Burke, in one of his political speeches, calls him "that prodigy Charles Townshend." I have heard the late Lord Thurlow say, that Charles Townshend was the most delightful speaker he ever heard. For myself, I never heard him but once; and that was not on an occasion in which his powers could be fairly shown, for he had himself arranged that he should on that day be in a minority. It was on that debate, previous to the dissolution of Parliament in 1768, when the land-tax was reduced from four shillings to three shillings; or, as it was ludicrously said, when the country gentlemen bribed themselves with a shilling in the pound of their own land-tax.

Mr. Charles Townshend was soon taken into the Duke of Grafton's Cabinet, and made Chancellor of the Exchequer. I will not use so strong an expression as to say that he was treacherous to this Administration, but he certainly saw that the Earl of

Chatham's greatness was on the decline; and that he should most readily increase his own importance by acquiescing in the wishes of the King. He therefore brought forward measures tending to revive the question of the right of the British Parliament to tax the American Colonies; but his premature death protects him from being considered as the author of the American war.

The Duke of Grafton, who had been made First Lord of the Treasury, was certainly a man of a very feeble mind; he had about him at that time a Secretary of the name of Thomas Bradshaw; and a mistress, formerly known by the name of Nancy Parsons, at that time bearing the name of Mrs. Horton, afterwards Lady Maynard. Those who wished to destroy the Earl of Chatham's Administration saw, that they should very much advance their designs if they could separate the Duke of Grafton from the Earl of Chatham: they had gained over the Duke's Secretary, Mr. Bradshaw; but they could not corrupt his mistress. She had the sense to see that the Duke's honour required him to remain firm in his connexion with

the Earl of Chatham. She had the sense to see this, and she had the integrity to tell him so. Her influence for some time prevented the Duke of Grafton from deserting the Earl of Chatham. When this was seen, those who wished the destruction of that Administration changed the direction of their batteries; instead of using their efforts to separate the Duke of Grafton from the Earl of Chatham, they employed them to separate him from his mistress. In this they succeeded, and married him to Miss Wrottesley, the niece of the Duchess of Bedford. To separate him from the Earl of Chatham was then an easy task. Thus fell the Earl of Chatham's Administration; and, I believe, the Earl was never after in any public office.

Very soon after the formation of this Cabinet, the Earl of Chatham had fallen into an ill state of health, and remained so for many months: his illness was of that nature that he was incapable of any application to public business. The secret junto availed themselves of this circumstance; and such was the imbecility of the Duke of Grafton,

that sometimes Lord Chatham's measures were pursued, and sometimes measures directly the reverse of them were brought forward. When the interior Cabinet had sufficiently disgraced the Duke of Grafton, they frightened him into a resignation.

From the formation of Lord Chatham's Cabinet, in 1766, to the ultimate determination, in 1774, of forcing the Americans into rebellion, the measures adopted seem to have been calculated to provoke and irritate the Americans. Perhaps this was not the intention of those in power, but it was the result of the different measures at different times adopted; sometimes the Earl of Chatham's opinion prevailed, viz. that the British Parliament had no right to tax the American Colonies. At other times the opinion of the interior Cabinet prevailed, viz. that the King was humiliated if the right of the British Parliament to tax America was not asserted.

But before I consider the measures adopted against the Americans in the session of 1773-1774, let me make a few remarks on two measures of this Parliament, viz. the expul-

sion of John Wilkes from the House of Commons, and the Royal Family Marriage Act of 1772. The expulsion of John Wilkes from the House of Commons, in 1769, was brought forward purely to gratify the resentment of the interior Cabinet against that gentleman. John Wilkes had no virtues that entitled him to the esteem of his country, but he was a persecuted man. The generous character of Englishmen led them to take part with a man persecuted by power: he became popular because the Court had oppressed him. It may not be improper to mention here a little anecdote, which I received from the late Mr. Sergeant Glynn, the confidential friend and law adviser of John Wilkes. Earl Temple had furnished Mr. Wilkes with a qualification to enable him to stand for Middlesex; but Mr. Wilkes was at that time under a sentence of outlawry for a misdemeanor, viz. for the libel published in the North Briton, No. 45. It was a matter of uncertainty whether this judgment of outlawry could be reversed by a writ of error; and, if the judgment of outlawry were not reversed, the freehold estate of 600*l.* a year, which Earl Temple had

granted to Mr. Wilkes, for his life, would have been forfeited. Earl Temple would not expose himself to this risk; it was therefore arranged, that if Mr. Wilkes should be called on at the poll to produce his qualification, he should immediately decline the poll: but Mr. Wilkes was not called on. I mention this anecdote, to show how often important events depend on little circumstances. If Mr. Wilkes had not been elected for Middlesex, his expulsion, and all the consequent questions, could never have taken place. But the most important consequence resulting from this persecution was, that it appeared that there was no measure so humiliating to those who supported it, but that a majority of the House of Commons might be brought to vote for it. It was seen that this House of Commons, elected under the auspices of the Duke of Grafton, in 1768, was perfectly well suited to adopt every measure proposed by the interior Cabinet.

The Royal Family Marriage Act of 1772, was the measure of importance next brought forward. I think it is the wickedest Act in the Statute Book. It was brought forward

to gratify the late Queen's pride, to protect her from the mortification of having the Countess Dowager of Waldegrave and Mrs. Horton raised to the rank of her sisters-in-law. The reason assigned for bringing forward this Act, was to prevent the King's children from contracting improper marriages; but this was only a pretence. The King's eldest son, who has now succeeded to the Throne, was at that time only nine years and a half old; and as far as regarded the honour of the King's children, or the succession of a person from an humble walk in life, the Act was wholly inadequate: it was the late Queen's German pride which was to be protected. I remember an intimate friend of mine, then high in office, using to me this language, a very short time after the Act had been passed: "And now all our trouble and all our danger appear to have been unnecessary, for the Duke of Gloucester and the Duke of Cumberland have been with the King, and told him, that they were married before the Act was passed." The Bill was carried through the two Houses with great difficulty. In the House of Commons it was carried only

by a majority of forty; and in the House of Lords nineteen Peers entered a protest, declaring that the Bill, if passed into a law, would be void. I think they were right in this opinion. Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir John Holt, have all laid down this doctrine in the most explicit terms, that an Act of Parliament repugnant to the law of God, is void. Suppose an Act of Parliament were passed, declaring that those who have been made the objects of this Royal Family Marriage Act, viz. the descendants of George II. should be dispunishable for murder, would such an Act be void, or valid? I think no man can hesitate to say, that such an Act would be void; because it would permit men to do that with impunity which God has forbidden them to do. The law of God has not commanded marriage, but it has pointed it out as the means by which man may continue his race, and live in his posterity. What right could Parliament have to say, "The children of the Dukes of Gloucester and Cumberland shall die without issue?" I hesitate to speak of the mischiefs which have been already produced by this Act. I

fear still more to point out the greater mischiefs which may hereafter flow from it. What tyranny has not been practised over His present Majesty? what cruelty has not been exercised towards the Duke of Sussex and his children? It was well said by some persons, while this Bill was depending in Parliament, that the title of the Bill should be, "An Act to encourage Fornication and Adultery in the Descendants of George II." But the subject is too painful; I will say no more on it.

The Parliament closed its career with passing Acts intended either to compel the Americans to yield unconditional submission, or to take arms immediately in defence of their rights: they chose the latter; they declared that George III. had forfeited all right to their allegiance, and erected themselves into a Federative Republic. This Parliament was then dissolved. The American war was persevered in for eight years. The inhabitants of this island were deluded into the support of it. I recollect in one debate, Lord North stated, that the inhabitants of Great Britain, considered collec-

tively, paid one man with another twenty-five shillings a year in taxes; while the inhabitants of our American Colonies, considered collectively, paid each only sixpence a year in taxes; he added, "Is this equitable?" The country gentlemen were weak enough to believe, that by persevering in the contest, their taxes would be diminished. The language held in the House of Commons sufficiently proved that the Americans were not represented in that House. The war was considered as the war of the King personally. Those who supported it were called the King's friends; while those who wished the country to pause, and reconsider the propriety of persevering in the contest, were branded as disloyal.

The zealous supporters of the American war have thrown blame on the War Minister, and the Generals who conducted it. In this I think they have acted unjustly. I believe that Lord George Germaine was as able a War Minister as could have been found; and the Generals employed were men of the first reputation. It always appeared to me that the design of compelling

the Americans to submit to be taxed by a British Parliament, was a wild and absurd project. The loose texture (if I may be allowed the expression) of American population, rendered the conquest of the country impracticable. Wherever our army appeared the people submitted; but whenever our army moved forward, the people who had submitted resumed their arms. We never attempted more than the conquest of the eastern side of America; had we succeeded in that, the war would still have been continued by the inhabitants of the Back Settlements; and if the Americans had ultimately been subdued, what must have been the size of that army which must have been maintained there for the purpose of enforcing submission, and collecting revenue? I believe no man now will maintain either the justice or the policy of the American contest: we are come to this opinion, although only the short space of thirty-six years has elapsed since the contest was relinquished. A century hence, men will wonder how the people of England could have been deluded to engage in it.

After the defeat and capture of General Burgoyne at Saratoga, a friend of Lord North's said to him, "My Lord, you must deceive yourself no longer; you must now see that the whole population of America is hostile to your designs." Lord North replied, "I see that as clearly as you do; and the King shall either consent to allow me to assure the House of Commons, that some means shall be found to put an end to the war, or I will not continue to be his Minister." I had this anecdote from the friend with whom this conversation passed. Lord North was no inconsiderable Statesman: he seems never to have been particularly attentive to the promotion of his own personal interests, and I have no doubt that he would have preferred to have pursued those measures which he thought most beneficial to his country; but the place of Prime Minister was pleasant to him, and he persevered in the war for four years longer.

At the close of the year 1781, the capture of Earl Cornwallis's army was announced: the slightest reflection must then have convinced every man, that the continuance of the

war could have no other effect than that of exhausting the nation still more. Many of those country Gentlemen, who had till that time supported Lord North, signified to him that the war must be relinquished. I have been told, that at a meeting of Lord North's confidential friends, three measures were resolved on: first, That Lord George Germaine should be dismissed; secondly, That the Earl of Sandwich should retire; thirdly, That Lord North should insist, that the King should permit him to assure the House of Commons that some means should be found to put an end to the American war; and if the King refused to permit him to give such an assurance, that Lord North should resign. The Minister approved of this advice. Lord George Germaine was removed. The removal of the Earl of Sandwich was delayed. During the interval occasioned by the delay, Charles Fox moved an inquiry into the conduct of Lord Sandwich: it would have been inconsistent with the honour of the Noble Earl to have resigned before that inquiry had been gone through; it was therefore necessary that he should be defended: he was successfully defended, but the defence weakened Lord

North. Many Members refused to vote; others voted with reluctance: the defence of the Earl of Sandwich evinced that Lord North's majority was tired of the American war.

The Opposition in Parliament was at that time composed of two distinct corps—Rockinghams and Shelburnes; they were like Hessians and Hanoverians in the same camp. The probability of Lord North's fall was visible; and the importance of a perfect union between the Rockinghams and Shelburnes was equally manifest. I had at that time very confidential intercourse with several of the leaders of the Rockingham party; and I had much intimacy with Mr. Dunning, the efficient leader of the Shelburne party in the House of Commons. I availed myself of these circumstances to urge to all of them the great advantage that would be derived from a sincere union between these parties. I found Mr. Dunning fully sensible of the importance of such a union; and he assured me that it was most anxiously desired by the Earl of Shelburne. When I urged the subject to Mr. Burke, he

treated it with contempt: he said, "The Earl of Shelburne's party is of no consequence; it does not consist of more than six or eight members;" and I remember he enumerated them. But the Shelburne party was more numerous at that time than Mr. Burke chose to believe; and subsequent events proved their strength. When I mentioned to Mr. Dunning the small number which Mr. Burke said the Shelburne party consisted of, I remember his answer: "*Non numeremur sed ponderemur.*" When I talked on the subject with Admiral Keppel, the answer he made me was this: "I see the advantage of the union as much as you can do: for myself, I stand well with both the parties, and am deeply interested that such a union should take place; but the Earl of Shelburne has that degree of ill-will to Mr. Burke, that no union ever can take place between the parties." I do not know what ill-will the Earl of Shelburne had to Mr. Burke; but, from the conversation which I had at different times with Mr. Burke, I am satisfied that his hatred to the Earl of Shelburne was at least equal to that which the Earl of Shelburne might have to him.

Sir George Savile died in the early part of the year 1781; he was a very wise and a very upright man. His death was a great loss to the Marquis of Rockingham; for from that time there was no man to check the ascendant which Mr. Burke sometimes improperly exercised over that nobleman.

At an early period after the commencement of the American war, while the Rockingham party formed the great mass of opposition to that war, Mr. Edmund Burke was the leader of that party in the House of Commons; and if victory had attended their efforts, it was their intention to have made him the Minister: but during the latter years of that Parliament, which was dissolved in 1780, Mr. Burke was become unpopular with the party. His unpopularity was to so great a degree, that it was a matter of consideration whether he should not retire from Parliament. It was ultimately resolved that he should not retire, but that Mr. Charles Fox should take the command of the Rockingham party in the House of Commons, and be brought in Member for Westminster by their influence. The change

was judicious; and, although the exertions of Mr. Fox, during the session of 1780-81, did not appear to have much effect, yet, in the session 1781-82, he completed the overthrow of Lord North, and prevailed on the House of Commons to express their wish that the contest with America should be relinquished.

This session was the glorious campaign of Charles Fox: his health was entire, his troops followed him with confidence, he felt that he was gaining ground on every debate;

> " His spirit lent a fire
> " E'en to the meanest peasant in the camp."

I still retain the remembrance of the pleasure which I experienced from the events of that session; and whatever mistakes Charles Fox might afterwards make (and he certainly made some), the service he did his country that session can never be forgotten. His exertions terminated the contest; had it been continued much longer, the country must have sunk. Lord North had always said that he would abandon the contest whenever

the House of Commons declared such abandonment to be their wish. As soon as he found himself in a minority, he signified to the King that he would resign. It is well known that the King was very eager for the continuance of the war. It was reported that the King offered Lord North to dissolve the Parliament; and that Lord North replied, "That measure will do your Majesty no service." I was told by one of Lord North's most intimate friends (but I do not vouch for the truth of it), that, after the King had in vain urged Lord North to remain Minister, his anger got the better of his prudence, and he said to Lord North, "You must then answer it to the country for having gone on so long." When Lord North had signified to the House of Commons that he was no longer Minister, a cessation of hostilities necessarily took place. The King sent Lord Thurlow, the Chancellor, to the Marquis of Rockingham, to request his assistance in forming an Administration. Lord Rockingham replied, "that he was very willing to serve His Majesty, but requested the honour of being admitted to a private audience before any Administra-

tion should be arranged." The King then sent for the Earl of Shelburne, arranged the Administration with him, and then sent the Earl of Shelburne to the Marquis of Rockingham, to inform him of the names of the gentlemen who were to form the Cabinet, and of the different offices which they were to fill.

No man was at that time more confidential with the Marquis of Rockingham than Admiral Keppel, who told me that Lord Rockingham himself was very averse to accept the office offered him; that the Noble Lord thought that the King had manifested such personal dislike to him, by refusing him an audience, and arranging the Administration with Lord Shelburne, that in his own opinion he was not a fit person to be in the King's service. Edmund Burke and Charles Fox were both very solicitous that the Marquis should accept office. I understood that Lord Rockingham was ultimately prevailed on, by the opinion and influence of the Duke of Richmond. That Noble Duke pledged himself for the honourable conduct of the Earl of Shelburne. When Lord Rockingham had signified his

acceptance of the place of First Lord of the Treasury, the King appointed so distant a time for receiving him, that three entire days elapsed before His Majesty saw his new Minister. By this treatment, His Majesty happily expressed the sentiments he entertained for him. The Cabinet was composed of eleven: five Rockinghams, five Shelburnes, the King retaining one, viz. Lord Thurlow.

Every man saw that such a Cabinet was formed for contention, and that it could not long hold together. From the very outset, the Rockinghams abused Lord Shelburne; but I do not see that they had much right to do so. It was owing to their own folly in listening to Mr. Edmund Burke, that a union had not taken place between them and the Shelburnes early in that session. When Lord North fell, the Rockinghams and Shelburnes were distinct parties. After having received Lord Rockingham's answer, through Lord Thurlow, the King sent for the Earl of Shelburne, and desired him to form an Administration. He arranged the Cabinet, and assigned to Lord Rockingham

the post of Prime Minister. This was the justification which Lord Shelburne made of his conduct; adding, "I passed my eldest to Lord Rockingham, which I had no occasion to do, for I might have been Prime Minister myself." But the parties hated each other; they could not conceal this hatred even on the day on which they kissed hands for their several appointments. On that day, they found that Mr. Dunning was to be created a Peer. This had not been previously notified to Lord Rockingham. Mr. Burke was furious: "What," said he, "shall Lord Shelburne make a Peer, and you not name one? Think of somebody, whom you may recommend for a Peerage." They at length fixed on Sir Fletcher Norton, a man who had never done their party any service. And when Lord Rockingham went in to the King, he recommended Sir Fletcher Norton for a Peerage. The King had sufficient penetration to perceive the motive which induced Lord Rockingham to recommend Sir Fletcher Norton; he saw that it was purely to enable him to appear to have equal influence with the Earl of Shelburne. It is reported that the King said to Lord

Rockingham, "Is it your Lordship's particular wish that Sir Fletcher Norton should be made a Peer?" Lord Rockingham declined answering in the affirmative; but said he thought Sir Fletcher Norton *ought* to be a Peer. He accordingly was made a Peer, and voted against the Rockinghams in the ensuing session.

But every day brought forth new proof of the hatred of the parties to each other. The Rockinghams every where abused Lord Shelburne for want of good faith. The reply of the Shelburnes was, that they were no ways pledged to Lord Rockingham. If any man applied to Lord Rockingham for an employment, and failed to obtain it, he had but to signify this the next day to the Earl of Shelburne, who immediately got the place for him. On the other hand, if a man went first to the Earl of Shelburne, his answer was, "You should not apply to me, I am not the Minister. Lord Rockingham is the Minister; he is the man to whom you should apply." I had an acquaintance who succeeded with both of them; it was Humphry Sturt, the Member for Dorset-

shire. He applied to Lord Rockingham for a writership, in Bengal, for a younger son. Lord Rockingham answered, "After the support which you have uniformly given us, Mr. Sturt, you certainly are entitled to ask for such a favour; you shall have it." A few days after, Mr. Sturt met the Earl of Shelburne riding in the Park. "Why, Sturt," said the Earl, "how could you think of applying to the Marquis of Rockingham for a writership for your son? I thought it would suit you, and I kept a Bengal writership for you."—"My Lord, I have another younger son; give me your writership for him." Lord Shelburne could not disengage himself from this voluntary offer, and Humphry Sturt got both the writerships.

After this motley Cabinet had existed about three months, an epidemic disease broke out in London; they gave it the name of the influenza. The Marquis of Rockingham was seized with it. His bodily frame had for many years been weak. From the formation of his Cabinet he had been constantly agitated, partly by the conduct

of Lord Shelburne, more perhaps by the violence and arrogance of Mr. Burke; and was possibly vexed with himself for having suffered others to prevail on him to accept of office against his own better judgment. He sunk under the disease. I will not say that the Marquis of Rockingham had a strong mind, but he loved his country, and all his actions promoted its interests. I never received any personal favours from Lord Rockingham; but approbation of his conduct has uniformly influenced my political life.

Within three hours after the Marquis of Rockingham's death was known, a friend of mine called on Charles Fox. The question which naturally occurred was, "Who is to succeed Lord Rockingham as First Lord of the Treasury?" Mr. Fox replied, "I think it must be the Earl of Shelburne; he is first oars, and I do not see how we can resist his claim." But Mr. Burke had afterwards sufficient influence with Mr. Fox, and the other leaders of the Rockingham party, to prevail on them to resist the appointment of the Earl of Shelburne. He insisted that

the Duke of Portland should be sent for from Ireland, where he was at that time Lord Lieutenant, and appointed First Lord of the Treasury. This proposal was offensive, even to some of the Rockingham party, particularly to the Duke of Richmond; who said, that as the Duke of Portland was provided for in Ireland, he himself had a better right to be considered as the head of the Rockingham party. But this was not acceptable to Mr. Burke; for the Duke of Richmond was not sufficiently under his guidance. At a meeting held soon after at Earl Fitzwilliam's, Mr. Burke used such coarse language respecting the Earl of Shelburne, that intercourse, even in appearance friendly, could no longer exist between the parties. The Earl of Shelburne was made First Lord of the Treasury, and the Rockinghams resigned their employments. The Earl of Shelburne then opened a negotiation for peace, and at the close of that year, or the beginning of the next, the peace was signed. This peace was certainly made against the wishes of the King; who, though he probably had no desire to remove the Earl of Shelburne,

determined to make that Noble Earl feel his displeasure. The household troops were therefore ordered to express in Parliament their disapprobation of the peace.

About this time, a coalition had taken place between Lord North and his friends on one side, and Mr. Fox and his party on the other. This coalition was very beneficial to Lord North; for it protected him from all future examination of his conduct, in having carried on the American war. It was beneficial to Mr. Fox, as it gave him the immediate support of the partizans of Lord North; but it disgusted the country, and excited that odium against Mr. Fox which many years were scarcely sufficient to extinguish. The King had not intended to remove the Earl of Shelburne; but that Noble Lord would not submit to the affront which the King had put on him. He therefore resigned; and the King, contrary to his intentions, was under the necessity of placing the Administration in the hands of the Coalition.

Let me here mention a little anecdote, which I think does honour to Lord North; because it shows that he was sensible to kindness. In the spring 1782, when Lord North resigned, the King's resentment against him was so strong, that he meant to withhold the pension, usually granted to a prime Minister, on his retirement from office. The Chancellor, Lord Thurlow, represented to the King, that Lord North was not opulent; that his father was still living; and that his sons had spent a great deal of money. The King answered, "Lord North is no friend of mine."—"That may be, Sir," replied Lord Thurlow, "but the world thinks otherwise; and your Majesty's character requires, that Lord North should have the usual pension." The pension was granted.

On the Coalition coming into office in 1783, Lord North accepted the employment of Secretary of State for the Home Department. Charles Fox had determined that Lord Thurlow should not retain the great seal, and the King was obliged to submit. Lord North, as Secretary of State

for the Home Department, received orders to write to Lord Thurlow, signifying his dismission from the post of Chancellor. He refused to obey these orders, and assigned this reason, "When I retired from office in 1782, Lord Thurlow was the man who prevented my retreat from being inconvenient to me; shall the first act of my return to office be to give Lord Thurlow pain? I will not do it." Lord North's refusal was sufficiently amusing to the King, who had a right to say, "While I keep Secretaries I am not bound to write my own letters." Lord North persevered; and after a delay of several days, Charles Fox, though it was not in his department, was obliged to write the letter.

The Coalition ultimately proved beneficial to the King himself; for the abuse of that power which the Coalitionists had acquired, produced an oblivion of the miseries which the King had brought on the country by the American war.

The feeble mind of the Duke of Portland, the indolence of Lord North, and

the yielding temper of Charles Fox, accustomed to rely on Mr. Burke on political subjects, all concurred to give to Mr. Burke the direction of public affairs. The peace had been made, but nothing was done for the relief of the people. Almost at the outset of this Administration, in the business of Powell and Bembridge, Mr. Burke had very nearly run the Coalition Ministers aground. Charles Fox saw the necessity of stopping him, and the embarrassment was removed. But India was the great object of Mr. Burke's attention. It was in India that he looked for power to his party, and opulence for himself and his family. Having used this expression, *his family*, I think it necessary to mention an anecdote, which I know only from the relation of others, but which I believe to be true.

Soon after Mr. Edmund Burke became a political character, he, and his cousin William Burke, embarked in a speculation in India stock. They prevailed on many of their friends to join them, among others, on Earl Verney, who fell a victim to this connexion. They used much solicitation

with Sir Joshua Reynolds to join them, but he was dissuaded from it by Anthony Chamier, for which Anthony Chamier, as he told me himself, was never forgiven by the Burkes. This speculation was at first extremely successful, but at last it failed. William Burke, and Lord Verney, were announced as the defaulters; and Edmund Burke's name was concealed. William Burke was sent to India, and a situation at the Court of the Rajah of Tanjore obtained for him. Other advantages in India were also obtained for this gentleman.

When the Coalition came into power, Mr. Burke saw that much strength might be acquired for his party, by the seizure of India patronage. With this view Charles Fox was employed to bring in the India Bill, generally known by the name of Fox's India Bill. But I am firmly persuaded that Mr. Fox had nothing to do with the formation of this Bill. It was prepared by Mr. Edmund Burke, whose only assistant in it was Mr. Pigot, afterwards Sir Arthur Pigot. Mr. Lee, at that time Attorney General, and Sir James Mansfield, at that time So-

licitor General, both assured me, that they never saw the Bill, until it was printed for the use of the House of Commons. They doubted whether Charles Fox himself had seen the Bill, before the essential parts of it had been completely arranged by Mr. Burke. Lord North certainly did not see it until the Bill was completed; and when it was shown him, he said with his usual pleasantry and sagacity, "that he thought it a good receipt to knock up an Administration." But he supported it in the House of Commons.

The great object of this Bill was to vest, for a certain number of years, the patronage of the India Company in fifteen directors, to be nominated by Parliament; in other words, to be nominated by those gentlemen who were at that time the King's Ministers. Had the Bill passed, those who were then Ministers, would have been almost irremovable; for who would have ventured to become the King's Ministers, when those who retired from office, would have carried with them the patronage of India? I know not how it happened, but this circumstance, which was really the great objection to the

Bill, was very little argued in the House of Commons. The language chiefly used was, that it was a confiscation of property, and a violation of the India Company's chartered rights. But the political objections I have alluded to, operated with those who reflected more deeply. The King had the sagacity to see, that the existence of his power depended on the rejection of the Bill. The household troops were brought forward, and the Bill was rejected in the House of Lords. I feel myself bound to acknowledge, that while this Bill was depending in the House of Commons, I did not feel the effects which it would have produced, if passed into an Act. I voted for the Bill. Gratitude to those who had terminated the American war, perhaps an opinion that the King's character required that he should be controlled by a strong Administration, led me to listen to no objections. But I rejoice that the Bill did not pass. Royalty might have been reduced to an insignificance highly injurious to the people.

On the removal of the Coalition, the King appointed Mr. Pitt First Lord of the

Treasury. His acceptance of office was a very bold measure, for he had against him a most formidable opposition in the House of Commons, conducted by leaders, whom he could not expect to find over-scrupulous in the means they would employ. And although the coalition of Mr. Fox with Lord North had much diminished the popularity of the former, yet it was not certain that the people would declare for the King, against the Whig party. There certainly were moments, in which it was doubted, whether it would not be most advisable that Mr. Pitt should resign. In one of these moments, Mr. Grosvenor, member for Chester, called together the leaders of the two parties, at the St. Alban's Tavern. The Duke of Portland had objected, that he could not meet Mr. Pitt, while he continued Minister; because the House of Commons had resolved, that Mr. Pitt had come into office under such circumstances as precluded them from placing confidence in him. To obviate this objection, it was arranged that the King should write a letter to the Duke of Portland, requesting him to meet Mr. Pitt for the purpose of forming an Ad-

ministration; and the Duke consented to consider such a letter as tantamount to a declaration, that Mr. Pitt was no longer Minister. In consequence of this, Mr. Pitt wrote a letter to the Duke of Portland, in which he said, he was ready to meet His Grace to arrange an Administration on fair and equal terms.

The morning on which this letter was to be considered, Mr. Fox could not be brought from St. Anne's Hill. From this circumstance, Mr. Edmund Burke had alone the direction of the Duke of Portland, and he prevailed on the Duke to write an answer to Mr. Pitt, requesting an explanation of the expression; "Fair and equal terms." This occasioned delay; the courage of Mr. Pitt and his friends revived, and they broke off the negotiation. Mr. Pitt afterwards said in the House of Commons, that when he was called on to explain what he meant by the expression, "Fair and equal terms," he took it for granted, that the Duke of Portland and his friends intended that the arrangements should not

be made on fair and equal terms. I mention this anecdote, as another instance how often little circumstances influence important events. Had Mr. Fox been present, his good sense would have pointed out to him the advantage of closing with Mr. Pitt, almost on any terms. He must have been sensible that he could not long continue in the position which he then held. He must have seen that Lord North's partisans were every day deserting him; and that those who remained, were not accustomed to bear the privations of an opposition camp. A coalition with Mr. Pitt and the King's friends, would have jumbled all parties together. It would have relieved Mr. Fox from the odium which he had incurred by his union with Lord North; perhaps it might even in some degree have conciliated the King, who was very uneasy at the continuance of the contest. All these advantages were lost by Mr. Fox not choosing to come to town from St. Anne's Hill.

In the month of March 1784, Mr. Pitt dissolved the Parliament. The elections

were every where favourable to him; and in the new Parliament Mr. Pitt had a decided majority.

I will here close my chronological recollections. Whatever other remarks I may make, they shall be on subjects as they happen to recur to me.

CHAPTER II.

From the Meeting of Parliament in March 1784, to the Commencement of the French Revolution in July 1789.

In 1786, Mr. Pitt established the Sinking Fund. While this measure was coupled with the pacific system, it was extremely beneficial to the country. It raised the funds; it increased the value of land, and of every thing else; in one word, it gave to every man the prosperity of a rising market. But when the pacific system was abandoned, the measure became injurious, because it enabled the Minister to increase the national debt with more rapidity.

Another measure which Mr. Pitt brought forward soon after, was a commercial treaty with France. This measure was also highly beneficial. I have always considered the Methuen Treaty with Portugal as injudicious. At the time when it was made, viz.

1703, there were circumstances which might perhaps have rendered it advisable, but the perseverance in it has been unwise. To form a correct opinion on this subject, it is necessary to look back to the commercial state of Europe in the seventeenth century. At the commencement of that century, Holland possessed the East India trade, the fisheries, and the carrying trade of Europe. France was the principal manufacturing country. England had neither fisheries, nor the carrying trade, nor the East India trade, nor the West India trade, nor any colonies of importance; she had hardly any manufacture for exportation, except that of wool. She had neither the silk manufacture, nor the linen, nor the cotton, nor the hardware. Until after the great rebellion in 1641, England could scarcely be considered as a commercial State. Oliver Cromwell destroyed the freight trade of Holland, by the Navigation Act. The fisheries of Holland were ruined by other circumstances; first, from a considerable part of Europe having become Protestant, and relinquished the observance of fast-days; secondly, from the improvements in agriculture, which fur-

nished men with other animal food than fish during the winter season; thirdly, from the establishment of the cod fishery on the banks of Newfoundland. The cod being a large fish, retains the quality of animal food, though it has been a long while salted; while the small size of the herring renders it in a short time a mere lump of salt. These circumstances have ruined the Dutch fishery. When we read in Sir William Temple's works, that the Dutch employed three thousand vessels in the herring fishery, we hardly credit it; but other authors of that period give the same account.

The French were at that time the principal manufacturers of Europe. In Sir William Temple's account of what passed between himself and the Dutch Ministers, while he was negotiating the Commercial Treaty with Holland in 1668, he tells us, that one of the Dutch Commissioners proposed, that England and Holland should confederate, not to consume the manufactures of France; and then, added the Dutch Commissioner, France will soon die of, a

consumption. But the Grand Pensionary, De Witt, would not listen to the suggestion. Perhaps he had little reliance either on the steadiness or good faith of Charles II. And he recollected the assistance which France had given to Holland, during the early struggles of that republic. It is a little curious that Buonaparte should have thought of the same means for destroying our opulence as had occurred to the Dutch Statesman in 1668. . When we relinquished the consumption of French wines, and took in exchange the wine of Portugal, we exchanged commerce with twenty millions of industrious, opulent, and therefore much consuming people, for commerce with two millions of idle, poor, and consequently but little consuming people. As we have ourselves no growth of wine, we confer a considerable benefit on that nation from which we take our wine; and it must be our object that the wine which we consume should be paid for in our manufactures. I doubt whether Portugal takes manufactures from us to the value of the wine which we take from her. I consider the Brazil trade as distinct from the trade with Portugal.

When the Methuen Treaty was made, it was our object to excite every nation in Europe against the Bourbons. But I doubt the wisdom of persevering in this measure. If we took our wines and brandies from France, she would be under the necessity of taking large quantities of our manufactures in return. But there is another circumstance which deserves consideration: if we took wines and brandies from France, it would be extremely inconvenient to France to be at war with England: a large proportion of her population would be distressed by such a war; for wine and brandy are not only a manufacture in France, the growth of wine affects a great part of her agriculture. The principle of the commercial treaty with France was judicious. I regret that it could not have been extended further; but perhaps the jealousy of the mercantile interest in England rendered such an extension impracticable.

The great political measure of 1787 was the invasion of Holland by a Prussian army, with the concurrence of the British Government. The measure was attended with suc-

cess: the expense to England amounted to no more than 350,000*l.* and it was applauded by the Opposition, which had at that time as its leader a member of the Bentinck family. But I doubt the wisdom of this measure; it was extremely perilous; and if the influence which Austria at that time possessed in the French cabinet had not induced that government to neglect its obvious interests, it must have been followed by a general war, the burden of which would have fallen upon England.

During the latter part of the contest with America, those who were eager for continuing the war had chosen to commence hostilities against Holland: perhaps they had resolved on this from a reliance on their influence over the Stadtholder. In this reliance they were not disappointed; he betrayed his masters, and kept their fleets unemployed. On the re-establishment of peace, the Dutch felt strong resentment against the Stadtholder, and put some affronts upon him; it would have been wise in him to have submitted for a time to those humiliations; the displeasure of the Dutch nation

would have gradually subsided; but this did not suit the proud imperious mind of the Stadtholder's wife. She was sister to the King of Prussia, and had been educated in sentiments ill suited to a republic. Under the direction of Lord Malmsbury, the British minister at the Hague, a Prussian army invaded Holland. It is true they succeeded, but their robberies and plunder have never been forgotten by the Dutch; the remembrance of them destroyed all affection of the Dutch people to the family of the Stadtholder. The invasion of the Prussian army produced another bad consequence: it showed how easily Holland might be overrun; it destroyed her strength by destroying her reputation for strength.

In the autumn 1788, King George III. was, for the first time, afflicted with that malady which became constant during the last ten years of his life. I shall speak on this subject with much reluctance, because I am aware that my opinions are not the same with those of the generality of my countrymen. I love the magistracy of royalty, because I think it highly beneficial to

the people: it protects them from the usurpation of oligarchs, a government, of all others, the most oppressive. Oligarchy is also the government which Englishmen have the most reason to fear, for the proprietors and patrons of boroughs have already usurped a power which the law has forbid them to possess; if they are allowed to extend that power a little further, royalty, a house of lords, and a house of commons, may remain as splendid pageants, but the real efficient power will be in that usurping oligarchy, the patrons and proprietors of boroughs. I love royalty as a magistracy, not as a property. With these sentiments, I acknowledge that I thought that after the King's first seizure he should never have been allowed to exercise the powers of royalty. Let me suppose that a chief justice of the King's Bench were afflicted with the same disease, and for the same period; would any man think that he ought to be replaced in the exercise of his office? Yet surely the judicious exercise of the magistracy of royalty is of more importance to the country than the judicious exercise of the powers of a chief justice. But these

sentiments are no longer fashionable; German principles have now brought us to consider royalty as property.

I think the interregnum which took place during the King's illness was highly injurious to the country. I think the same of Mr. Pitt's proposal to establish regency in the Prince of Wales with curtailed prerogatives. I regret that the minds of Englishmen have been accustomed to the idea; I fear that mischief may hereafter follow from it. But I will have done with reflections which I know will be odious: I will now speak of the matter historically.

Mr. Fox was out of England when the King was taken ill: Lord Thurlow, the Chancellor, availed himself of this circumstance; he studiously sought intercourse with the Prince of Wales, that he might have an opportunity of conveying to him his sentiments on His Royal Highness's situation. He recommended to him to lie upon his oars, to show no impatience to assume the powers of royalty. He pointed out to him, that, if the King's illness were

of any considerable duration, the regency must necessarily devolve on him. I believe Lord Thurlow and Mr. Pitt were not at that time on the best terms: Mr. Pitt's conduct in the prosecution of Mr. Hastings had been disapproved of by Lord Thurlow, and this disapprobation ultimately produced an ill humour which occasioned a separation; but this ill humour had not at that time risen to such a height, as to prevent amicable intercourse between them; and I have very little doubt but that if the Prince of Wales had listened to Lord Thurlow, the measures recommended by Mr. Pitt and the Chancellor would have been the same. But Mr. Fox returned from abroad; the Prince gave himself up to his guidance: the injudicious advice of Lord Loughborough, the incautious language of Charles Fox, and the folly and arrogance of Mr. Burke and others, brought Mr. Pitt to declare, that although the regency should be vested in the Prince of Wales, it should be vested in him with diminished powers.

I know the Chancellor, Lord Thurlow, has been much abused for his conduct on

this occasion; some members of the Opposition have gone so far as to say that he would have acted against the opinion of Mr. Pitt, if the Opposition would have engaged to continue him in the office of Chancellor: but I do not believe this assertion to be true. Trimming was not congenial to the character of Lord Thurlow. If such a negotiation had ever taken place between Lord Thurlow and the Opposition, Mr. Fox must have been privy to it: I never heard it intimated by him, and I think I should have heard it intimated if such a negotiation ever had existed; for, after my return to the House of Commons in 1796, I had, at different times, much confidential intercourse with Charles Fox, and the subject of the regency was frequently mentioned. I believe that Lord Thurlow acted with great integrity: he once told me that if it had been ultimately necessary to pass the Regency Bill framed by Mr. Pitt, he should have acceded to it with great reluctance.

CHAPTER III.

Causes of the French Revolution.

THE French Revolution took place in the month of July 1789. I date its commencement from the day on which the Etats Généraux voted themselves to be the National Assembly, and Louis XVI. accepted royalty under the form of government then voted. The causes which led to the French Revolution were many and various; they have been differently stated, according to the passions and interests of the different parties; but people are now beginning to view them calmly, and, when the passions of those who have been involved in the contest have a little more subsided, we shall be able to see them distinctly.

I have said that the causes which gradually operated to produce the French Revolution were many; I will endeavour to enumerate them as succinctly as I can: I shall distinguish them as principal and as secondary. I consi-

der those causes as principal which must, at some time or other, have necessarily produced a revolution; while I shall call those causes secondary which only accelerated it. Among the principal causes, I shall give the first place to the distinction of noblesse and bourgeoisie. How or when this distinction arose, it is difficult to say: did the Franks bring it with them when they took possession of lands in France? or was it introduced at a later period in French history? It does not seem to have been a necessary consequence of the feudal tenure. Tacitus, in his most valuable treatise, De Moribus Germanorum, has this expression, *Reges ex Nobilitate sumunt.* If the Germans elected their kings from among the nobles, the distinction of noble and ignoble must have existed before the Franks quitted their native soil. But the question carries us back to such remote ages, that I will not pretend to form an opinion on the subject. If this supposition is well founded, it is probable that the nobles among the German tribes were few in number, that they were not numerous originally in France, and that they did not possess those privileges and preferences which ren-

dered the distinction so disgusting at the period immediately preceding the Revolution. The French lawyers do not recognise more than two or three hundred families as being of this ancient nobility, and they distinguish these families by the name of Les Familles Historiques; the rest of the French nobles obtained the distinction at different periods, either by grant or by purchase; but by whatever means they obtained this distinction of noblesse, they were permitted to enjoy the same preferences as had been allowed to the more ancient nobles. At what time the kings of France first assumed the right of granting noblesse, I cannot say. But from granting, they deviated into the practice of selling it; and from thence gradually established, that noblesse should always accompany certain employments which they conferred. It is probable, that at first the sale of noblesse was not very frequent. It became more frequent in the reign of Louis XIV.; and the practice had been so much increased during the reign of Louis XV. that, a few years before the Revolution, it was computed that there were four thousand employments purchasable, every one of

which gave noblesse. These nobles by purchase enjoyed all the privileges of the ancient noblesse; they were exempt from taille, corvées, &c. &c. These exemptions from taxes increased the burdens on those who were not noble: for example, if a hundred thousand francs were to be raised by taille on a district, and half the lands in that district belonged to nobles, the nobles were exempt, but the king was not to lose his revenue; the whole sum, therefore, was to be raised on those proprietors who were not noble. I do not know whether the same rule extended to corvées and the other taxes from which the nobles were exempt.

But there was another circumstance still more offensive to the bourgeoisie. The nobles had always claimed a preference for advancement in the army, the navy, the church, and the parliaments. About the middle of the reign of Louis XV. the Minister of War represented to the King, that the nobles were become so numerous, that if commissions in the army and the navy were not kept exclusively for them, they must starve, as their rank prevented them from

entering into commerce, or from becoming advocates or physicians. On this representation a rule was adopted, that no man should receive a commission in the army, except he could produce proofs of noblesse; and I believe, that although this rule might sometimes be relaxed as to lieutenants, it was always observed in respect to those who were raised to the rank of captains. I have also heard that this rule was not observed in the ten regiments of artillery: in the artillery they began as cadets, and the education was so severe, that the nobles were unwilling to enter into that service. I believe the same rule was soon after adopted respecting admissions into their parliaments: probably the same rule existed as to advancement to elevated stations in the church; for I recollect, that, dining one day at a French nobleman's, in company with an ecclesiastic, whom I saw to be of some consequence; after he had retired, I asked the nobleman if that ecclesiastic were noble: "Certainly," said he, "did I not tell you that he was abbot of such an abbey?" On which I said, "Why, are all abbots noble?" He replied, "I do not know that there is

any law which prevents men who are not noble from becoming abbots; but it never happens that abbeys are conferred on those who are not noble." These circumstances contributed much to render the distinction of noblesse more odious to the rest of the nation; such exclusive preference must at all times have been offensive; but the disgust was increased as the nobles became more numerous, and the bourgeoisie more opulent and intelligent: in fact, this distinction divided the nation into two parts. The bourgeoisie felt themselves a degraded class. Observing men perceived the increase of this disgust. About the time of the commercial treaty between England and France, Mons. de Vergennes, then Minister of France, remarked to a French friend of mine, that France was become too commercial. Mons. de Vergennes probably wished to keep France in the same state in which it had been during the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV.; and saw that the increasing opulence of France, in consequence of its commerce, would render the distinction of noblesse intolerable.

I have no hesitation in assigning to this distinction of noblesse and bourgeoisie the first place among the principal causes of the French Revolution.

I rank feudal burdens as the second principal cause. France, like most of the other European governments, was originally a feudal state.

In feudal governments, the burdens imposed on the military vassals were so heavy, that there was little room for further taxation. My knowledge of feudal governments is chiefly drawn from the English law. In England, I believe, few taxes were imposed on those who held by military service, before the reign of Henry II. That monarch made a great change in the feudal government, by substituting, under the name of escuage, a money payment in lieu of military service. Perhaps this change was at first convenient to the military tenant; but the demand of this escuage was so frequently renewed, that the payment in time became oppressive, and the vassals of the Crown compelled the King to consent, that the

sum to be paid under the name of escuage, should be fixed by Parliament. Sir Edward Coke says, that those who held by knight's service were exempt from tallium, or taille; but those who held by other services seem to have been always liable to money payments, under the name of tallages. It was gradually established, that all money payments demanded from the people should be fixed by Parliament. The clergy were exempt from this rule: they voted their taxes in convocation. Perhaps the claim of the House of Commons, that all taxes should originate with them, arose from this circumstance, that the principal grants of money were tallages, from which the military tenants were exempt. It was therefore reasonable that the Commons should fix what they were able to pay, and the military tenants retain only the right of dissenting.

As Edward I. was the first of our monarchs who preserved our records, all conjectures in respect to taxation, after the Conquest until the reign of Edward I. must be very hazardous. The Parliaments, under our early Norman Kings, consisted, most

probably, only of bishops, mitred abbots, priors, and the great military vassals. In the time of Henry III. a considerable change seems to have been made in the nature of Parliaments. Bodies of the commonalty were authorized by the King's writ to send representatives to that assembly: it is doubtful whether the Earl of Leicester or the King first introduced this practice. The idea that bodies of the commonalty should send representatives to Parliament was probably adopted from the right which had been allowed to the mitred abbots and priors: these men sat in Parliament as representatives of aggregate bodies of ecclesiastics: if the representative of an aggregate body of ecclesiastics might with propriety sit in Parliament, there was no reason why the representative of an aggregate body of the commonalty might not sit there. But whoever first introduced the practice, kings soon saw the advantage they could derive from it; they saw that these representatives of bodies of the commonalty would support them against their powerful vassals, and they selected for the exercise of this right those boroughs which were most dependent

on themselves. It is on this ground that I account for so many members of the House of Commons being sent by Cornish boroughs. During the reign of Henry III. his brother Richard, King of the Romans, was Earl of Cornwall: on the death of Richard, his only son Edmund became Earl of Cornwall, and he dying without issue in the 28th of Edward I. that earldom escheated to the Crown. The earldom of Cornwall has therefore belonged to the Royal Family from the earliest period at which representatives from bodies of the commonalty have been sent to Parliament. My opinion on this subject is confirmed, from observing how many other towns, out of the county, but within the earldom of Cornwall, or, as it is now called, the duchy, have been summoned to send representatives to Parliament. I will enumerate them: Plymouth, Plympton, Dartmouth, Totness, Oakhampton, Berealston, Tavistock, Ashburton; to which may be added Newton Bushel, which formerly sent members; all these boroughs, though out of the county, were within the domains of the Earls of Cornwall.

I know it has been said, that these towns in Cornwall and Devon might formerly have been places of great trade; but whoever is acquainted with the county of Cornwall must see that this supposition is ill founded. Why did the borough of Tregony send members to Parliament as early as the reign of Edward I. while the city of Westminster sent no members till the reign of Edward VI.? The reason is obvious: Tregony was a small town dependent on the Earls of Cornwall; while the city of Westminster, until the Reformation, was under the influence of the great Abbot of Westminster. I think this opinion is strengthened by another fact mentioned in English history. The first occasion on which the representatives of the Commons appear to have been brought forward was in support of the King's power. Henry III. had confiscated the estates of the Bishop of Winchester by Act of Parliament. The Pope wrote a letter to the King and Parliament, signifying that he would excommunicate them if they did not restore to the Bishop his property. The King and the Lords answered this letter with great humility: they said that they were very willing

to comply with His Holiness's wishes, but that the representatives of the Commons refused to concur. If the histories of other European nations are examined, I believe the same cause will have been found every where to have operated to occasion representatives from bodies of the commonalty to be sent to the states of those countries, viz. to support the King against the power of his great vassals.

I have deviated to this short view of the English Government, because I think that, in those distant times, the principles of government in England and in France were very nearly the same. Until the reign of Charles VII. King of France, I believe taxes were always imposed in France by the Etats Généraux. On the accession of that Prince, he found the English and the Burgundians in possession of the greater part of his dominions: it was, therefore, out of his power to assemble the Etats Généraux; yet money was necessary. He imposed taxes by his sole authority; and those who were attached to him submitted to the innovation, because they saw that the situation of the King required them to ac-

quiesce. As it was necessary that these taxes should be made known to the people, he registered them in his principal Court of Justice, the Parliament of Paris: thence the usage in France, that taxes should be imposed by the King's sole authority, and registered in his Parliament. Charles VII. introduced also another innovation: he raised a regular army, which he kept constantly on foot. Before that time, the armies of France, like those of other feudal nations, had been composed of military vassals, or of soldiers furnished by contract; but these were found unequal to the task of expelling the English and Burgundians. From the reign of Charles VII. we must date these two great alterations, viz. taxes imposed by the King's sole authority, and a standing army. Both usages were uniformly persevered in till the time of the Revolution.

I rank the continuance of feudal burdens on lands, and the power usurped by their Kings of imposing taxes by their own sole authority, as the second and third principal causes of the French Revolution. Were I called on to say which of the principal causes

operated the most, I should certainly say, hatred to the privileges and to the distinctions of the Noblesse: I should give the second place to the aversion to feudal burdens. I think the power which the King had usurped of imposing taxes by his sole authority, had not excited so much aversion as those circumstances which I have above enumerated. The power which the King had assumed of imposing taxes by his own sole authority, was much checked by the power which the Parliament claimed of refusing to register those taxes; and if the Parliament of Paris had exercised with integrity the right which they had acquired of registering edicts for taxes, perhaps the disuse of taxation by the Etats Généraux might have been tolerated. But the Parliament exercised this power dishonestly; they employed it for no other purpose than that of protecting the Nobles from the payment of taxes, thereby throwing most intolerable burdens on those who were not of the order of Noblesse. The exemptions might have been tolerable while there were only two hundred families who claimed them; but when by sale, or improvident grants, these families were augmented

to thirty thousand, the distinction could no longer be endured: the abolition of privileges became necessary.

I consider the fourth principal cause to have been the general wish which prevailed to destroy the power and wealth of the Church. Perhaps the Reformation took place at an earlier period in England than in France, in consequence of the opulence of the Clergy having been so much greater in the one country than in the other. There had been some little diminution of Church property in England by the confiscation of the property of the alien priories in the time of Henry V.; but the wealth of the Church remained so great, that when the Reformation took place in the reign of Henry VIII. the people saw the confiscation of Church property with pleasure.

I cannot, in compliance with the opinions of French Royalists, rank the writings of the philosophers as a principal cause; but I will so far acquiesce in their opinions as to admit that these writings may have accelerated the Revolution, and I will therefore

place them among the secondary causes: for what were these writings? In fact, they were only efforts to bring the people to feel, that the finest country in Europe was kept in a degraded state, in consequence of the existence of these abuses. I have said, the finest country in Europe. I will ask any man, who is well acquainted with France, whether, in point of soil, of climate, variety of valuable productions, and the advantage of local situation, there is any country in Europe superior to it? If France, therefore, at the time of the Revolution, was inferior to any other country in Europe, it must have been owing to faults existing in her government. In one word, the unimproved state of France was the consequence of that feudalism which had been suffered to remain after the causes which had given birth to it had ceased to exist.

Perhaps other causes, which led to the Revolution, might be considered as principal; but for the present I will content myself with those which I have enumerated. I will now mention some other secondary causes. I consider the policy of Louis XIV.

in bringing all the French Nobility to attend his Court, as having contributed to the Revolution. The feudal lord is the oppressor of his vassals; but he sometimes confers kindnesses on them. When he was removed from the country to the court, he was known to his vassals only through his agents: oppressions were continued, and kindnesses withdrawn. The heavy taxes, imposed in consequence of the unnecessary wars of Louis XIV. had rendered France more sensible of her grievances, and more disposed to innovation.

Before the French Revolution, half the land in France was either occupied by Maitres - valets or Métayers. If by the first, the land must be considered as in the occupation of the proprietor himself; if occupied by Métayers, they paid their rent in a moiety of the produce. In either case, the residence of the Lord at Versailles must necessarily have diminished the produce. It is admitted, even by zealous ultra-royalists, that the lands in France at this time produce one third more than they did before the Revolution; and that this is the consequence

of the lands being either cultivated by the proprietor himself, or under his immediate inspection.

Among the secondary causes which led to the French Revolution, I place the treaty of alliance between France and Austria, about the beginning of the year 1756. The Duke de Choiseuil was the adviser of this treaty: he was a native of Lorraine, and as such was by birth a subject of the new House of Lorraine-Austria. This treaty was very beneficial to Austria; for it not only secured to her the quiet possession of the Netherlands, but left her at full liberty to pursue all her projects of aggrandizement in Germany. But it was highly injurious to France; for it placed out of reach the only power against which her army could with propriety be employed. The diminution of the army seemed a necessary consequence. Perhaps a still more important consequence followed it: perhaps from that time the army became less the object of attention with the Crown. I am aware that the reverse of this was the immediate consequence; that France sent an army into

Germany to support the views of Austria during the seven years' war; but when that war was terminated, I believe that the consequences which I have above stated actually took place.

If the French Ministers wished to preserve France in the state in which she had existed during the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. the alliance with Austria was an unwise measure. I will pause for a moment to consider the seven years' war.

In this war France and England both acted against their natural interests. The object of Austria was the diminution of the power of Prussia; but it was the interest of France to support the petty Princes of Germany, as the means of preventing the aggrandizement of Austria. On the other hand, it was the interest of England that Austria should extinguish those petty Princes. By possessing the sovereignty of the whole of Germany, Austria would have been more able to keep down the power of France; and England had herself nothing to fear from the power of Austria: but the Elector

of Hanover had an interest directly opposite to that of the King of Great Britain. As Elector of Hanover, it was his interest to check the power of Austria, and to prevent her from making new acquisitions in Germany. France sacrificed her interest to her alliance with Austria; and England sacrificed to the views and wishes of the Elector of Hanover. But this treaty with Austria was afterwards followed by a matrimonial alliance, which was productive of far greater mischiefs to France than those which I have now enumerated.

About 1768 Russia, the ally of Austria, attacked the Turks. Good policy would have induced France to support the Turks, and to prevent Russia from making new acquisitions on that side. But the alliance with Austria restrained France from acting agreeably to her obvious interests. About 1772 Austria, Russia, and Prussia, formed the plan of dismembering Poland. It was the interest of France to prevent it; and she had the means of preventing it. If her armies had entered the Austrian Netherlands, the plan would have been abandoned. In the beginning of the year 1778, Austria

attempted to get possession of the Electorate of Bavaria. Prussia and other German Princes resisted this attempt. The interests of France required her to assist those German Princes; instead of which, she paid no attention to the German contest, but without any provocation commenced an unnecessary war with England. As a principal in the treaty of Utrecht, France may fairly be considered a guarantee that the arrangements of that treaty should be observed. But she suffered the Emperor Joseph to violate the rights secured to Holland by that treaty.

I place the Treaty of Alliance between France and Austria in 1756, as one of those circumstances which accelerated the French Revolution. The part which France took in the war between England and her Colonies, I consider as another cause. That contest necessarily produced, through the whole of Europe, a discussion as to the rights of governors and governed; a discussion which governors ought to wish to avoid. France took part with the governed. Her conduct encouraged their claims; and on

the return of the French army from America, both officers and soldiers were actuated by a knowledge and love of liberty unknown before that time in France. The discussions produced by the American war, and the sentiments with which the French army returned from America, had, I believe, more influence in accelerating the Revolution, than all the publications of French philosophers antecedent to the commencement of the American contest. I use the expression accelerating, because the French Revolution was the result of natural causes. These I call principal; while I consider those which only accelerated as secondary causes. I place the vacillating, unsteady mind of Louis XVI. and the haughty imperious character of Marie Antoinette, among the other secondary causes. When Louis XVI. in July 1789, acknowledged the Etats Généraux to be the National Assembly, and consented to be King according to the Constitution then established, he virtually relinquished those powers which had been exercised by Louis XIV. and Louis XV.; but the restless ambitious mind of Marie Antoinette, educated from early years in the

love of arbitrary power, and abhorrence of the principles of liberty, could never abandon the wish of re-establishing the *ancien regime.* She influenced her husband to endeavour to restore it; and his struggles to effectuate her wishes, were a violation of that faith which he had pledged when he accepted royalty under the new Constitution.

The ultra-royalists all consider the late Duke of Orleans as having contributed in a very high degree to the Revolution. I am not quite certain that this opinion is well founded. He had undoubtedly strong resentments against the Queen, who had done him great personal injuries; but I cannot easily bring myself to believe that he wished to overturn that dynasty of which he was himself a member. It is said that he spent large sums of money in exciting the people to insurrection, but there is no proof of this. He was an avaricious man, and as such not likely to waste his own money. I believe his property consisted chiefly in land, and not in money. It must have been difficult to convert this land into money, or even to

borrow a large sum upon it. There is no proof that any sum of money was ever so raised: if raised to a large amount, it must have been known, and a small sum could have produced no important effects.

I have heard the sensuality and crapulous life of Louis XV. mentioned as having hastened the French Revolution; but I doubt whether this supposition is to any great degree well founded. I travelled through a considerable part of France in 1772, and I could no where discover that the King was odious; on the contrary, it seemed to me as if every Frenchman considered his own personal importance as connected with the glory of Louis XV. The weight of taxes certainly had an effect in bringing forward the Revolution, and these taxes had been in a great degree increased by the wastefulness of the French Court; but when we consider the extent of France, her productiveness in various valuable articles, her local situation in the centre of Europe, the activity and ingenuity of her inhabitants, and all her other various advantages, we must acknowledge that at the death of Louis

XV. ample provision might have been found for the payment of her taxes without destroying the comfort of the people.

The Parliaments, at the death of Louis XV. consisted wholly of Nobles. This was certainly the case in respect of the Parliament of Paris, and I believe was equally so with the other Parliaments of France. At the commencement of the French Revolution, the financial embarrassments of France were certainly greater than they were at the death of Louis XV. But even at that period they might very easily have been removed, if the Parliament of Paris would have acted with integrity. Mons. de Calonne represented to the Parliament, that it was impossible to go on any longer with the practice of imposing taxes in such a manner as that the Nobles should not be affected by them. But the Parliament of Paris refused to diminish in any degree that exemption from taxes which the Nobles had been accustomed to enjoy. They even had the folly as well as the injustice to vote an abstract resolution, that France was by its nature taillable and corvéable; by which

they indecently declared, that the taxes from which the Nobles were exempt should be those by which a large proportion of the public revenue should at all times be raised.

Few people in England have taken the trouble to inform themselves accurately of the construction and character of the Parliament of Paris. I believe that assembly acted with integrity in deciding causes between man and man. I have formed this opinion from this circumstance, that the French Government could not corrupt the Parliament of Paris; and if the Government could not corrupt it, it was not likely that an individual would be able to corrupt it. But though the Parliament of Paris was honest in deciding causes between man and man, it was very dishonest whenever the exemptions and privileges of the Noblesse came in question. Its members were all of the order of Noblesse. For the most part they purchased their situations; but they purchased gradually, beginning with the lower situations; as officers of the Guards do in England. I believe it was as imprac-

ticable for a man to begin by buying a high station in the French Parliament, as it would be for an Englishman not in the army to begin by purchasing a company in the Guards. They made but a very moderate interest for the money they employed in purchasing their situations: I have been told very rarely more than six per cent. Yet they devoted themselves to acquire that knowledge which was necessary to enable them to discharge their functions. They were paid for their trouble by the rank, power, and consideration which their situations gave them. I know that the Noblesse de l'Epée affected to look down on the Noblesse de la Robe; but the latter always preserved that consequence which is the natural result of education and superior knowledge. When M. de Calonne found that he could not prevail on the Parliament of Paris to consent to a more equitable distribution of the public burdens, he assembled the Notables; but this assembly also was entirely composed of Nobles, and M. de Calonne had no better success with this assembly than he had had with the Parliament of

Paris: he was then under the necessity of assembling the Etats Généraux.

I place the conduct of the Parliament of Paris among the causes which most materially operated to accelerate the Revolution. I rank among the same causes the imbecility of M. Necker, both as a financier and as a statesman. Perhaps I am influenced in my opinion of M. Necker as a financier, from a little circumstance which happened in the House of Commons. In one of the debates which took place during the American war, Mr. Burke insulted Lord North by remarking the difference of talents between M. Necker and himself: "M. Necker carries on the war without imposing the usual war-taxes; while the Noble Lord is every year coming to this House for new burdens on the people of England." I remember Lord North's answer: "Yes, Sir, it is very true M. Necker does carry on the war without imposing those taxes which are usually imposed in France during war; and the time will come when France will bitterly regret what M. Necker is now doing. He is creating an unfunded debt, which must ulti-

mately ruin the public credit of France." It turned out as Lord North foretold. The Parliament of Paris would not assist M. de Calonne to provide for this unfunded debt; he was forced to assemble the Etats Généraux; and Revolution was the consequence. I know the friends of M. Necker have said, that if he had continued Minister till the conclusion of the war, he would have funded this debt, and provided for the payment of the interest. It is possible that he might have been able to have done this; but he did not remain Minister, and the mischievous consequence took place. M. Necker would, I believe, have been a very able *premier Commis* for a great speculating bank; but this is a situation widely different from that of the financier of a great nation. In this latter character, Lord North was infinitely his superior.

I have said that M. Necker was also deficient as a statesman. I think I am right. The idea that his popularity would enable him to stand as mediator between the National Assembly on one side and the Bourbons and the Noblesse on the other, was a

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notion which could never have entered into the head of any but the vainest and the weakest of men. The National Assembly was carried forward by the torrent of popular opinion. If a Minister had been able to corrupt the majority of that assembly, yet he could not have stopped the torrent. The Bourbons and the Noblesse must ultimately have given way.

From the joy which the people of Paris expressed on the destruction of the Bastile, it might be supposed that *lettres de cachét* were extremely odious: but I doubt the correctness of this opinion. *Lettres de cachét* chiefly affected the Noblesse and Bourgeois of the higher orders.

It is possible that many causes besides those which I have enumerated contributed to the Revolution; but I believe that the odious distinction of Noblesse and Bourgeoisie, and the privileges of the former, the oppressive feudal burdens, and the hatred and contempt in which the Clergy were justly held by the great body of the people, were the circumstances which most contributed to it.

When the National Assembly had once held out to the people the hope of relief, the wavering irresolute conduct of the King, the known imperious character of the Queen, and the persuasion that the Courtiers and the Noblesse would never relinquish the intrigues by which they hoped to disappoint the reform of abuses, kept the people in constant agitation. The apprehension that they should again be subjected to those abuses, drove a large portion of the nation mad; for, during the reign of terror, the people seemed to be divided into two classes, viz. men actuated by madness, and men subdued by fear.

The high price of corn in 1789 certainly kept the people in a state of great agitation. In the existing state of the country it had considerable effect; and I must consider this among the accelerating causes of the Revolution.

I have said, that the privileges of the Noblesse and feudal services were among the principal causes of the French Revolution: I believe that I am right in this opi-

nion, although I do not pretend to know how the distinction of Noblesse and Bourgeoisie first became established. It is manifest that France has been conquered at different periods by successive swarms from the great northern hive. The original language of the conquered nation remains in every part of France, under the name of *Patois.* In different parts of the country this *Patois* is, I believe, a different language; but a language distinct from the French is found every where. In the south and the west of France, as far north as the Loire, this *Patois* seems to consist of corrupt dialects of the *Provençal.* The *Provençal* was the language into which the Latin first passed when it became corrupted; it was the language in which that race of poets called Troubadours, celebrated the achievements of the heroes of the Crusades; and from this language have been formed Italian, Catalan, the language of other provinces of Spain, the Patois of a large portion of France, and a great part of what is called the French language.

Where the conquered people are extirpated, or exterminated, the original language is lost with them; but where the conquered people remain, much of the original language remains: in our island, the Saxons extirpated, or exterminated, the Britons; few or no British words therefore are found in our language. The Normans did not extirpate the Saxons; the present English language is therefore a mixture of the Saxon and Norman. I recapitulate these circumstances in support of my assertion, that France has at different periods been overrun by northern invaders. Conquest naturally brings forward the distinction of Noblesse, for the conquerors are Nobles. In general, the conquerors gradually blend with the conquered; they become one race, and the distinction is lost.

There is another circumstance which may possibly have contributed to keep up the distinction of Noblesse in France, and other states of Europe. After the fall of the Roman Empire, for many ages the strength of armies consisted in heavy-armed cavalry. But armour, and a horse capable of bearing

a man heavily armed, could be purchased only by the opulent. This contributed to increase the distinction between the rich and the poor, the noble and the commonalty.

After all these reflections, I am apt to think that the great number of the French Noblesse was occasioned by an abusive sale of the distinction. But however the distinction arose, it had the effect of dividing the people into two classes. All who were not noble felt themselves degraded; and as they became rich and intelligent, the degradation became insupportable. I have mentioned feudal services as another principal cause of the French Revolution. I do not pretend to have an accurate knowledge of the feudal services in France. They were various in different provinces; for France is but an assemblage of different nations conquered by northern invaders at different times, and united at different periods; but every where feudal services seem to me to have been extremely heavy, and even degrading. *Corvées*, that is to say, labour in kind, seem to have been payable to the Lord in a great part of France. In many districts of France the

feudal Lord claimed a right to a great part of the succession to personal property. It has been thought by many antiquarians, that the same right formerly existed in England; and that the heriot, which was in most places the best live beast of the tenant, and in some a still heavier payment, viz. that of the best personal chattel, is a remnant of this old feudal service, the feudal Lord having gradually consented to accept this acknowledgment of his right instead of the larger portion of the moveables which he was entitled to demand. This payment of a portion of the moveables to the feudal Lord, on the death of a tenant, seems to have been prevalent in parts of France, down to the period of the Revolution.

I shall hereafter mention circumstances which have contributed gradually to extinguish feudal services in England: I cannot find that any such circumstances ever existed in France. Immediately before the Revolution, it was computed that half the land in France was occupied by *Métayers*. A great part of France is still occupied in the same manner. That I am correct in my

opinion, that the distinction of Noblesse, and aversion to feudal services, were the two principal causes of the French Revolution, is sufficiently proved by the votes which were passed in the celebrated sitting of August 1789. Whoever reads the resolutions of that sitting, will see that every vote had a tendency to the removal of these two grievances. It is possible that some of the votes of that night were not sufficiently considered; but the Assembly was driven forward by the general wish of the nation.

I dwell more upon the subject of the French Revolution, because every effort has been employed to mislead the people of England as to the causes of that Revolution. The publications of the French emigrants, of Mr. Burke, and the great Whig families, and of the agents of Government, were all sent forth with this view; and they succeeded in deluding the country. After a struggle of twenty-seven years we find ourselves loaded with taxes which we bear with extreme difficulty, while the French have obtained the great objects which excited them to the Revolution; viz. the abolition

of the privileges of Noblesse, of feudal services, of the power and wealth of the Church; and have secured all their rights by the establishment of national representation. It is possible that efforts may yet be made to re-establish the *ancien regime;* but it is impossible that those efforts should succeed. They may perhaps establish a military despotism, but they cannot re-establish the government that existed before the Revolution. How can they re-establish their Parliaments? The privileged Noblesse, of which those Parliaments were composed, exist no more. They cannot restore to the Church the wealth of which it has been deprived; and if they cannot restore its wealth, they cannot re-establish its power. The Nobles drew much of their wealth from their exemptions from taxes, and from the receipt of feudal payments, or, as the French call them, *les droits seigneureaux.* These exemptions from taxes, and the feudal payments, have been abolished more than thirty years: can any man believe that the French nation will submit to see them again established? The French have now a national assembly, representative of the people,

guardian of their rights; they have also an army very solicitous for the defence of those rights. Let me suppose it possible that the Bourbons should be able to succeed in changing the law of election, and the law for recruiting the army; still the great difficulty of re-establishing the *ancien regime* would remain. A military despotism might arise, but a Bourbon would not be at the head of that despotism, for there is not a military character among them. All attempts made to destroy the present order of things in France, would probably terminate in the expulsion of the Bourbons, and the destruction of the Nobles.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Consequences likely to follow from the French Revolution.

I SHALL consider this question as it regards France itself, and as it regards other nations. I am of opinion that a representative government is permanently established in France. It is probable that the Nobles, who, comprehending every age and both sexes, are computed to amount to 150,000, will endeavour to re-establish their ancient privileges; they will be assisted in this by the clergy and the fanatics. The Bourbon family is suspected of wishing them success; but the united efforts of nobles and priests will fail. The French nation retains too strong an abhorrence of the *ancien regime*, and too correct a sense of the advantages obtained by the Revolution, ever to suffer itself to be deprived of those advantages. The Kings of Europe confederated to prevent the French nation from establishing a

representative government, but their efforts have failed.

I have already remarked, that in consequence of the French Revolution, their lands, in tillage, now yield a produce of one third more than before the Revolution. Is this owing to the abolition of tithes, or to the abolition of feudal burdens? or must we attribute it to the more equal imposition of taxes, and the security from oppression which the subject now enjoys? or is it owing to the division of great masses of landed property, formerly possessed by ecclesiastics? or to the division of the landed property of the Nobles, in consequence of the late confiscations and the present law of succession? or shall we say that it is owing to the Nobles being obliged to reside on their estates, and to superintend their cultivation, in consequence of their being no longer supported by the bounty of a Court? In what degree these, or other causes unknown to me, have occasioned the improvement in the produce of their land, I cannot pretend to say; but I believe the assertion to be true,

that the land in France now yields one third more than it did before the Revolution.

I have said, that France has established a representative government. In every district, the man who pays 300 francs, or 12*l.* 10*s.* a year, in direct taxes, is entitled to vote. It is calculated, that the man who pays this sum annually in direct taxes, will most commonly have property to the value of from 1500 to 1800 pounds sterling: this is a sufficient property to create an interest in the elector, that taxes should be moderate; he will therefore give his vote with this impression on his mind; and the sentiments of the elected will most probably be in unison with those of the electors: thus the deputies will really be the representatives of their constituents; they will guard the people's money; and it is the money of the people which every Government is endeavouring to obtain. Every measure which Government brings forward in every country, has more or less a reference to this end. The Nobles will no longer be supported by the profusion of a Court; they will no longer be exclusively entitled to advancement in the army or the

church; and their Parliaments are abolished. Whatever large estates may yet remain to individual Nobles, they will gradually be divided by the existing law of succession: no means of acquiring affluence will remain to the Nobles, except agriculture and commerce. I know that French Nobles have hitherto been accustomed to think themselves disgraced by engaging in commerce, or by the practice of the professions of law and physic; but these prejudices must be got over. The Nobles will soon feel themselves on a level with their fellow-subjects, and agriculture and commerce will be their chief pursuits: thus France will become an agricultural and commercial nation. It is supposed that there is a wish in the Bourbon family to reserve commissions in the army for the Nobles, but they will not be able to effectuate this wish. While the army is recruited by conscription, there will be necessarily found men of education among the conscripts; and such men will not submit to be considered in a degraded character: they will demand advancement according to their merits.

The French Ministers are at this time endeavouring to obtain a change in the law of election, and also a change in that law by which the army is recruited. By a change in the law of election, they propose to diminish the commercial influence in elections. By a change in the law of recruiting, they wish to prevent a large proportion of officers being taken from the ranks. They will probably fail in both these attempts. A very large proportion of those who are now officers have risen from the ranks: even the Generals and Marshals who are now seen at the French Court, are well aware that they would soon be treated with contempt if the ancient Nobles were advanced to high military rank. It has even been said, that the disgust of the late Marshal Ney originated in insults offered to his wife by emigrant Nobles, when she presented herself at Court. If the measure were persevered in, the Bourbons might fall victims to the attempt.

I have said that a representative government is established in France. I do not mean by this, that corrections may not be

necessary. Perhaps the number of the deputies ought to be doubled, or at least considerably augmented. The Chamber of Peers seems to me to be a very unnatural and a very useless part of their government. It was probably introduced with a view to imitate the English Constitution; but the French Chamber of Peers is wholly unlike the English House of Lords. The French Chamber, in the course of its ordinary proceedings, exercises, I believe, no judicial functions (I am aware that the trial of Louvel has been assigned to it); while the judicial power exercised by the English House of Lords is the last resort in all cases both of law and equity, and on all questions both civil and criminal. This jurisdiction has existed in England from the most distant times; and perhaps no tribunal in any country was ever less suspected of abusing its power. Its decisions are not only acquiesced in with respect, but with a confidence that they are wise as well as just.

I have said, that the Parliament of Paris, though honest in the decision of causes between man and man, was dishonest where

the interest of the privileged order of Noblesse was in question. The English House of Lords has never been even suspected of this; and however remarkable it may seem, yet it is true, that in almost every case in which the House of Lords has differed in opinion from the Courts in Westminster Hall, after-ages have generally said that the House of Lords was right, and that the Courts at Westminster were wrong.

There is another circumstance in which the French Chamber of Peers will with difficulty be made to resemble the English House of Lords. In the English House of Lords the hereditary Peers are men of the largest landed estates: in the French Chamber, if peerage is to be hereditary and the existing law of succession is to be persevered in, the Peers will for the most part be poor. I do not quite know the nature of the majorats which have been instituted. If it is meant that certain portions of land should be inalienably annexed to each peerage, and the portions are considerable, inconvenience will arise from the inalienability of the land; and if the portion annexed to each peerage

is inconsiderable, the institution will be of no effect.

The French Chamber of Peers is a bad imitation of the English House of Lords. If they thought it advisable that every question should be discussed in two assemblies, they would perhaps have done better to have followed the model of the United States of America. A senate and a house of representatives would perhaps have answered all the ends they could have had in view. If ever the Bourbons should entertain sentiments in unison with those of the nation, the power which is now given to the executive government of France, of paying the ministers of religion, will create an influence which perhaps has never yet been fully estimated; and it will be an influence extremely beneficial to the nation. By withholding payment, the Government will at all times be able to control every ecclesiastic. We hesitate to grant emancipation to the Irish Catholics; and the strongest argument urged against this emancipation is, the danger arising from the influence of their priests: but this danger would be nothing if every Ca-

tholic priest were paid by the executive government. The English government has been in the practice of annually distributing a very moderate sum among the Presbyterian ministers; I believe it never exceeded 20,000*l.* in any one year: yet the influence of this sum has been found highly beneficial to the Government. Since the return of the Bourbons to France, their executive government has not derived much benefit from this power: the reason is manifest; the Bourbons have not wished to avail themselves of it. They have not been in unison with the wishes of the nation on this subject. On the contrary, their object has been to re-establish the wealth and the power of the Church. The Catholic church, wherever it is established conformably to its policy, is in truth imperium in imperio. The celibacy of the clergy was established with this view. It was introduced into England by Archbishop Lanfranc about the year 1100: I believe it had not been insisted on much before, even among the continental clergy. The Saxon clergy made great resistance to it; but it was of much importance to the establishment of ecclesiastical power, and

Lanfranc, by birth an Italian, compelled the English clergy to submit to it. Celibacy deprived the clergy of domestic affections, and reduced them to have but one object of solicitude, viz. the extension of the power of the Church. In all Catholic countries the celibacy of the clergy is insisted on with great strictness; I believe it is more difficult to obtain from Rome a dispensation for a clergyman to marry, than it is to obtain a dispensation for an uncle to marry his niece, though the latter is prohibited by the Levitical law. But the influence which the executive government of France will possess by thus holding the purse from which the ministers of religion are to be paid, has not yet been felt; indeed, it has scarcely been noticed.

When the Bourbons returned in 1814, they were accompanied by emigrants who had too much influence over them. Had Louis XVIII. acted wisely, he would have claimed the crown under the title created by the acceptance of Louis XVI. in 1789. Claiming as his heir under that title, he would have removed all suspicion of his hav-

ing a wish to re-establish the *ancien regime;* and he ought to have seen that such re-establishment was impossible. I do not believe that Buonaparte was invited to return in 1815 by any political party; but he certainly had received intelligence that the conduct which the emigrants had influenced the Bourbons to hold, had induced every part of the nation to receive him back with pleasure: the people believed that the odious distinction of a privileged noblesse would be re-established: the Protestants thought that they should be persecuted for their religious opinions: the possessors of national property believed that this property would be taken from them: the proprietors and cultivators of land were apprehensive that tithes and feudal burdens would be re-established. I do not believe that the emissaries of Buonaparte instigated the people to these opinions; they arose from the conduct of the emigrants, who every where gave out that the *ancien regime* should be re-established. While Louis XVIII. rested the constitution on his charter, the people saw that their liberties were revocable: had he claimed the crown as the heir of Louis XVI. and under

the title accepted by him in 1789, the people would have been uninfluenced by these suspicions, and the return of Buonaparte could never have been attended with success.

I have said that France will become agricultural and commercial: I am aware that this may be prevented by the people being prevailed on to become again a military nation. Although the Bourbons now in existence are not of a military character, yet they will probably wish to give the nation this turn. Kings naturally wish for standing armies, and the Nobles will entertain the hope of being advanced in military rank. The great number of officers formed in the late war will render it more easy to give the nation this propensity; and should a war break out on the continent of Europe, the Bourbons may find the adoption of this policy easy. But the pacific system can alone confirm the free government of France: it will render the French people happy, and contribute to the happiness of the other nations of Europe.

I have been thus insensibly led to the consideration of the effects which the

French Revolution will probably have on the other states of Europe: but before I proceed to this consideration, I wish to explain what I mean by the expression which I have used, that representative government is permanently fixed in France. I believe this assertion to be true, but it is the only part of their government which is permanently fixed. The Chamber of Peers must either be moulded into a character very different from that which it now exhibits, or it will be extinguished. The Bourbons ever since their return have been suspected of wishing to destroy that government of which they are the supreme executive magistrates. I will not inquire whether this suspicion is well or ill founded; but Cæsar's wife must be free even from suspicion; the King must convince the nation that he has no desire to possess those powers which were exercised by Louis XIV. and Louis XV.; that his wishes are in unison with those of his people; and from that moment he starts up the most powerful monarch in the world.

I do not believe that there is in France at this hour much personal attachment either

to a Bourbon or to Buonaparte. The attachment seems to me to be to the nation: if there is any exception to this sentiment, it is in the military: they remember with pride the victories which the French armies obtained in the progress of the Revolution; and those who have served under Buonaparte attribute their victories to his superior military skill. I believe, however, that I say no more than the truth when I assert, that the attachment of the great body of the people is to the interests of the nation: and they consider those interests as depending on the permanent establishment of representative government. Should I be right in this opinion, France and the United States of America will both be representative governments. The members of the Holy Alliance may cabal and intrigue, but they will tremble. In case of a war, what resistance can the despots of Germany oppose to France? Their own subjects will be their most formidable enemies, for they will wish to possess the same advantages as are possessed by the people of France. The same sentiments will prevail in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Great Britain may perhaps escape the general

wreck of European monarchies; its government is still, to a considerable degree, representative. Wherever an individual, as proprietor or patron, has been permitted to usurp the nomination to a seat in Parliament, to that extent the House of Commons can no longer be considered as the representative of the people. But the abuse has not yet extended so far but that it may be easily corrected. It is much to be lamented that some men have been so injudicious as to recommend universal suffrage. This would be no remedy; it would be no reform of abuses; it would be revolution. But men who think, see the necessity of correcting abuses; and revolution will be prevented by the adoption of reform.

What changes in other nations will be the consequence of the French Revolution? We hesitate to give an answer to this question: but there are certain peculiar circumstances which deserve our consideration. Most of the revolutions which we read of in history have been the consequence of conquest by invaders. Where they have not been effected by conquerors, but have

been produced by the efforts of the people, they have in general been confined to the expulsion of the reigning dynasty. The insurrection of the Dutch against Philip II. was confined to the expulsion of that tyrant; the government was left nearly the same as it had existed before. Even in the late American war, the Americans did little more than deprive the King and his family of the sovereignty. Each colony was left under its antecedent government, the whole being united by a federative union. But by the French Revolution the entire government has been swept away. Will the example be followed in Spain or in the Spanish colonies? Will it be followed in Germany? Intelligence is gone forth. The rights and duties of governors and governed have been every where discussed. Will the Holy Alliance be able to defeat the people's efforts? England may, I hope, escape the influence of this Revolution; a very little reform will bring back her House of Commons to be really the representative of the people. The chief opponents to this reform are those great families which have usurped the nomination to seats in Parliament from those

bodies of the commonalty to which the Crown had originally granted it. An event has lately happened which has rendered it more necessary for the people of England to turn its immediate attention to this reform; I mean the death of His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent. The late Duke of Kent, from his sound health and habits of life, was considered as a man likely to live to old age. In him the nation hoped to avoid the mischiefs arising from a long minority. But from the present state of the dynasty, on the death of the King and his two brothers, a minority must probably take place. Who will have the government during that minority? The answer is obvious: those who nominate the members of the House of Commons: and as more than one half of those members are nominated by proprietors and patrons, the people at large may find it difficult to protect the rights of an infant sovereign. I may be told, perhaps, the three Princes to whom I have alluded may live to old age. I sincerely wish they may: but men will fear impending dangers, and it is the duty of Parliament to guard the country

CHAPTER V.

Effects produced by the French Revolution in England.—Mr. Pitt's Conduct till his Death in 1806.

I WILL now consider the effects which the French Revolution produced in England.

The French Revolution certainly created much sensation in the people of England. They were naturally led to think of the reform of abuses in their own government; but I do not think that this sentiment was by any means universal: they were in a state of prosperity, and those who are in a state of prosperity are not desirous of a change of government. Mr. Pitt was at that time Minister with uncommon power, for the Opposition was sunk to nothing; and he seemed to possess the confidence of the King. One would be led to think from his conduct, that he never felt how much the transactions in France required his vigilant attention. In 1790 he had an unnecessary

dispute with Spain about a smuggling transaction at Nootka Sound. In 1791, he seemed to wish for a dispute with Russia about the fortress of Oczakow, though it is impossible to believe that he could have entertained at that time the idea of a serious quarrel with Russia. In 1791 the treaty of Pilnitz was negotiated: in this treaty, the invasion of France was decided on. I believe Mr. Pitt took no part in this treaty; but the King, as Elector of Hanover, approved of it. Mr. Pitt acted with great wisdom in determining to take no share in hostile operations against France. A little reflection ought to have pointed out to every Statesman, that if France were attacked by hostile armies, she would be under the necessity of becoming herself an armed nation.

It is much to be regretted that in 1792 Mr. Pitt refused the application of the French government to prevent by his influence the intended hostilities: I will give Mr. Pitt credit for his wish to avoid entering into a war on account of the French Revolution; but he seemed to me never to have

viewed the French Revolution with the eye of a Statesman. He never appeared to feel the effect which the agitations in France must have on the other States of Europe. He seemed wholly ignorant of the causes of that Revolution. Mr. Pitt was a great Parliamentary debater; perhaps he deserves the title of a good financier in times of tranquillity; and from the period when he became Minister in 1783, the prosperity of England had revived, but he was wholly unacquainted with the internal state of other nations. In one word, he was a good pilot in calm weather, but not equal to conduct the vessel of the State in a stormy season. But although I cannot consider Mr. Pitt as a great Statesman, yet I think that his conduct of public affairs for the first nine years of his Administration, viz. from the end of December 1783, to the end of the year 1792, was highly beneficial to his country. I think he made several mistakes; those mistakes arose from his not being sufficiently acquainted with the interests and views of foreign nations. He became a Minister at too early a period of his life, for he was made Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1782, when he

was little more than twenty-three years of age; and he was made First Lord of the Treasury, and Prime Minister, on the 20th of December 1783, when he was only of the age of twenty-four and a half. Before Mr. Pitt had attained the age of twenty-five, he was as powerful a debater in Parliament as he ever was in the whole course of his life. We have many instances of men who have become able public speakers at an early period; but I believe that there is no instance of any man who became a great Statesman at the same early period. Mr. Fox obtained the summit of that eloquence which he ever attained to, at as early an age as Mr. Pitt: Charles Townshend, and Lord Bolingbroke, were also instances of the practicability of attaining Parliamentary eloquence in early life. Perhaps there is no art in which men are so rapidly improved by practice as in the knack of Parliamentary debate. Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox had both of them great advantages; for at his outset each was supported by a powerful party. This circumstance relieved them from apprehensions, and confidence is a necessary ingredient in a Parliamentary speaker. But though a man

may become a Parliamentary speaker in early life, he cannot become a consummate Statesman at a time of life equally early. He must have read much; he must have conversed and reflected deeply, before he can be qualified to direct the affairs of a great nation. Mr. Pitt had never travelled. I believe he was imperfectly acquainted with the French language. Before I finish these reflections, I shall probably show, in some striking instances, how ignorant he was of the situation of France. But for the present I will only view him in the first nine years of his Administration, and here I am ready to give him the full tribute of applause.

In November 1783, he came forward to defend the King against the efforts of a confederacy; he was successful; had he failed, the power of the Crown would most probably have been placed under the control of that confederacy, which was denominated the Coalition. An oligarchy would have been established; and, of all the forms of government, oligarchy is most oppressive to the people. Had Mr. Fox's Bill been

carried, the patronage of India would have been placed in the hands of the Coalition; and while they possessed that patronage, it would have been very difficult for the King to have removed them from the Administration. It would have been difficult to prevail on men to accept of office, while they knew that they were to contend with an opposition possessing this patronage. We know from English history the dangerous consequences which have followed from an irremovable Parliament; perhaps equal mischiefs might have followed from an irremovable Administration. I give Mr. Pitt full credit for his wise and able conduct on this occasion.

In 1785 he brought forward his Irish Propositions. They seemed to me to be drawn with too much minute detail. I never could form an opinion as to what the result would have been if they had been adopted. At the close of the discussion, Mr. Pitt allowed such clauses to be introduced as insured the rejection of his Propositions by the Irish Parliament: it was generally believed that he adopted this conduct in com-

pliance with the apprehensions of great cotton manufacturers in Lancashire and Scotland.

In the following session he established the Sinking Fund; a measure highly beneficial while accompanied with the pacific system. About the same time he negotiated the commercial treaty with France. In reflecting on this treaty, I can only regret that it was not negotiated with more boldness, and extended to more objects. But Mr. Pitt was most probably controlled by the fears of commercial men. On the King's illness in 1788, I think Mr. Pitt acted judiciously in resisting the language of Lord Loughborough and Mr. Fox. But I cannot say that I saw with pleasure his attempt to limit the powers of royalty while exercised by the Prince Regent. The King's recovery made this Bill unnecessary; but the opinions then thrown out have, perhaps, been subsequently injurious.

I have thus enumerated the principal acts of Mr. Pitt during these nine years, that I might declare most explicitly my

approbation of his conduct. During these nine years, I think Mr. Pitt's Administration, considered together, and as a whole, eminently beneficial to his country. It would have been fortunate for the glory of Mr. Pitt if he had been removed from office at the close of the year 1792. It would have been equally fortunate for his country; for during the remaining eight years of his Administration, every measure which he brought forward, displayed his incapacity as a Statesman. There is full proof, that down to the close of the year 1792, Mr. Pitt had no intention to abandon his pacific system. In the summer of 1792, towards the close of the session, he said in the House of Commons, "England never had a fairer prospect of a long continuance of peace than she has at the present moment. I think we may confidently reckon on peace for ten years." But my opinion of his perseverance in the pacific system does not rest on his expressions in Parliament. Before the close of the session in 1792, the three per cents had risen almost to par. Mr. Pitt saw that this gave him an opportunity of reducing 32,000,000 of four per cent.

stock to three per cent. He negotiated with the holders of the four per cents: they demanded a larger bonus than he chose to give, and he closed his treaty with them, by saying, "Then we will put off the reduction of this stock to next year." Can any man believe that Mr. Pitt would have used this language if he had at that time intended to take part in the war? for the war was at that time actually begun by Austria, Prussia, and other German Princes.

In the close of the year 1792, Mr. Burke prevailed on the great Whig families to declare for war with France: it was well known that this declaration would be highly acceptable to the King. Perhaps every King in Europe had been alarmed by the French Revolution. Most certainly all German Princes had felt this alarm in a very high degree; and a jealous apprehension of encroachment on his power, had always been a marked feature in the King's character. The great Whig families were received by the King with joy. Mr. Burke was rewarded with two pensions, estimated to be worth £40,000; whether he received any further gratification

from M. de Calonne, I cannot say. The language by which Mr. Burke prevailed on the great Whig families to declare for war was, I apprehend, the following: He stated to them, that the French Revolution was an insurrection of the many against the few; of the people against the constituted authorities, of the commonalty against the nobility: that if the principles on which the French Revolution was founded were not crushed, they would spread through Europe: that if noblesse were not re-established in France, nobility would be abolished in England: that every motive of self-preservation required them to come forward and exert themselves to stop this Revolution: that the sentiment of enthusiasm which at that time seemed to actuate the whole French nation, would probably soon subside if restrained within the limits of France; but that, if not restrained, it would spread over other nations: that the agitations in France might be considered as a hurricane; that if they could outlive that hurricane, they would be in a state of safety.

I believe these arguments were used very openly by Mr. Burke. I believe there were

other arguments which were used more secretly to the leaders of the Whig party. He reminded these Noblemen, that their political importance depended on the power which they possessed in nominating members of the House of Commons; that this power was by many considered as a usurpation: that the attempt of the British House of Commons to extend the right of taxation over our Colonies in America, had led people to examine the manner in which members of the House of Commons obtained seats in that House: that in consequence of this examination, it was found that there were many members who possessed their seats by the nomination of proprietors and patrons of boroughs; and that it was in consequence of this circumstance, and of the facility with which a Minister could purchase the support of these members from the respective patrons and proprietors, that the American war had been so obstinately persevered in, against the interest of the country: that this opinion had led to a wish for a reform in the House of Commons: that this sentiment had not only prevailed with great numbers of the people, but that it had been publicly promoted and

recommended by individuals of the first consequence. He desired them to reflect, whether, if French principles were allowed to prevail in England, reform of Parliament must not be the necessary consequence? and whether the extinguishment of the power of their party would not be the immediate result of such a reform?

The leaders of the Whig party were at that time the Duke of Portland, Earl Fitzwilliam, and Earl Spencer. I believe that the Duke of Portland was tired of having been so long in opposition; and that he was desirous of reaping those advantages which he could obtain by promoting the King's wishes. I believe that Earl Fitzwilliam and Earl Spencer were wholly free from any desire to obtain office or emoluments; but both of them had been educated from early life in that leading principle of the Whig party, that they were to acquire power by a confederacy of great families. I date the origin of that party which is now denominated the party of the great Whig families, from the fall of Sir Robert Walpole. Sir Robert Walpole had governed the country by uniting the in-

fluence of Government to the Whig party. I will not stop to inquire whether Sir Robert Walpole was a great minister; but his pacific system was certainly beneficial to England, and secured the Brunswick family on the throne. On his fall, Sir Robert had dexterously contrived to destroy the power of his rival, Mr. Pulteney. The Earldom of Bath, conferred on that gentleman, extinguished his importance. The Administration then fell into the hands of men who had been the supporters of Sir Robert Walpole. They were at first called the Pelham Party. On the retirement of the Duke of Newcastle, and the advancement of the Marquis of Rockingham to office, they were called the Rockingham Party. On the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, and the Coalition which took place at the end of the year 1782, they went by the name of the Coalitionists. They are now distinguished by the name of the Party of the great Whig Families. Their principle was to possess influence by confederacy. On the first formation of this party, this principle was not openly avowed; but on Mr. Burke's being placed in the service of the Marquis of Rockingham, that gentleman

saw the great advantage which he should derive to himself from propagating that principle of confederacy. The doctrine which he inculcated was, that there are certain great families whose ancestors placed the Brunswicks on the throne; that from this circumstance the descendants of those families have a right to be the Ministers, and to dictate the measures of Government. No language could be more acceptable to men of high rank, large fortunes, and moderate talents. I do not use this expression, moderate talents, from any sentiment of disrespect; but the education of men of high rank and great wealth necessarily occasions them to stand in need of the assistance of those whose inferior rank and moderate fortunes have subjected them to a different education. Mr. Burke felt the influence which this language gave him over the Rockingham party; but his influence over that party was not so transcendent while the Marquis of Rockingham lived, as it was after his death. The Marquis of Rockingham numbered among his friends Sir George Savile and the Duke of Richmond; these two gentlemen checked in a considerable degree the assuming authority of Mr. Burke: perhaps there might

be others who concurred with them. Most certainly Mr. Burke had not the influence over the Marquis of Rockingham which he afterwards possessed over the Duke of Portland.

Let me pause to consider for a moment whether the arguments thus used by Mr. Burke to the great Whig families were such as they ought to have attended to. The circumstance which had most contributed to the French Revolution was the distinction between Noblesse and Bourgeoisie. Thirty thousand noble families were supposed to comprehend one hundred and fifty thousand individuals; these claimed exemption from the most burdensome taxes, and exclusive advancement in the army, in the navy, in the church, and in the parliaments. Could a commonalty, now become opulent and intelligent, submit to this humiliating distinction? I appeal to every man who has dispassionately examined the French Revolution, whether this odious distinction of Noblesse and Bourgeoisie must not be set down as the first and principal cause of that great event? In England no such distinction exists; our hereditary Nobles are few, not exceeding in num-

ber two hundred and fifty: they possess no exemption from the payment of any tax; nor are they entitled to exclusive advancement in the army, the navy, the church, or the law: their children are of the order of the commonalty. In truth, British Peers are magistrates, hereditary legislators, hereditary judges, and hereditary advisers of the Crown: they have as little resemblance to French Noblesse as they have to the order of Mandarins in China.

Unfortunately the leaders of the great families could not be brought to see the fallacy of Mr. Burke's argument; they were misled by the similitude of names; and they declared themselves advocates for embarking the country in war. Mr. Pitt acceded to the proposal: he was ignorant not only of the causes of the French Revolution, but of the strength of France: he was so little acquainted with the resources of that country, and with the energies of which she was capable when her whole force was put in motion, that he had persuaded himself that France could not carry on the war for six months: he held this language to M. Bigot de St. Croix, who had been Minister for Foreign Affairs in

France, on the 10th of August 1792. M. de St. Croix had emigrated to England between the 10th of August and the end of that year. When the resolution to declare war against France was about to be taken, Mr. Pitt discoursed on the subject with this gentleman: he pointed out to M. de St. Croix, that it would be impossible for France to continue the war for more than six months, as she had no finances. M. de St. Croix replied to him, "Sir, if you knew the resources of France as well as I know them, you would know that she is capable of carrying on war for a great length of time." When Mr. Pitt pressed him on the circumstance of her finances, M. de St. Croix answered, "Sir, France is more powerful because she has not what you call finances; those who are in possession of the government will put all property in requisition." I had the account of this conversation from M. de St. Croix himself; and he added, that from that hour Mr. Pitt's door was always shut against him. Mr. Pitt expressed the same sentiments to another political friend of mine, and I have no doubt that he used this language to many others. But the matter does not rest on private conversation. Mr.

Pitt employed Sir Francis D'Yvernois to publish a pamphlet, showing, that the state of the French finances would disable France from going on with the war for six months; and so infatuated was Mr. Pitt with this opinion, that he suffered Sir Francis D'Yvernois annually to repeat the same opinion for several years.

There is another circumstance, which so strongly marks Mr. Pitt's want of sagacity as a Statesman, that I cannot help taking notice of it. Influenced by the opinion of Mr. Burke, the great Whig families had declared for war; but the opinion of Mr. Burke was clear and explicit: it was, that war should be undertaken for the purpose of re-establishing the *ancien regime* in France. I use this expression, *ancien regime*, because it was employed by the French royalists as a term of art, viz. that every thing should be replaced exactly as it had existed before the assembly of the Etats Généraux: to undertake a war for this object might be injudicious; but the proposal was intelligible and definite: Mr. Pitt acceded to it; but engrafted his own plan on Mr. Burke's, viz.

"Indemnity for the past and security for the future." This language could not be misunderstood; every one saw that the meaning of it was, that France should be dismembered; that she should be deprived of certain provinces, and by that means be rendered less formidable to the rest of Europe. Mr. Pitt did not perceive that Mr. Burke's plan and his own could not both be effected by the same measures. Mr. Burke wished to re-establish France in all her former strength; and Mr. Pitt wished to re-establish the Bourbons in France, mutilated and dismembered. The very first event of the war showed the two plans to be irreconcileable.

In 1793, Valenciennes was taken. The arms of France were removed, and the Austrian eagle erected in their stead. Within forty-eight hours there was written under this eagle, "*Ton aigle sera un dindon.*" A friend of mine remonstrated with the late Duke of Brunswick, that he might, that same campaign, have taken Landau; his answer was, "Ought I, as the King of Prussia's general, to have employed his army to take Landau for Austria?" In the close of the same year we took possession of Toulon

and the French fleet: we received this possession by a treaty, in which it was stipulated, that every thing should be preserved for the use of the French King. Mr. Burke's plan required that this treaty should have been faithfully observed; but Mr. Pitt's wish, that the power of France should be weakened, prevailed, and the terms of the treaty were violated.

After these events, the designs of Mr. Pitt were manifest to every one; and all who wished that France might remain entire withdrew their assistance. The King of Prussia would naturally say, "It is with difficulty that I support myself at present against Austria; what must become of me if the Austrian power is augmented?" He continued to receive subsidies from England; but he never after gave any assistance in carrying on the war. The King of Spain, as a Bourbon, had no wish to see France dismembered. The French royalists could never wish to see Mr. Pitt's designs attended with success. In a word, the views with which he carried on the war reduced England to one single ally, viz. Austria; and, to enable

that power to carry on her military operations, England supplied subsidies to an amount never before recorded in history. The plans of Mr. Burke and Mr. Pitt were avowedly so different, that the military operations were carried on by distinct Ministers. The expedition to the coast of France, in 1795, with a view to give assistance to the insurgents in La Vendée, was under the direction of Mr. Windham, the Minister of Mr. Burke's friends. It was as badly planned and as badly executed as any expedition ever undertaken by a War Minister.

Let any man dispassionately review Mr. Pitt's conduct on these points, viz. his want of knowledge of the causes of the French Revolution; his ignorance of the resources of France; and his engaging in a war for two objects inconsistent with each other; and let him then say, whether he thinks Mr. Pitt was a great Statesman. I ought to mention that Mr. Fox refused to concur in opinion with Mr. Burke on this subject: his good sense led him to see the folly of engaging in a war for the purpose of compelling the French nation to submit to a form of govern-

ment which they abhorred; and he had the integrity to resist every allurement, both of emolument and power. He remained the decided opponent of the measures which were then adopted. I believe that Mr. Pitt soon regretted his having engaged in the undertaking; but he was committed, he could not go back. I think his friends must acknowledge that he showed no great talents as a War Minister. Prussia and Spain soon abandoned him. He relied on the armies of Austria; and to give activity to those armies, he supplied Austria with British money, with a boundless profusion. I can discover no superior wisdom in the manner in which he raised this money. The sale of the land-tax, the income-tax, and that most calamitous measure the stoppage of the Bank, were rather the measures of a daring projector than of a prudent financier. The sale of the land-tax was a plan adopted in imitation of the French government; for it was the putting property in requisition. The income-tax was a violation of faith; for those who had redeemed their land-tax had a right to presume that a similar tax, under another name, was not to be immediately laid on their land:

it was also a violation of the faith pledged to the public creditors. The paper-money, consequent on the stoppage of the Bank, has produced calamities of which we do not yet see the end. Mr. Pitt floundered on, adopting various but unsuccessful projects, until the commencement of the year 1801. He then resigned. Various reasons were mentioned for this resignation: the friends of Mr. Pitt gave out, that he had resigned because the King would not consent to that emancipation of the Catholics, which he had recommended; but I do not believe that this was the real cause of the quarrel between the King and Mr. Pitt: the same cause was assigned when the King dismissed the Ministers distinguished by the name of the Talents, in 1807; and it is now well known, that the emancipation of the Catholics was not at that time the real ground for their dismission. I have reason to believe, that the displeasure which the King, in 1801, had conceived against Mr. Pitt, arose from other causes. The Austrian armies had been so repeatedly defeated by the French, that they were completely disheartened; their discouragement was so great, that they could no longer be brought to face French sol-

diers in the field. Mr. Pitt probably stated this circumstance to the King, and pointed out to him, that if the war against France was to be carried on by continental armies, the King of Prussia was the only sovereign who could supply the means; and he proposed to the King, that, to induce the King of Prussia to afford this assistance, His Majesty should cede to him some part of his German dominions. The King was indignant at the proposal; it not only induced him to dismiss Mr. Pitt, but it occasioned a return of that unfortunate malady with which His Majesty had been visited in 1788.

I do not pretend to say that I have any certain knowledge of the facts above stated; but I have some reason to believe, that the quarrel between the King and Mr. Pitt had a reference to the King's German dominions. There is one circumstance which tends to confirm the above suspicion, and which is known to the whole world. About the time that this quarrel broke out between the King and Mr. Pitt, a body of Prussian troops entered the Duchy of Lunenburgh. They were not in such a number as to give

reason to believe that they came there to conquer; the inference therefore is, that they came there to take possession under a treaty. On the dismission of Mr. Pitt, these Prussian troops were removed.

During the eight years that the war had been thus carried on under the auspices of Mr. Pitt, it seemed as if the instigators of the war had considered that royalty and nobility would be extinguished if the ancient Government of France were not re-established. They carried on the war with a violence bordering on despair. Every principle of the law of nations was disregarded: every prudential consideration was thought of little importance. In Lord Grenville's celebrated letter to the British Minister at Genoa he used this expression: "In a war like this no nation is to remain neutral." There were two violations of the law of nations productive of so much mischief to the interests of Great Britain, that I cannot refrain from examining them more fully. The first was the claim that British ships of war might stop neutral ships on the high seas, and take out and impress for the King's

service any British sailors whom they found on board. As the Americans were at that time the only neutrals who could be said to carry on trade, the question peculiarly affected them. I will not discuss at large the great principle of *mare liberum et mare clausum;* but I take it, that by the general principles of the law of nations every sea is *mare liberum,* and to be considered as *inter communia.* Every nation has a right to send its ships on this open sea. The ship is to be considered as part of that country to which it belongs; and when it hoists its colours, it shows by what nation it is protected. This is the common law of nations; and as there is no general assembly of civilized States capable of making statutes to bind the whole, there can be no change in this common law, except by treaties between certain particular nations, which may afterwards have been adopted by other nations.

I shall take no notice of any treaties which may heretofore have been made between the maritime states of Italy or the Hans towns. The first treaty of which I shall take notice is a treaty made between

Sweden and England in 1654. Sweden was at that time the sole manufacturer of arms in Europe. Oliver Cromwell, who then governed England, would not permit the Swedes to supply his enemies, the Dutch, with military stores; and he had sufficient influence with the Swedish government to prevail on them to stipulate that neutral ships should not carry military stores to any nation with which he was at war. I will not enter into the various regulations introduced into that treaty, to protect the owner of a ship so visited from injury or insult; but this treaty gave birth to what was called *contrebande de guerre.* It was afterwards adopted in a treaty concluded between England and Holland in 1668, and was, I believe, subsequently acceded to by all the civilized nations of Europe. The English Ministers set up the following claim: they said, We have a right to stop and enter a neutral ship to search for *contrebande de guerre;* when we are on board that ship, if we find British sailors, we have a right to impress them. If we may reason on the law of nations according to the maxims of the common law of England, this claim

was ill-founded. By the law of England, a landlord may enter on the premises leased to his tenant to distrain for rent; but the law says, that this right of entry is a qualified power, granted for one single purpose; and if the landlord who distrains avails himself of his entry for any other purpose, he is considered as having used this power of entering to distrain solely as a pretence for entering to enable him to commit another act: he is therefore considered as a wrong-doer, or, according to the language of the common law of England, as *a trespasser ab initio*. If I may be allowed to apply this principle of the law of England to the claim of the British Government to impress British sailors found on board a neutral ship, I cannot hesitate to say that the claim was ill-founded. Let me examine it in another point of view. The commander of the English ship of war who stopped the American ship, and took out sailors, saying, that they were British subjects, and as such he had a right to impress them, was both the claimant and the judge. From similarity of language and appearance, he would of necessity be frequently mistaken; but

the sailors would be carried away, and relief most commonly precluded. Would Englishmen ever have submitted to the claim of such a right against themselves? And if Englishmen would not themselves have submitted to the exercise of such a right, ought they to have claimed it against others?

There was another measure of Mr. Pitt's repugnant to the law of nations, and, in the opinion of many very intelligent men, productive of great injury to this country. At the commencement of the French war in 1793, France was much distressed for food, both at home and in her colonies. The English Government thought it advisable to endeavour to increase this distress, and with this view they stopped all neutral ships carrying provisions to France or to her West India colonies. This measure was certainly a violation of the law of nations; for a neutral has a general right of trade with either of two belligerents. To prevent the complaints of the neutral, the British Government paid the invoice price of the goods with an increase of ten per cent. But they were soon obliged to relinquish this measure

of seizing these provision ships; for the foreign merchant adopted the practice of charging in the invoice so high a price for his goods, that, with the addition of ten per cent. allowed him for his supposed profits, he found the seizure by the British Government the best market at which his goods could be disposed of. The provisions thus detained and paid for by our Government were, through the negligence of persons employed to sell, sometimes not disposed of until they were much diminished in value. At the time that this measure was first adopted by the British Government, I recollect that a mercantile friend of mine, eminently intelligent, remarked to me, that Mr. Pitt would be fortunate if this disturbance of the provision trade of Europe and the West Indies did not ultimately prove injurious to ourselves. I will not pretend to say how far the measure contributed to that famine with which we were a short time after afflicted.

I will take notice only of one great measure more of Mr. Pitt's Administration; I mean the stoppage of the Bank, and the con-

sequent establishment of paper money, in February 1797. The adoption of this measure afforded relief from that embarrassment which the indiscretion of Government had occasioned. By multiplying the circulating medium, he raised the price of every thing. Every man felt the prosperity of a rising market. Taxes could be increased without being burdensome; for, when the circulating medium was doubled, though the sum demanded by the tax-gatherer remained nominally the same, yet the pressure was to the extent only of one half. All felt prosperity except those who lived on such fixed incomes as could not be increased. But every man of reflection foresaw the difficulty there would be to get rid of this paper money; that, while persevered in, the measure of the value of all property would be unsettled; and that this must in the end produce general confusion. Our Ministers are now endeavouring to free us from paper money; in so doing they act wisely and honestly, but great immediate distress is the consequence of the measure which they are compelled to adopt; and, even if they should succeed in returning to a metallic circulation, they will leave

the nation oppressed by that unnatural taxation which was the progeny of a fictitious paper money.

Mr. Pitt returned to office in 1804. He injudiciously prevailed on the Austrian Government to renew the war, for their troops were too much dispirited by repeated defeats to be fit immediately to meet the victorious armies of France. This was in vain urged to the British Minister; he persisted; the Austrians failed in their efforts; and Mr. Pitt died, most probably the victim of affliction.

I decline saying any thing further of his administration. As I frequently expressed my disapprobation of his measures while I was in Parliament, I may perhaps be supposed to think of him with ill will; but I am not conscious that such an opinion would be well founded. Except on two occasions I never had any private intercourse with Mr. Pitt. On both those occasions his offers were expressive of kindness; and in the House of Commons he more than once protected me when others wished to injure me.

I believe he began his political career with sentiments of strict integrity; but, as he himself once said, "Constituted as the House of Commons then was, no Minister could act honestly;" and the personal character of his Master increased the difficulty. I have already expressed my opinion of his conduct in 1784, when he protected the King and the people from the meditated designs of oligarchy; and although the nation suffered in some instances from his being unacquainted with the state of other countries, yet that his administration, from December 1783, when he accepted office, to the close of the year 1792, when he consented to begin a war with France, was on the whole beneficial.

A question is often asked, which was the abler speaker in the House of Commons, Mr. Pitt or Mr. Fox? Their situations were so different, that it is very difficult to answer this question. Mr. Pitt was supported by a well-disciplined majority, and his eloquence was calculated to make his measures plausible. He was a very correct grammarian; but there was one talent in

which he surpassed every speaker I ever heard. I mean the talent of building a speech, and of introducing the arguments of his adversaries exactly in that place in which it best suited him to answer them. Mr. Fox never built a speech; he relied on his ability to seize weak parts of his adversaries argument, and beat them to pieces. He did this with extraordinary skill and success.

The style of a public speaker must necessarily depend on the audience which he addresses, on the ends which he wishes to obtain; perhaps, in some degree, on his own personal situation. Considered in this point of view, Lord North was certainly a very good speaker. His pleasantry and good temper were well suited to turn aside the impetuous attacks of his adversaries. To form a true opinion of Mr. Burke's merit as a speaker, he also must be viewed in the same manner. His importance depended on his standing high in the opinion of that party which had placed him in the House: for this reason, he always introduced such passages as captivated admi-

ration; and though his speeches were often injudicious, and rarely had the effect of bringing others to think and to act with him, except they were previously so disposed by being of the same party, yet he never made a speech in which there were not those brilliant passages which the Roman authors call *Purpurei Panni*. When he brought forward the Impeachment against Mr. Hastings, he laid on the table of the House of Commons twenty-two Charges. I was under the necessity of examining those Charges with attention. I think they were a master-piece in that style of composition which Mr. Burke thought himself authorized to use. They were a happy mixture of assertion, of evidence, of inference, and of invective, so dexterously blended, that it was extremely difficult to unravel them; but admirably suited to influence the opinions of those who read negligently.

Demosthenes is considered as the ablest speaker of antiquity. He addressed his speeches to an audience highly intelligent, and actuated by an opinion that the peo-

ple of Athens, were entitled to hold the first place among the Greek Republics. The same arguments, addressed to a British House of Commons, would have appeared ridiculous and contemptible.

Mr. Pitt died early in the year 1806. An Administration was immediately formed, composed of the three parties; the Grenvilles, the great Whig families, Lord Sidmouth and his friends; Mr. Fox was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The immediate friends of Mr. Pitt, viz. Mr. Percival, Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Canning, Lord Eldon, and others, took their stations in Opposition. An indiscreet friend of the new Administration incautiously said, that they comprised all the talents of the country. From this accident, they got the nick-name of "The Talents." I decline to review the measures of this Administration; for I cannot say that I see many to be applauded, and I see several which I must condemn. There is, however, one measure which I must take notice of, because it has already produced much injury to my country. Its injurious

consequences are still existing, and perhaps may never be removed. The measure I allude to, was the declaration of War against the King of Prussia. This Monarch had taken possession of Hanover. His Majesty, King George III. felt the strongest indignation at this circumstance; and to gratify his Majesty's resentment, Mr. Fox consented to declare War against the King of Prussia. In adopting this conduct, Mr. Fox forgot his duties as Minister of the King of Great Britain; for it was not for the interest of Great Britain, to weaken the force of Prussia, nor had she any just ground for War against that Monarch. Buonaparte had destroyed the power of Austria, and compelled Russia to retire from the contest. Having subdued Austria, and the Southern part of Germany, it was not probable that he would leave Prussia Sovereign of the Northern part; and the King of Prussia had given Buonaparte ample grounds for complaint. It was not only visible that it was the interest of Buonaparte to attack Prussia, but his intentions to do it could scarcely be said to

be concealed; for the report of such intention was prevalent through every part of France. While the Continent was in this situation, could it be for the interest of Great Britain to diminish the strength of Prussia?

But after the War against Prussia had been declared, Mr. Fox adopted another measure which has produced most injurious consequences to Great Britain. I allude to his putting the four great rivers of the King of Prussia's dominions, the Trave, the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, in a state of blockade. Mr. Fox announced this blockade in a letter to Mr. Monroe, the American Minister in London, in April 1806. In this letter Mr. Fox signified to the American Minister, that his Majesty having thought proper to put the four above mentioned rivers in a state of blockade, American ships would not be allowed to enter them. In the course of the ensuing summer, Lord Howick, now Earl Grey, who had succeeded Mr. Fox in the management of foreign affairs, extended the blockade along the Northern Coast of

France; and subsequently it was extended along the Western Coast, and the Mediterranean. I shall consider this measure in three points of view: First, how far it was consistent with the law of nations; Secondly, how far it was consistent with our immediate interests; Thirdly, I shall take notice of the injurious consequences which have since followed from it. As to the first point, it appears to me to have been a direct violation of the law of nations. That law allows to every Neutral the right of trading with either of two Belligerents. This right may be restrained by treaty. The first Treaty that seems to have restrained this right, is the Treaty of Commerce between England and Holland in 1668; which Treaty was subsequently adopted by France and the other principal European nations, in the Treaties of Niméguen, Ryswick, and Utrecht. All Treaties are negotiated in French. The expression in this Treaty is, that the Neutral shall not trade *avec une place assiegée, bloquée ou investie.* I believe the word *place* is never used in the French language to signify a country. It is gene-

rally employed to denote town or fortress! But if I am mistaken in this opinion, I think I cannot be mistaken in my next observation, viz. that *assiegée* and *investie*, the first and third of the participles applied to the *substantive place*, are only applicable to a town or fortress; and the intermediate participle *bloquée*, must be considered as analogous to the other two. I apprehend that the meaning of the Article thus introduced into the Treaty of 1668, was this: viz. That the Neutral should abstain from trading with a town, which either of two Belligerents was endeavouring to capture:—and it was reasonable that the Neutral should be thus restrained; for, by continuing to trade with such a town, he might prolong the Siege. I know it may be said, that by this construction, there can be no blockade of a Sea-port, except it is blockaded by land as well as by sea. My answer is, that if blockade by land, as well as by sea, is necessary to the Capture, the town which is not blockaded by land, as well as by sea, is not a town within the Article of the Treaty of 1668.

Buonaparte followed the example which we had set him. By his Berlin Decree, he put restraints on the Commerce of one Nation with another. This produced new restraints from the British Government. These were followed by Buonaparte's Decrees from Milan; and thus both Nations concurred in restraining Commercial intercourse. Was this for the interest of Great Britain? This was the second point which I wished to consider.

I can easily perceive that this restriction of the Commerce of the World, assisted the views of Buonaparte. His strength did not arise from Commerce, but from the Armies which he could maintain; and he maintained those Armies by the pillage of the Continent. By cramping Commerce, he diminished the resources of Great Britain. But what interest could Great Britain have, in thus restraining Commerce? She deprived herself of the immediate advantage of sending out her manufactures by Neutral ships. The prejudice she subsequently suffered by this measure, was still greater;

for it produced a War with the United States of America. The Americans said, "France and England concur in acts of injustice against us: we cannot make war with both: whichever of the two Nations first relinquishes its acts of injustice, we will make War upon the other, if it does not adopt a similar conduct within four months." Buonaparte immediately revoked his Decrees, as far as they regarded the Americans. We refused to revoke our Orders of Council; and War was the consequence. The Earl of Liverpool had the good sense to terminate this war.

But mark the consequences which have followed from this unfortunate restraint on the Commerce of Nations. Germany, accustomed to be supplied with our manufactures, was obliged to set up manufactures within itself; and on the return of Peace, has been obliged, in a great degree, to reject the use of our manufactures, because the sale of them interfered with the prosperity of her own.

Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh,

who succeeded Earl Grey in the Foreign Office, both approved and persevered in this doctrine of blockade; and it has been contended that Buonaparte first began the restrictions; but this has been denied by the Dutch Commissioners. Mr. Fox's letter was in April, 1806. Can any instrument of an earlier date be produced, issued by Buonaparte? Before the commencement of these restrictions, Great Britain possessed, almost exclusively, the manufacture of cotton. The distress in Lancashire and Glasgow, too evidently shows how much we have suffered by the establishment of the Cotton Manufacture in other parts of Europe.

I am aware how much I shall offend the friends of Mr. Fox by making these remarks on this measure of blockade; but truth requires it. I cannot censure his conduct without feeling regret; for he had qualities which conciliated both affection and esteem. Perhaps few men have ever owed more to nature, and less to education; for, from early life, he had never been accustomed to habits of re-

straint. He owed to nature great parts, and an affectionate heart; *Aliis se dedere eorum obsequii studiis*, was prevalent with him, even to a weakness; but having never accustomed himself to habits of restraint, he loved the deep stake, and the rash game. This ruined his fortune in private life, and was equally injurious to him in his political career. He was three times the efficient Minister of this Country. During the first period that he was in this situation, viz. in 1782, he brought forward no great public measure; although, as the House of Commons had declared its wish to put an end to the American War, a termination of that Contest was the measure which he obviously ought to have brought forward, yet he does not appear to have taken any step with that view. He was probably rendered inactive by the dissensions in the Cabinet, by the contentions between the political parties, and the dis-union among his own friends. In this year, he remained Minister only three months.

After the death of Lord Rockingham, he came to an open breach with the Earl

of Shelburne and the Duke of Richmond; and resigned his situation in the Cabinet, in compliance with the wishes of Mr. Burke.

His coalition with Lord North, at the end of the year 1782, was a rash and ill-advised measure. I have heard Mr. Fox use this argument in his justification:—"Our Party is formed on the principle of Confederacy; ought we not, then, to confederate with him who can give us the greatest strength? And who can give us greater strength than Lord North?" But Mr. Fox did not take into his calculation the importance of character. The Nation could not bear an Alliance between the Minister who had so injuriously carried on the War, and the man by whose exertions that Minister had been compelled to relinquish the Contest.

In 1783, he was Minister for nine months; during which time, he was wholly under the guidance of Mr. Burke. The India Bill was the great measure of his administration during this period. In

1786, he yielded to the wishes of Mr. Burke, and prevailed on the Opposition to support that gentleman in the Impeachment of Mr. Hastings. His acquiescence in the wishes of Mr. Burke on this occasion, can be attributed only to the influence which Mr. Burke had over him, and to his indulgence to those with whom he acted: for he must have had the good sense to have seen the advantage which this measure gave to his rival, Mr. Pitt. Mr. Burke's importance depended on his not being disgraced by this Impeachment; Mr. Pitt could at any time inflict that disgrace on him; and as Mr. Burke's influence over Mr. Fox guided the Opposition, that Party was, from the moment that Mr. Pitt acquiesced in the Impeachment, under the controul of Mr. Pitt.

This Impeachment necessarily led to connexion between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke; and as the good sense and upright heart of Mr. Fox could not be prevailed on to approve of a War with

France, Mr. Burke openly separated himself from him.

He died in September, 1806. He had received from Nature great parts. He had not acquired much political knowledge. By patient reading and reflection, that political knowledge which he possessed, was principally derived from the business of the House of Commons. Perhaps it may be said of him, as of his progenitor, Charles the Second, "that Indolence was his Sultana-Queen."—In contemplating his character, we can scarcely avoid recollecting that expression which the Roman historian applies to the Emperor Galba! —"*Capax imperii nisi imperasset.*"

CHAPTER VI.

On the Causes which contributed to the Extinguishment of Feudal Burthens in England.

I HAVE stated Feudal Burthens, or as they are called by the French, *Les Droits Seigneureaux*, as one of the principal causes which led the people of France to wish for a Revolution. A question will naturally occur, how happens it that no such aversion has existed in England? The answer is obvious. Because no oppressive Feudal Burthens exist in England. The payments by copy-holders on alienation, or descent, are perhaps politically inconvenient, because they may prevent the improvement of land; but this tenure affects at present so very small a part of our land, that in some places it is scarcely known, while the Feudal payments in France, were spread through the whole country.

As France and England were both originally Feudal Governments, how has it happened, that these Feudal payments have remained so universally in France, while they have been nearly abolished in England? It is difficult to answer this question; but I will mention two circumstances which seem to me to have contributed to their abolition in England. The first was the statute of *Quia Emptores*, the 18th of Edward I. This statute prevented sub-infeudation. Before this statute, a tenant by knight's-service could alien his land, to be held of himself by knight's-service. But after this statute, the alienee was to hold of that lord of whom the alienor had held.

The other circumstance was the usage which gradually prevailed in England of feoffment to uses.

Fraud, fear, and convenience, the great springs of human action, introduced this practice.

The man who was conscious that he held

his land by a bad title, enfeoffed a friend of his land to the use of himself, that when the rightful owner of the land brought an action against him, he might plead *non tenet*, that he was not the owner of the land; and by this plea defeat the demandant's action.

But fear was a more universal motive. This conveyance to a friend, to protect lands from forfeiture for Treason, must have operated far more frequently; perhaps the practice became almost universal during the long period of dispute between the two Houses of York and Lancaster. No man could be certain of the success of that party which he joined. He therefore enfeoffed a friend to uses, that in case of his being unfortunate, his family might be protected from forfeiture.

There was a third motive to induce men to adopt this practice of feoffment to uses. By the common law, a freehold interest in land could not be devised by will; but if a man had, in his life-time, limited his land to uses, this use could be devised by his will.

From these motives, almost all the lands in England had become vested in *Feoffees to Uses*; and as by this practice, the Lords had lost the Feudal profits they were entitled to from their lands, either those Feudal payments were forgotten, or were released, or fell into disuse.

Henry VIII. by the statute which he procured to be passed towards the close of his reign, preserved these Feudal payments to the Crown, by re-uniting the *seisin*, or legal estate, to the *use*. On the restoration of Charles II. the King consented to abolish Feudal services, and to receive a compensation in lieu of them. But in the statute, which provides this compensation to the Crown, no compensation is provided for any subject of whom lands were held by knight's-service. The inference is, that at the Restoration, there were no lands in England held by knight's-service of a subject. Yet most certainly, in all Feudal Governments, tenure of the alienor, and attendant services, were consequent on every alienation, except there was either an express or implied provision to the con-

trary. This rule was so fully established by the common law of England, that before the statute of *Quia Emptores*, if B. had held lands of A. by knight's-service, and had aliened those lands to C. and his heirs, without expressing the services by which C. should hold, the law said that C. should hold the lands of B. by knight's-service, and the same payments as B. paid to A.

Perhaps the great proportion of the lands in England, which had been conveyed in mortmain, contributed to the abolition of Feudal services; for when land was conveyed in mortmain, the Feudal services were suspended; or, to speak more accurately, no Feudal services were receivable. And when that land, by confiscation of Convent property, in the time of Henry VIII. had passed into the hands of a layman, from whom the Feudal service might have been demanded, either the Feudal services were forgotten, or the demand neglected to be made. But from whatever circumstance it happened, I believe, that at the restoration of Charles II. there were no lands in England held of a subject by

knight's-service. In France, down to the time of the Revolution, Feudal services of different natures, and to different extents, seem to have prevailed through the whole country.

CHAPTER VII.

Reform of Parliament.

I WILL now consider that most important question, the Reform of Parliament. A decision on this question must, ere long, take place. The general attention of the nation has been called to it. The people must be subdued, or the subject must be fully examined, and some Reform consented to. Let me first state the sense in which I use the words *Reform* and *Revolution.*

I consider Reform to be a correction of abuses without destroying the existing Constitution. I consider Revolution to be a correction of abuses, accompanied with the destruction of the existing Constitution.

In England, in 1688, the nation removed the existing dynasty, and established a new one. As the dynasty is considered as the most prominent part of the Constitu-

tion, this change has been denominated a Revolution. Perhaps, according to my definition, it might more properly have been called a Reform; for the two other existing parts of the Constitution, viz. the House of Lords and the House of Commons, were left unaltered.

In 1789, that Government which had existed in France during the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. was swept away. A new Constitution was established, and when Louis XVI. accepted Royalty under this new Constitution, the same dynasty, but under a new title, was placed on the throne. I consider this proceeding in 1789, to have been, in the fullest sense of the word, a Revolution.

In 1800, the Irish Government was abolished, and the inhabitants of Ireland subjected to a new Constitution. This measure also I consider as a Revolution.

I have always dreaded Revolution. The crisis consequent on it, is sometimes beneficial; I believe it will ultimately be found

to be so in France; but the paroxysms which precede the crisis, are terrifying. As an Englishman, I have always wished for Reform; because I have always been of opinion, that if Reform did not take place, Revolution would be a necessary consequence of the existing abuses.

I will state what I consider as the abuse which stands most in need of being corrected. It is this—that individual Peers have, in many places, usurped the nomination of Members of Parliament from those aggregate bodies of the commonalty to which the Crown had originally granted it. I have said individual Peers; I am aware that in many places, individual Commoners have usurped the property in boroughs: but the usurpation is most frequently by Peers; and if the acquisition is first made by a Commoner, the power which he has thereby acquired soon occasions him to be elevated to the Peerage. The mischief is also greater where the usurpation is by a Peer; for after he has acquired this unconstitutional power, he exercises functions inconsistent with each other; in impeachment, for exam-

ple, the Commons are the accusers, and the Peers the Judges; but if the Members of the House of Commons, who prefer the accusation, are nominated by the Peers, and there is any truth in that maxim of the common law, *Qui facit per alium, facit per se*, those who are the Judges are at the same time the Accusers. Will any man say that this ought to be? By the principles of our Constitution, the Commons are to vote the taxes, and the Peers have only a right to prevent the proposed tax from being imposed, by refusing their consent. This regulation was introduced to protect the Commons from being taxed beyond what they could bear. But what becomes of this protection, if the Peers are allowed to name the Members of the House of Commons? Immoderate taxation is the real cause of our present distress; and men call for a Reform of the House of Commons, because they feel that the power of taxing has been abused.

Kings first summoned to Parliament Representatives from bodies of the Commonalty, that they might be protected against

their great vassals. The great vassals saw this, and endeavoured to deprive the King of this defence, by compelling these aggregate bodies of the Commonalty to depute to Parliament those men whom the several Peers might select. This attempt of the Peers seems to have been made at a very early period after Representatives of the Commons were first summoned to Parliament; for in the first Parliament of Edward I. he enacted provisions to restrain this conduct in the Peers. The expressions in the act are these: "Forasmuch as Elections ought to be free, the King forbids, on pain of severe forfeiture, that any great man or other should, by force of arms, or by menaces, or by any subtle contrivance, disturb the freedom of Election."

The Commons of England now stand in need of this protection against the Peers, which was heretofore wanted by our Kings. I know it will be said, that the Peer, who nominates Members of the House of Commons, and afterwards sells their votes to the Minister, pays his proportion of those taxes which are imposed. This may be

true; but the gain of his immediate object induces him to forget the more distant evil.

I decline giving instances in the present reign, of the abusive exercise of power thus acquired; but I will name one instance in the reign of George II.; and it is so generally known, that I am confident no man will dispute the correctness of the anecdote. The post of Captain of the Band of Pensioners was vacant; the King wished to give it to a gentleman whom he desired to have about his person. The Minister, Mr. Pelham, proposed to give it to another gentleman; but after some struggle, the Minister yielded, and the post was destined for the King's friend. At this moment, before the place was actually given away, Lord Falmouth signified to the Minister, that he wished to have this employment. Mr. Pelham remonstrated with him that the place was destined for a personal friend of the King: the only answer which Lord Falmouth made, was: "Sir, we are nine." This was the only answer which the Minister could obtain from him; and because

Lord Falmouth named nine Members of the House of Commons, the King and the Minister were both obliged to submit. Lord Falmouth certainly paid his share of the taxes, which these nine Members assisted the Minister to impose. But this consideration was out-weighed by the immediate object which he obtained.

The people of England have been gradually led, to demand a Reform in the House of Commons. I believe the late Earl of Chatham was among the first who suggested the necessity. He saw that the number of Members nominated by Proprietors and Patrons of Boroughs was so large, that the people were not protected against immoderate taxation.

Towards the close of the American war, the people were led to observe that they had been engaged in that War, and subjected to heavy taxes, for the purpose of enforcing a claim of the House of Commons to tax their fellow-subjects in America. How far the House of Commons was entitled to this right, was at least

doubtful; for the usage had always been for the Colonies to tax themselves in their own Provincial Assemblies; and on questions of Constitutional Rights, usage has always been appealed to. The people of England found themselves disappointed in that hope which had been held out to them, that by procuring Revenue from America, taxation on the inhabitants of Great Britain would be diminished. They experienced the very reverse of this hope which had been so held out to them. They found their own burthens immoderately increased, and if the contest were persevered in, they saw no bounds to taxes. While the Country was in this situation, several eminent men pointed out to the people, that immoderate taxation was the consequence of the existing state of the House of Commons; that a Reform of that House was necessary; that the people ought to be more efficiently represented in it.

The Duke of Richmond was among those who stood foremost in recommending a Reform of Parliament. The remedy

which he suggested, was Election by Universal Suffrage.

If I am correct in what I have stated respecting the manner in which aggregate bodies of the Commonalty acquired the right of sending Representatives to Parliament—the Duke of Richmond's plan would not have been a Reform, but a Revolution

I will acknowledge that I have always heard with regret, the suggestion of this plan. It never could be a permanent Constitution. It might possibly be an intermediate state, through which, after much suffering, we might ultimately pass to a good *Constitution*.

I have said, that the nomination to some seats in Parliament, has been usurped by Peers; I will explain what I mean by this assertion. In Burgage-tenement Boroughs, the right of electing Representatives to Parliament has been granted to every owner of a freehold interest, in a tenement within the Borough; and it has been decided, that the scite of an ancient

Burgage entitles the owner to a vote. A Peer purchases a majority of the Burgages or ancient scites. The night before the election, he sends down his dependants! The noble Lord's steward then delivers a Conveyance of a Burgage to each person; the next morning they are carried up to vote, and as soon as the return is made, the several Voters give back their Conveyances to the steward, and they are heard of no more. The members thus returned, have not been elected by proprietors of a freehold in the Burgages; for the Conveyances transferred no interest to the several persons to whom they were made. Suppose the noble Lord had made these Conveyances to prevent these Burgage-tenements from being taken in execution by his creditors; will any man say that these Conveyances would have been valid against the creditors? I believe there is no doubt as to the answer which must be given. The Conveyances were fictitious and colourable: and as against the creditors they were void; for they conveyed no property. But can they be void as against creditors, and valid as against the King?

for the King has a right to have two Members returned to Parliament, elected by a majority of the owners of freehold interests in the several Burgages within the Borough. But if the two members returned are not elected by owners of freehold interests, they will sit in Parliament only by the nomination of the noble Peer *himself*.

I believe there are about sixty Members of the House of Commons, who thus sit in Parliament by the nomination of proprietors of Burgage-tenement Boroughs. A more considerable number sit there by the nomination of Patrons of Boroughs. In these Boroughs the Right of Election is various. Sometimes in close Corporations; sometimes in Freemen; sometimes in the payers of Scot and Lot; sometimes in Pot-boilers, with other various qualifications. The Patron's merit with the Minister is, that he can supply him with the nomination to these seats.

It will be asked, what mischief arises from all this? The answer is obvious. The Minister having thus obtained a com-

mand over a majority of the House of Commons, the people are deprived of that protection against immoderate taxation, which the principles of our Constitution had secured to them. Should it be asked, did the House of Commons ever, in fact, protect the people against immoderate taxes? I answer, Yes. From the accession of the Tudors, to the commencement of the great rebellion, in the reign of Charles I. the people were protected from immoderate taxation by the House of Commons. Take, for example, the reign of Henry VIII. in disposition the most tyrannical of all our monarchs. Though they yielded to every other of his wishes, they would not grant him the people's money. In vain did he urge them to these grants; he told them repeatedly that they cheated him; and in this he told them the truth; for, by *Feoffments to Uses*, the profits which he was entitled to from estates held of him in *capite*, were withheld from him. It was not until the 27th year of his reign, that he could prevail on them to pass the Statute of Uses, by which the frauds which had been practised on him

were prevented; although he had been for many years urging the House of Commons to pass this statute. I know it may be said, that the House of Commons consented to let him confiscate the property of the convents; but that property was not under their protection. They permitted Queen Mary to re-establish the Roman Catholic religion; but when she asked them to consent that the confiscated property of the convents should be restored, they refused it; for that property was then become the property of laymen, and was under their protection.

At the commencement of the great rebellion in the time of Charles I. perhaps there was hardly any nation in Europe in which taxes were more moderate than in England. On one occasion during that reign, an unusual number of subsidies was demanded in a message from the Crown. The House was startled at the novelty; but a Member reconciled them to the proposal by shewing them how very small a sum he, who was reputed a very rich man, should pay. Mr. Hampden had an es-

tate of £2,000 a year; the ship-money demanded from him was only twenty shillings: he resisted it; not on account of the amount, but on account of the injustice of the demand.

In the time of Charles I. Members were sent to the House of Commons from those Counties, Cities, and Boroughs, which send them now. Chester and Durham, I believe, did not send Members till the reign of Charles II. The alteration, however, as to the places which have a right to send Members to Parliament, has been very little. But the Minister had not then discovered the means of influencing Elections. I have attributed immoderate taxation to the manner in which Members are returned to the House of Commons. It is not the Members returned who are alone to be corrupted, but every man who contributes to the Election of the Members is to be influenced; and the present system renders it necessary that the Crown should have great patronage. Men call for retrenchment in the expenditure; but if retrenchment were carried to a beneficial extent,

the Crown would be left under the power of an Oligarchy, the most oppressive of all Governments.

I have thus stated the mischief. What is the remedy? My answer is, a House of Commons interested to keep down taxes. And to secure that the House of Commons should be interested to keep down taxes, the Members should not only be men of property themselves, but should be elected by men who have that degree of property which may make them solicitous to keep taxes moderate. Retrenchment must be preceded by Reform.

While Members are returned to Parliament by those Cities and Boroughs which now send them, is it practicable to secure that they shall be elected by men of property? I think it is. For instance, in the Burgage-tenement Boroughs, let every Elector swear, not only that he is proprietor of the Burgage-tenement for which he claims to vote, and has been so for a twelvemonth preceding the election, but let him also swear, that he has a landed estate of a

a moderate value, say £20 a year, in that county in which the Borough is situate; and if the Electors are found to be below a certain number, suppose 100, let a concurrent right of voting be given to every Freeholder within the County, who is owner of £100 a-year. Apply the same remedy of a landed qualification to other Cities and Boroughs, varying the circumstances according to the different Rights of Election.

I think it would be also advisable that the qualifications of Electors for Counties should be raised from 40 shillings to £20 a-year. This would preclude the necessity of Electors being carried to the Poll at the expense of the Candidates. I know that the remedy which I suggest, is the reverse of what is recommended by the Advocates for Universal Suffrage; but the mischief against which I wish to protect the people, is immoderate taxation.

I.

The Members returned to the French National Assembly are elected by men, each of whom must have property to the

value of £1800 sterling. I think this a good Right of Election; for the Electors have an interest to Elect those who will keep taxes moderate. I know it may be said, that there are other articles which require to be defended as well as the Subject's property; such as his life and liberty. This is true; but it is the property of the Subject which the Minister wants, and it is, therefore, the property which we ought most solicitously to guard; and let it be remembered, that the Representative who has an interest to guard my property because he is at the same time guarding his own, will for the same reason, be interested to guard my life and liberty.

I have heard it said, that Reform in the House of Commons would prevent those men who have abilities, but are without property, from being Members of that House, and that these men are very useful. I am of a different opinion. I think they are rather mischievous than useful. I wish the House of Commons not to continue to exercise that share in the Executive Government which it has lately acquired.

The Minister always wishes the House of Commons to vote a previous approbation of that measure which he is about to adopt. By this means, he is protected from subsequent crimination. But the Nation is deprived of one of the most important advantages which it is entitled to expect from a House of Commons; viz. An Assembly watchful over the conduct of Ministers, and punishing them for acts injurious to their Country.

I have given my opinion thus fully on the subject of Reform; because I am convinced, that either Reform or Revolution must soon take place. I wish for Reform and deprecate Revolution.

I have thus ventured to give my opinion on the probability that a Reform of the House of Commons will take place in Great Britain. I have expressed my wish that a Reform may take place as being the only means by which Revolution may be avoided. I have also expressed my opinion as to the manner in which Reform may be effected. Most certainly more

regulations than those which I have suggested will be necessary.

Members of the House of Commons were first summoned to Parliament to protect the King against his great Nobles; they are now wanted to protect the People against immoderate taxation. To induce them to afford this protection, they must themselves be interested; and to secure that they shall be interested, they must be elected by men who are payers of the taxes. With this view, the right of electing Members must be taken from many of the small Towns, and transferred to the inhabitants of large Towns.

Some men have thought, that Triennial Parliaments might be of great benefit, and this is the only Reform which the great Whig Families seem disposed to consent to. I cannot say that I see any great advantage in the adoption of this measure. It would render the House of Commons less suited to share in the exercise of the Executive Government. And this is the only benefit which I can see in it. I admit

that this would be a benefit; for while the House of Commons continue to possess that share in the Executive Government which they have been allowed to usurp, they are disqualified to watch over the conduct of the Executive Government, perhaps the most useful duty which they have to discharge.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the State of Parties in England.

THE present political parties in England affect to rally under two names; viz. *Pittites* and *Foxites*. Has either party any great Political object which it professes to wish to carry? The Pittites profess no other object than that of preventing changes; the Foxites profess no definite object. The people therefore, view the two parties under the more intelligible names of the *Ins* and the *Outs*. Admit for the moment that both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox had great talents, and that both conferred much benefit on their country. It does not follow, that those who call themselves *Pittites* have the same talents, or have a right to claim, as heirs, the reward of his merits. The same answer may be given to the *Foxites*. The names are brought forward as *noms de guerre*, and to give splendour to the several parties.

It may not be undeserving our attention, to consider how these parties have arisen; Sir Robert Walpole governed England by uniting the influence of the Crown to the Whig Party. I use the expression *Whig Party*, because, during that period, the Whigs were not a faction but a party; for they had a great political object; viz. To prevent the return of the Stuarts and the dreaded establishment of Popery and despotism.

Sir Robert Walpole fell; he was succeeded by the Pelhams. Mr. Pelham was the man of the best understanding in that administration; but he certainly was not a man of a superior mind. George II. wished to employ Lord Carteret, afterwards Earl of Granville, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He was beyond all doubt, the ablest man of the day for that situation. But the Pelhams feared his abilities and compelled the King to remove him; the Pelhams carried on the War of 1741 feebly, and they ended it without wisdom; for they left in existence the seeds of future disputes. The Peace

of Aix-la-Chapelle must be considered as little more than a cessation of Arms; it was a Truce rather than a Peace. Mr. Pelham died. His party continued in power under the auspices of his brother, the Duke of Newcastle.

History hardly points out to us in any country or in any age, a Minister more incapable or more contemptible.—The War of 1756 burst forth, the Duke of Newcastle was under the necessity of assigning to Mr. Pitt, the employment of Secretary of State, with the management of the War. The great abilities of this gentleman enabled him to carry on the War with much success; and the three last years of the reign of George II. are perhaps the most glorious period of our History since the accession of the Brunswick dynasty.

In October 1760, George III. succeeded to the Crown; he had been educated in aversion to those trammels in which his grandfather had been held; and tutored from early life to wish to be his own minister,

within a year after his accesssion, he removed Mr. Pitt, and in the following half year swept away the whole Pelham confederacy. He appointed the Earl of Bute his Prime Minister, who in the year following terminated the War. But the people were dissatisfied with the conditions of the peace, pussillanimity induced the Earl of Bute to resign his situation. The King appointed Mr. George Grenville his successor; but his Majesty soon found that this gentleman wished to exercise the same controul over him, as the Pelhams had exercised over George II.

He removed Mr. Grenville, and placed in the administration those gentlemen who had been Members of the Pelham confederacy. The Marquis of Rockingham was appointed Prime Minister. The new Ministers on their accession to power, repealed the Stamp Act, and re-established tranquillity between Great Britain and her Colonies. Did the attempt to impose taxes on the Colonies by the vote of the British Parliament originate with Mr. Grenville, or with the King, and his own

interior Cabinet? I cannot pretend to answer this question. I believe that there are papers in existence which may hereafter elucidate the subject from the unremitted obstinacy with which the King persevered in this attempt to tax the Colonies; from the various artifices which he employed to induce his Ministers to assist him in the attempt; from his boundless gratitude to those who supported him in this measure, and from his aversion to those who opposed it, we are naturally led to believe that it was the measure of the King himself. He removed the Rockingham administration; and by dexterously playing one faction against another, he succeeded in his wish to revive the dispute with America. War was the consequence, till Peace was re-established by the acknowledgement of the Independence of the American Colonies. From 1766, when the Rockingham's were removed from office, to the death of Lord Rockingham in 1782, the Partizans of that noble Lord are entitled to be considered, not as a faction, but as a party, for they had a

great public object in view; viz. To prevent the rights of the British Colonists in America from being violated.

On the death of Lord Rockingham they ceased to be a party, and became a faction; for from that hour their efforts were no longer employed for the attainment of any great public object. Their exertions were confined to the attainment of office and of emoluments for the Members of their confederacy. I have recapitulated these facts to show what I consider as the distinction between the expressions *faction* and *party*. It is a faction, where the individuals who compose the confederacy have no other view than to obtain office and emoluments for themselves. It is a party, where the exertions of the individuals are directed to obtain a political object. Whenever those gentlemen who called themselves *Foxites* declare the public object which their efforts are directed to obtain, they will then deserve the name of *a party*. Until they declare this object, they will be viewed in England only as a faction.

It is idle to attempt to amuse the country by the name of Mr. Fox, as if they were the heirs of his merits; and if they mean to say that they pursue his opinions, they ought to specify those opinions. The gentlemen who form this faction, ought to recollect that the Pelham faction never was popular in England. The Pelham administration was even less popular than that of Sir Robert Walpole. For although Sir Robert Walpole's administration was feeble and corrupt, yet it had a public object, viz. To preserve the Brunswick Family on the Throne; and Sir Robert Walpole succeeded in this object. His perseverance in the pacific system contributed much to his success; the Pelhams had no public object; the dread of the return of the Stuarts was extinguished; time and the Rebellion of 1745, had relieved the people from all apprehensions on that head. The great political object of Sir Robert Walpole's administration had almost ceased to affect the nation. The Brunswick's were believed to be firmly established; and the Pelham confederacy from the Peace of Aix-la-Cha-

pelle could scarcely be considered as having a party object..

I have said that from the death of the Marquis of Rockingham in the summer of 1782, the leaders of those who had composed his party scarcely pretended to say that their efforts were directed to the attainment of any public object. The maxim inculcated was, that you were to look to men, not to measures; that when you had joined a party, your exertions should be directed to the support of that party, without enquiring into the particular measure immediately depending. In some of Mr. Burke's publications, I recollect this doctrine explicitly avowed. Speaking of those who sometimes voted with the Minister, and sometimes against him, he adds, "I hope to God the race is extinct." Even Mr. Fox incautiously adopted this sentiment; speaking of an independent man, he defined him to be one whom nobody could depend upon. That you should look to men not to measures, might be a very good maxim for a faction; and a very advantageous doctrine for Mr. Burke, who had con-

trived to obtain the situation of the Guide of a faction. But it was not a doctrine calculated to induce the great body of the people to exert themselves in support of those who acted upon it.

Review the measures of the Foxites from the death of Lord Rockingham, to the commencement of the year 1793, when England took part in the Crusade against French principles; and let any man say whether there was any one measure brought forward by the party likely to attract the co-operation of the country. The first measure which took place on the death of that lamented nobleman, was the complete and avowed separation of his friends from those of the Earl of Shelburne; this measure proceeded wholly from Mr. Burke: it was to gratify his personal malice against the Earl of Shelburne, and to promote his views of governing the party under the nominal direction of the Duke of Portland; I do not know that there was at that time any other man among the friends of the deceased Marquis who had personal ill-will to the Earl

of Shelburne. I am certain that Charles Fox had not. The Duke of Richmond, Lord Keppel, and General Conway remained in office with the Earl of Shelburne.

The next measure was the coalition between Mr. Fox and Lord North. So far from this measure having been likely to conciliate the good will of the Country, a long course of years was hardly sufficient to rescue Mr. Fox from the unpopularity which it occasioned.

The next measure was Mr. Burke's plan for seizing the Patronage of India, brought forward under the name of Mr. Fox's India Bill. No man will say that this conciliated the Country when the Coalitionists were removed from office, they retained, during the first three months of the year 1784, a majority in the House of Commons. Many of those who had been attached to the party of the Marquis of Rockingham, were alarmed at the possible consequences of this situation. They were relieved from their fears by

the decided victory obtained by Mr. Pitt, in the ensuing general election, in the Spring, 1784.

The next measure was the impeachment of Mr. Hastings. A measure brought forward solely to gratify the malevolence of Mr. Burke; it is scarcely possible but that the good sense of Mr. Fox must have pointed out to him the prejudice which his party would sustain from supporting this impeachment. He yielded to the influence of Mr. Burke.

In the Autumn, 1788, the King became deranged. I will not enquire whether the doctrines advanced by Mr. Fox were correct or otherwise; but they certainly were not popular. The King recovered, and the party remained under no inconsiderable load of odium.

At the close of the year 1792, Mr. Burke carried the party into the King's Camp, clamouring for the Crusade. The King received them with joy. Mr. Pitt, that he might retain his place, submitted

to the King's wishes; and War was resolved on. Has the party either merited or conciliated the affections of the Country, by the share they took in driving us into this war? Mr. Pitt died early in 1806, and the party again came into office, under a coalition with the Grenvilles and Lord Sidmouth. Did they gain any credit during the year that they were in office? They are now in opposition. Mr. Fox is no more; but they endeavour to acquire popularity by assuming his name. They find that it is in vain; they feel that the people are not with them. They complain, but unjustly; for they have no right to expect that the people should exert themselves to place one set of individuals in office, in the room of another.

Would they engage their Country's support, let them bring forward some great public measure which the Country may be interested to obtain. All men, who give themselves the trouble to reflect, see that the Reform of the House of Commons is the only measure which can relieve us from our difficulties. Immo-

derate taxation, the result of the unnecessary wars of the Reign of George III. is the cause of our embarrassments; and that immoderate taxation has been occasioned by the House of Commons, being composed of men not interested to protect the property of the people.

It is well known, that the leaders of the Foxite party are among those who are the most averse to Reform; that they rank among the usurpers of the nomination to seats in Parliament, and that by their coming into office all hope of Reform would be at an end. How then can they expect that the people should wish to see them in office? I may be told, perhaps, that Mr. Fox was himself a great advocate for a Reform of the House of Commons. Yes, this is true. But at the General Election in 1780, he accepted the situation of Commander-in-Chief of the Political Forces of the Rockingham Party. From that hour, he ceased to be the sincere advocate of Reform. He could no longer sincerely endeavour to obtain Reform, without being disloyal to that party into

whose service he had entered. It may be said that he voted for Reform subsequently to 1780. I admit it; so did Mr. Pitt, who, antecedently to his being in office, had certainly been sincerely desirous of a Reform of Parliament. But after Mr. Pitt had accepted office, he would, by bringing forward a Reform of Parliament, have thwarted the views of the King, as much as Mr. Fox would, by a similar measure, have thwarted the views of the Rockinghams; both, therefore, were equally insincere.

Reform is the only measure which can relieve the country. Retrenchment, not preceded by Reform, is impracticable. Profuse expenditure is wanted, not merely to feed Members of Parliament, but to feed those who have a share in making Members of Parliament. Deprive the Crown of the means of purchasing, and your Government instantly becomes an Oligarchy, composed of Proprietors and Patrons of Boroughs. And it cannot be too often repeated, that of all forms of government, Oligarchy is the most oppres-

sive. Reform is necessary; and either Reform or Revolution will take place; Universal Suffrage would be Revolution. It is possible, that a good Government might grow out of it; but the paroxysms by which we should arrive at the crisis, would be dreadful.

When Earl Grey, in 1792, established the Society of the Friends of the People, for the avowed purpose of bringing men together to declare their opinions on the necessity of a Reform of Parliament, I acknowledge that I, at that time, thought that it would be practicable to Reform the House of Commons, without departing much from the present form of Borough representation;—that we might Reform the different classes of Boroughs according to the different diseases which existed in them;—that we might proceed gradually, little by little, *en tatonnant*, ever keeping in mind that maxim of the wise physician, *Vel prodesse, vel non obesse*, as the first object of our attention. I presumed to point out to that Society the class of Burgage-tenement Boroughs; an Address was voted

to the House of Commons, stating the number of Members who sat in that House by the nomination of Proprietors and Patrons. But it was seen, that the correction of this abuse would be injurious to the interests of the leaders of the faction of the great Whig Families; and all further attempts at Reform of Parliament were abandoned. Had Parliament been reformed at that time, we might possibly have avoided the Crusade against French principles.

Reform will take place. To render it beneficial to the Country, it must be a complete correction of the existing abuses. I do not mean by Universal Suffrage, but by a Reform which may place the House of Commons in a situation to protect the property of the people. The French Revolution has given us an example of an Assembly adequate to the discharge of this duty, viz. an Assembly elected by men, payers of direct taxes to such an extent, that none can be Electors, except those who are so affected by the payment, that they are interested that

taxation should be moderate. I am persuaded that such a Reform will sooner or later take place; though it is possible that resistance to such a Reform may occasion it to be preceded by Revolution.

The Bourbons, the Nobles, and the Fanatics may attempt to re-establish the *ancien regime* in France. They will fail. The pillars on which the fabric stood, are reduced to powder. No art can again cement them into solid masses. If a representative Government should cease to exist in France, it must be succeeded by a Military despotism.

In Spain, though the present efforts should fail, yet the Cortes will ultimately be established.

In Germany, the intelligence of the people will probably prevail against all the efforts of the Holy Alliance; and Representative Government will be the consequence.

Can any man suppose, that with such

examples under its eye, England will long submit to the usurped power of Proprietors and Patrons of Boroughs? Let it be recollected, that this usurped Power is odious to Royalty, insulting to Aristocracy, and oppressive to the People.

There are among those who call themselves Foxites, men who possess both wisdom and integrity. Let them declare that their efforts are directed to obtain an object in which their Country is interested. Their Country will rally round them, and Revolution may be averted.

CHAPTER IX.

On the Duration of Papal Power.

I SHALL consider this not as a religious, but as a political subject. The doctrines of the Catholic Church may remain long after the power of the Pope is destroyed. I shall consider the question purely as it regards the duration of Papal Power. It seems to me that this power cannot subsist much longer, either in France or Germany. I doubt whether it can continue much longer in Spain and Portugal:—it will fall in Italy whenever that country is formed into one kingdom; an event, perhaps, not very distant: and with regard to Ireland, where three out of four of the inhabitants are Catholics, the power and the influence of the Pope of Rome will be at an end, whenever the British Government has the good sense to become the pay-master of the Catholic Clergy. I say it must fall in France. The wealth

of the Church has been sweept away; and its power has vanished with its wealth. Tythes have been abolished; and having now been discontinued for more than thirty years, can never be re-established; the lands of Bishops and Convents have been confiscated; and the present possessors will never submit to be deprived of them. The officiating Ministers of the Church must henceforth receive their salaries from the Executive Government; and from that circumstance must be dependant on that Executive Government. Whenever a King of France abandons the wish of re-establishing the power lately possessed by the Clergy, he becomes really and substantially the Supreme Head of the Church; or, to use an expression applied by Roger Bacon to our King Henry VIII.—"He starts up a King with a Pope in his belly."

No inconsiderable part of Germany remained under Ecclesiastical Sovereigns, down to the commencement of the late Revolution in France; I believe they have been every where destroyed, and their ter-

ritories assigned to temporal Princes. This circumstance must have greatly diminished the influence of the Roman Pontiff. Princes and Nobles no longer look up to the Church as a provision for their younger branches. Intelligence must gain ground; and though Catholic doctrines in Religion may remain, Papal Power must fall. In Spain, though the present efforts to re-establish a Free Constitution should fail, yet it is manifest that intelligence has gained such ground in that Country, that the Cortes, with a Free Constitution, will ultimately be established. The Papal Power will be inconsistent with that Free Constitution; it will fall, and probably will be accompanied with the confiscation of a large portion of the wealth of the Church. This event will produce the same advantages in Spain, as have been produced by similar confiscations in England and in France: viz. The existence of a middle class of Land-proprietors. Portugal will follow the example of Spain. Most probably the Spanish Colonies in America will do the same.

I have said, the formation of Italy into one kingdom, is an event probably not very distant; and I believe that I am correct in my opinion. Italy has been harrassed by foreign invaders ever since the close of the fifteenth century. When Charles VIII. King of France, invaded Italy, about the year 1490, he found the country under the power of various Governments; but every where in a state of great prosperity. From that time to the present, it has been desolated by Spaniards, Germans, and French; every sensible Italian must wish to see his country rescued from these invaders; but it cannot be formed into one kingdom without the abolition of the power of the Pope. The Papal power was originally established with great political wisdom. The acquisition of landed property, and of sovereignty, were among the marked instances of its sagacity. Its power will fall with the loss of landed property and sovereignty.

I have said, in a former place, that the Executive Government in France will, at a future period, derive much influence from

the Funds for the payment of the Clergy being entirely at its disposal. That this power has not hitherto been felt, because the Bourbons have hitherto entertained a wish that the power of the Clergy should be re-established. But the French Clergy cannot again be put in possession of their landed estates. Those estates are now in the possession of the Laity, and are divided among so many proprietors, that any attempt to wrest those lands from them must fail of success; and those who made the attempt, would probably fall the victims of their own folly. Every Ecclesiastic must be dependant upon that Government which, by withholding payment of his salary, can reduce him to poverty. The Christian Church was established with much political wisdom. Its founders ever had in view, to make it independent of the Executive Government; and it bribed the existing Government for the time being, by its readiness to support the immediate views of such Government. The Clergy were every where invested with landed estates; they were sensible how much their political influence would be increased

by the possession of land, instead of being dependant on Government for salaries.

When the Reformation took place in England, the property of the Convents was seized; and Queen Elizabeth obtained considerable portions of episcopal property by forced exchanges. A celebrated letter of the Queen, on this subject, to a Bishop of Ely, is preserved in the British Museum. I have had occasion to see proofs of her having taken large portions of the lands of the Bishoprick of Lincoln, under pretence of similar exchanges; and there is no doubt that she plundered many bishopricks in the same manner. The practice was carried so far by Queen Elizabeth, that on the accession of James I. the Church of England had sufficient influence to procure an Act to be passed, to prevent the Crown from making exchanges in future, with Bishops. The English Clergy are so sensible of the political advantage of possessing lands, rather than monied property, that in case of a bequest of money, upon condition that the trustees of Queen Anne's bounty should add a sum of equal value,

the trustees will never permit the money to remain in the Funds, but insist that it shall be laid out in the purchase of lands; and they require this, although they are sensible that the Ecclesiastic intended to be benefited, would receive double the income from the Funds that he can expect to receive from land: and although another inconvenience ensues from this doctrine, that the money must be laid out in land, viz. That the Courts of Law have resolved, that these bequests are within the Statute of Mortmain, and they are frequently void, in consequence of the directions of that Statute not having been observed. The great objection to the Emancipation of the Catholics in Ireland is, that the Pope will always retain influence over the Catholic Clergy, and the Catholic Clergy over those of their Church. But this objection would vanish, if the Catholic Clergy were paid by the Executive Government.

Consider the state of Ireland. Among four millions of inhabitants, three millions are Catholics; and of the remaining mil-

lion, six hundred thousand are computed to be Dissenters, and four hundred thousand only of the Church of England. Yet all the funds allotted for the maintenance of Ecclesiastical Ministers, are confined to those of the Church of England. Is this equitable? Would it not be more advantageous that these funds should be employed for the maintenance of the Clergy of all those who profess the Christian Religion? It will not be denied that all ought to receive religious instruction. Whether a man believes in transubstantiation, or does not believe in it, is a matter of little importance to the State; provided his opinion on this subject does not lead him to have political connections injurious to the interests of his country.

It is this apprehension which leads men to fear Catholic Emancipation. We had just reason to fear the power of the Pope during the reigns of the Stuarts: habituated to that fear, we cannot bring ourselves to believe, that if any such danger still exists, it is easy to guard against it. Suppose Bishopricks and Chapters as they

became vacant in Ireland, were not filled up, and their revenues vested, for a few years, in trustees, to be employed under the direction of the Executive Government, for the maintenance of the Clergy of every branch of the Christian Religion, while the Roman Catholic Clergy received maintenance according to the pleasure of their own Government—would there not be an end to all well-grounded fear of Foreign influence? There are many parishes in Ireland, in which the inhabitants are almost all Catholics; yet the owner of the advowson is obliged to present a Clergyman of the Church of England. Would it not be equitable, that the incumbent on such a benefice, should be obliged to contribute to the payment of Ministers for Catholics and Dissenters? I am well aware that the Clergy of the Church of England will be indignant at such a proposal; but its adoption would be beneficial to my Country.

I will go one step further. I think it highly probable that, ere long, a plan, somewhat of this nature, will be adopted

in the British Empire; particularly in Ireland. It is already established in France. A Civil War is ready to break out in Spain, between the King and the Clergy on one side, and the Army and the Cortes on the other. Should the latter be successful, much of the Church property would probably be confiscated; and the Ministers of the Church in Spain, in the same manner as those in France, would receive their payments from Government. When such a Revolution has taken place in France and Spain, is it probable, that the Clergy of the Church of England would be allowed to retain that political power which they now possess? It may be said, that they are always readily subservient to the immediate views of the Crown. This may be true: but a more equitable distribution of emoluments would be beneficial to the Crown, and could scarcely be disapproved of by any one.

Seven hundred livings, in the King's gift, are left at the disposition of the Lord Chancellor. Five hundred of these are

said to yield very small emoluments to their several incumbents. If six of the most opulent Bishopricks were not filled up, as they severally became vacant, and their incomes for a certain term of years vested in trustees for the purpose of creating a fund, to be employed under the King's direction, in augmenting the emoluments of the incumbents of these benefices, could any man complain of this? When the Bishopricks of Winchester and Durham become vacant, they will be disposed of by the Crown, either to serve the views of a Minister, or to gratify some Court favourite. Would not the influence of the Crown be more increased, and the interests of the Country more advanced, by the augmentation of small benefices in the gift of the Crown, in the manner I have suggested?

CHAPTER X.

On the Consequences likely to result from the Establishment of the United States of America.

THESE States form a Federative Republic. They have neither King, nor Nobility, nor Established Church. The English language, and the English love of Liberty, prevail through the whole confederacy. The facility with which landed property may be acquired, and brought into cultivation, gives to the inhabitants a disposition to migrate; a propensity which will much facilitate the extension of agriculture, and the rapid population of the Country.

On the Sea Coast, the active spirit of the people leads them to Commerce, and the Fisheries; and when compelled to

become a Military State, they have shewn the most courageous exertions. It is visible, that they are capable of presenting themselves as a formidable Naval Power. Great Britain, France, and Spain, are the only naval powers of much consideration now in Europe; and even the most formidable of these—I mean Great Britain—would find it difficult to carry on a Naval War with the United States of America. It is true, Great Britain, at present, possesses on that Continent, one Naval Port and Arsenal: viz. Halifax. If deprived of this, Great Britain would find it extremely difficult to carry on a Naval War on the Coast of America; and British America could not long be defended, except at an expense which could not be borne.

The United States of America may now be considered as holding a high rank in the intercourse between themselves and the several States of Europe. The facility of acquiring landed property, naturally leads the people to apply themselves to Agriculture, rather than to Manufactures; and

it is more for the interest of the Americans to bring land into cultivation, than to establish manufactures. The injudicious conduct of the British Government has, in many places, forced the Americans to establish manufactures: and machinery will be used with more advantage in a country where the population is thin, than it can be in a country like Great Britain, where the manufacturing population may perhaps be too great.

The application of the Steam Engine to the navigation of rivers, affords an advantage to America, almost beyond calculation. The inhabitants on the upper parts of her great rivers, will easily be supplied with every thing that commerce can present.

The United States will be divided. If the whole continent of North America formed but one State, it could only be controuled by a Despotic Government; but the happiness of man requires that Governments should be free. One of the circumstances which at present contributes

the most to the happiness of the inhabitants of the United States is, that they have occasion for so little government. The facility with which subsistence can be acquired, removes the temptation to criminality. Whenever a division of the United States takes place, most probably it will not be, in the first instance, a separation of the Northern from the Southern States; though this separation will, most probably, at one time or other, take place. But the first division will probably be, of the Western States from the Eastern. That immense plain, which is watered by the Mississippi, with her attendant streams, is naturally separated from the Eastern States by ranges of mountains; and the difference of soil, climate, produce, and occupation, will create that opposition of interest which leads to separation. But though this separation may be attended with bloodshed, it will ultimately be beneficial to the Country.

There is, however, a danger, which perhaps the wisdom of their Government will not be able to avert: I mean, that they

may be tempted by the gold and silver of Spanish America, to relinquish agricultural pursuits, and attempt the conquest of Mexico. They will succeed; and success will be a misfortune. There are reasons to believe, that the ancestors of those whom the Spaniards found in possession of Mexico, on their arrival in that country, had migrated from the more northern parts of America. It is said, that in Kentucky there are proofs that the country must, at some remote period, have been inhabited by men far more advanced in civilization, than those Indians whom we found there. But whether this opinion is well or ill-founded, there is little doubt but that the Americans, whenever they chuse it, will be able to penetrate into Mexico. What may be the character of the inhabitants of Spanish America, when the present motley race is crossed with American blood? This is a question which we cannot answer. But it is to Great Britain that the power of the United States is most formidable. They can, to a considerable degree, controul our intercourse with Jamaica;—they may become the ally of the

Black Population in Saint Domingo:—they may even acquire the possession of Cuba:—and in every part of the world they will be our rivals in commerce.

It is much to be regretted, that those among us who had in vain attempted to deprive the Americans of their rights, should have persevered in their hatred to them, after the contest was terminated. Unfortunately, this was the case. The same language, the same love of liberty, descent from the same common ancestors, to which I might add, similitude of laws, (for the Americans still retain those laws which they had carried with them from England) would have rendered amicable intercourse between the two countries, of easy establishment. I believe that this was the opinion of the Earl of Shelburne. I believe he openly declared, that the intercourse between the two nations ought to be re-established, as nearly as possible the same, as it had existed before the separation. Unfortunately, he was not listened to. Injuries, insults, and

affected contempt, have excited sentiments in the breasts of the Americans, which it may be difficult to eradicate; and Great Britain now, exhausted by her Crusade against French principles, may be obliged to submit to humiliating concessions.

CHAPTER XI.

On the Effects likely to be produced by the French Revolution on other Nations.

I HAVE considered the effects which the French Revolution must have in France itself. I will now consider the effects which it will probably produce on other nations. But in doing this, it will be necessary to observe circumstances which now exist, or are likely very soon to be in existence.

The American War established a Representative Government, in what are now called the United States of America. The French Revolution has established a Representative Government in France. It is probable, that we shall soon see a Representative Government in Spain; and Representative Governments in the continental provinces of Spanish America, will

perhaps be established, in imitation of their parent country. Cuba deserves a distinct consideration. It will either be taken possession of by the United States of America, or by England; or become an Independent State: for its size and population enable it to assume this form.

When the Spanish Empire, in Europe and America, shall have assumed the form which I have mentioned, can we suppose that Portugal will remain in its present situation? Is there not every reason to expect, that Portugal and Brazil will not long remain under the same Government? If the King returns to Portugal, he will lose the Sovereignty of Brazil; and if he remains in Brazil, Portugal will shake off his government. Probably her new Government will be Representative; and we shall see a Portuguese Cortes re-called to power, as we have seen it in Spain.

I shall be told, all this depends on Ferdinand's Government being overthrown; but it is manifest, that Ferdinand's Go-

vernment cannot be durable. Even though it should resist the present shocks, the general wish of the people to see the Cortes re-called, and a Constitution established, must ultimately prevail.

Germany already feels the effects of the French Revolution. The desire of a Representative Government is every where prevalent. The diminution of the wealth and power of the Roman Catholic Clergy in Germany, must have great effect in producing changes in that country. Before the French Revolution, much sovereign power was possessed by the Catholic Clergy in Germany; I believe they are now every where deprived of Sovereignty. Their dominions are assigned to neighbouring Princes.

Even Italy will be affected by the French Revolution. The principles of Liberty have been discussed, and are understood in that country. The fall of the Papal Power, which cannot long be deferred, will necessarily occasion that country to assume a new form.

The human mind trembles at the contemplation of these probable events :—

" Through what variety of untried being,
Through what new scenes and changes must we pass ?
The wide, the unbounded prospect lies before us,
But shadows, clouds, and darkness rest upon it."

The changes which I have alluded to, will not only affect the Government of Nations; it will greatly affect their intercourse with each other. The Spanish Provinces on the Western side of South America, will open a trade with India and China; they will be supplied from those countries with silk and cotton manufactures, because they can be supplied from thence, at a cheaper rate than they can from Europe.

Even the Black and Mulatto nations of Saint Domingo, ought not to be left out of our consideration. They will probably extend themselves over the whole of that island; perhaps even to Porto Rico. Perhaps the time is not far removed, when posterity may see the inhabitants of the four great Antilles, one motley race; in

which, however, it is most likely that the Mulatto will gradually predominate.

There is a circumstance in the changes already occasioned by the American and French Revolutions, and which will probably be found in the changes about to take place: viz. that these changes will not be the effect of conquest, but the result of insurrections of the People against their Governments; whereas, almost all the other Revolutions which we read of in history, have been the consequence of conquest. The Persian, the Macedonian, the Roman Empires, were established by conquest. The Roman Empire was destroyed by conquerors from the Northern and Eastern parts of the world. Revolutions, the result of conquest, necessarily occasion a change in the race of inhabitants. Most probably the Northern Conquerors of the Roman Empire, did not extirpate, but became blended with the inhabitants; for we every where find a language evidently derived from the Latin. I believe, in every part of France, the common people retain their *patois*; a corruption of the language

they used before they were conquered. In our island, the Saxons extirpated or exterminated the Britons; and therefore we have no British words left in our language. The Normans did not extirpate, and our language is consequently a mixture of Saxon and French; the Latin words being derived to us through the French.

I believe it will be found, that all the Revolutions in Asia and Africa, as well as in Europe, have been produced by conquest. What difference may be occasioned, from the Revolutions in our days being produced by insurrections of the People, and not by conquest, I cannot say; nor can I venture to form an opinion, on the probable consequences of the fall of the Roman Catholic Church; for their wealth and power will fall together. The Bramin says, "that sin came into the world by the confusion of casts." I hope the motley race of inhabitants about to occupy so large a portion of America, will not verify this opinion.

CHAPTER XII.

On the British Possessions in India.

THE India Company was established solely with a view to trade; and as the voyage to India was long, and supposed to be attended with great danger, an exclusive privilege of trading beyond the Cape of Good Hope was granted to the Company.

About the year 1740, the Mogul Empire fell to pieces, in consequence of the invasion of Nadir Shah, Kouli Khan. The different Governors, or Nabobs of Provinces, seized the Government of different districts. In the province of Arcot, or, as it is generally called, the Arcot Carnatic, the French India Company supported the claims of a native named Chunda Saheb, and soon discovered the inferiority of the native troops, when opposed to Europeans. The French ac-

quired dominion rapidly; this roused the jealousy of the English India Company. They set up claims on behalf of another native, called Mohammed Ali. After various success, the cause of Mohammed Ali prevailed.

About 1756, the English Factory in Bengal was plundered by Sujah Dowlah, the Nabob of that province; and the Europeans found in it treated with great cruelty. The British Troops, which had placed Mohammed Ali on the Throne of Arcot, were transported to Bengal; Sujah Dowlah was defeated, and the Sovereignty of a large district seized by the India Company. Much wealth was acquired for the Civil and Military Servants, as well as for the India Company, by this Conquest; and from that hour, the desire of extending the India Company's acquisitions in India, has never been relinquished.

It is said, that the India Company possesses Sovereignty over 80,000,000 of people in India, and Revenue to the amount of £17,000,000 sterling, a-year. Ceylon,

the Isle of France, and the Cape of Good Hope, have been obtained as appendages necessary to the safety of their Indian Empire. A question naturally occurs; what benefit accrues to Great Britain from these Indian possessions? They furnish neither army, nor navy, nor revenue, to be employed in Europe for the service of Great Britain: on the contrary, they require soldiers to be annually sent from Great Britain to India. Very commonly they require a navy, and sometimes even pecuniary assistance.

But it is said, that the wealth acquired by the civil and military servants is remitted to Great Britain, and has much contributed to give activity to improvements. I am not prepared absolutely to deny this assertion. To a certain extent, it may be true; but I doubt whether this benefit has compensated the mischief introduced by our Indian acquisitions. When we see 80,000,000 of subjects at the distance of 10,000 miles, governed by twenty-four mercantile characters resident in Leadenhall Street, we are naturally led to

say, the Government of Empire cannot require so much skill as we common people generally believe. And the Board of Controul engrafted on the Court of Directors must rather contribute to increase than to diminish embarrassment.

But the great advantage accruing from these Indian possessions, if it be an advantage—is patronage. Much of this patronage is disposed of by the Ministers of the Crown; some remains with the India Directors. When Jugurtha took his last view of Rome, he exclaimed: "*Vale venalis civitas, mox peritura si emptorem inveneris.* Is not the same exclamation applicable almost with equal truth to those who elect the House of Commons? Is it not a fact that Members have sat in that House for seats purchased for them by an Indian Prince?

Has it not been acknowledged publicly, that a Bengal writership was given by the Minister to one of his friends that he might sell it, and with the produce purchase a seat in the House of Commons?

The French call us, *une nation pirate & boutiquiére*; and has not Indian patronage peculiarly contributed to give us that venal money-loving character, which the French attribute to us? But the material consideration is, what circumstances will accompany our abandonment of these possessions? for abandoned they must be, sooner or later. Every acquisition renders it more necessary for us to extend our conquests; we are now told by every man returned from India, "you must have the whole, or you must relinquish all that you possess."

And where are the boundaries of that whole? To whatever extent your acquisitions are carried, you will still have neighbours the object of your fears. Many are now apprehensive that you have already approached so near to the frontiers of Russia, that on any difference with that power, her forces may be employed to invade India; but as there are three States, viz. the Seiks, Zemaun Shah, and Persia, between your possessions and the Russian frontiers, I own I have never

felt any apprehensions of an attack from Russia. But your empire is too large to be under the controul of one Government; you will be ruined by the expense of repressing insurrections which will be constantly renewed. Aureng Zebe ruined the Mogul Empire by the acquisition of the Decan; from the time that he had made that acquisition, the Empire was too large for Government; you may fear the same fate, and the loss of your Indian Empire may be preceded by struggles destructive of your happiness.

It may be asked, does not the possession of Empire in India counterbalance the loss which you have sustained in America? I have no hesitation in answering, No. Your Continental possessions in America added to the strength of Great Britain, they enabled you to command the French and Spanish West India Islands. Even the treasures of the Continent of Spanish America, could not be safely brought to Europe, while you were disposed to prevent it. Your Continental possessions in America could not

be attacked by sea; and whatever complaints might be made of murders committed by the Indians, it was manifest, that the Indians, like the wild beasts of the forest, would either be extirpated or exterminated in proportion as the agriculturist advanced.

Your American Empire was inattackable; it was so happily united to your European possessions, that it rendered you the most formidable power in the world. But your Indian Empire is a source of weakness; you are under constant apprehension, that it may be attacked by some foreign enemy.

While you keep it, you must be always extending its limits; for both your civil and military servants derive immediate wealth from new acquisitions. The very size of the Empire must ultimately destroy it. But there is another circumstance in the present state of your Indian Empire, which must necessarily create great embarrassment. This Empire has been acquired by a Company of Merchants;

and they retained the character of exclusive trader, after they had assumed that of sovereign. They have now resigned the character of exclusive trader. They allow British subjects to trade concurrently with themselves; but retain the sovereignty. Sovereign and trader, are characters incompatible: as traders, they will be defrauded; and as sovereigns, they will oppress those who are their rivals in trade. The present condition of the India Company therefore, cannot long subsist. They must content themselves with one character; they must either be sovereigns or traders.

CHAPTER XIII.

Impeachment of Mr. Hastings.

I HAVE hitherto only slightly alluded to the Impeachment of Mr. Hastings. But of the twenty-two charges exhibited against that gentleman, two, viz. the first and the third, are of such historical importance, that I think it may be advisable to state them accurately.

The first was denominated the *Rohilla* Charge; the latter the *Benares* Charge. I have already mentioned, that on the dissolution of the Mogul Empire about the year 1740, by the invasion of Nadir Shah, the Governors of Provinces in many places assumed the Sovereignty. A chieftain of Mountaineers, known by the name of the Rohillas, usurped the Sovereignty of a district, to which, from his own tribe, he gave the name of the Rohilla Country. This district was a rich soil, and had about two millions of inhabitants. The

Rohilla Chief and his descendants had possessed this Sovereignty, from the first usurpation in 1742, to their expulsion in 1774, by Sujah Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude. In the summer of 1773, Mr. Hastings, at that time President of the Council in Bengal, had an interview with Sujah Dowlah in the upper provinces; I believe at Benares. The Directors of the India Company had pointed out to Mr. Hastings two objects which they were very solicitous to obtain. The first was a larger payment from Sujah Dowlah for the use of their troops whenever they were employed in his service. The second was, to prevail on Sujah Dowlah to purchase from them two Provinces known by the names of *Corah* and *Allahabad.* When the heir apparent of the great Mogul, called the Shah Zadee, had been received under the protection of the India Company, they had assigned to the Prince the possession of these two Provinces for his maintenance. After having possessed these Provinces for some few years, the young Prince was persuaded to attempt to recover the throne of Delhi. To enable

him to execute this project, he quitted these Provinces; which were immediately again taken possession of by the India Company. But Corah and Allahabad were so remote from the other possessions of the India Company, that they could not be defended, except at an expense exceeding the revenue which could be drawn from them. And as the deranged state of the Company's finances, both at home and in India, did not make it advisable for them to incur this additional expense, the Directors wished to dispose of these Provinces to Sujah Dowlah, the only Monarch who was capable of defending them against the Mahrattas.

When Mr. Hastings met Sujah Dowlah in 1773, he succeeded with him in both these objects. He prevailed on him to make a larger payment for the use of the Company's troops; and he obtained the sum of £500,000 for the sale of the above named Provinces. Sujah Dowlah then brought forward the object which he wished to obtain from the India Company. He stated, that in 1772, the Ro-

hillas had applied to him for assistance against the Mahrattas, who had invaded their territory; that he had been extremely unwilling to afford them this assistance; that he had at last been prevailed on by Sir Robert Barker, the Commander of the Company's troops in the upper Provinces, to enter into a Treaty with them; that by this Treaty, he had engaged to assist the Rohillas to drive out the Mahrattas; and that in consideration of this assistance, they had stipulated to pay him £400,000. That he had successfully assisted them;—that he had driven out the Mahrattas;—and that the Rohillas refused to pay him the stipulated sum. As he had afforded this assistance to the Rohillas solely through the persuasion of Sir Robert Barker, and at his earnest solicitation, and from a reliance that his authority would secure to him the stipulated payment, he thought himself entitled to call on the India Company to assist him in punishing this gross breach of faith by the Rohillas: Mr. Hastings acquiesced in the justice of the demand. After these points of the treaty had been

arranged, Mr. Hastings and Sujah Dowlah remained some days longer at Benares. Before they separated, Sujah Dowlah came to him and made the following statement:

"I have yielded to your two objects, and you have yielded to mine. But on more mature reflection, as I am immediately to pay to the India Company, £500,000 for the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad, and have also agreed to increase my payment for the use of their troops, I find that my treasure will be so much exhausted that I shall not be immediately able to adopt any measures against the Rohillas. I must therefore defer, for the present, my intended designs against them. But if future circumstances should make it necessary for me to commence hostile proceedings against the Rohillas, I trust that you will recollect, that I have yielded to your two objects, and that you, in consideration of this, have agreed to afford me the assistance of the India Company for the execution of this measure: and that whenever I

call for your assistance, no time shall be wasted in discussing the propriety of my demand; but that your troops shall immediately obey my call."

Mr. Hastings acquiesced in the fairness of this reasoning, and pledged himself that the Company's troops should march to his assistance against the Rohillas whenever they were called on.

Whether the Rohillas received any intimation of this discussion between Mr. Hastings and Sujah Dowlah, or whether their conduct was the result of a consciousness of their own breach of faith, I cannot say. But in the Autumn of that same year, Sujah Dowlah received information that the Rohillas were negociating a treaty with the Mahrattas for the invasion of his Dominions. He then saw that hostilities against the Rohillas could no longer be deferred. He stated to Mr. Hastings the intelligence which he had received, and demanded the assistance of the Company's troops. Mr. Hastings, with the approbation of his Council, ordered the troops to

place themselves under the direction of Sujah Dowlah. The War was commenced in the spring, 1774. The Rohillas were subdued; and at the close of the Campaign, a Treaty was concluded between them and Sujah Dowlah, called the *Treaty of Loldong*, by which it was agreed, that one of the Rohilla Chiefs should retain a certain portion of the country, and remove to it with five thousand of his troops. The rest of the Rohilla Army were to cross the Ganges, and place themselves under another Rohilla Chief of the name of *Zabeda Cawn*. On the discussion of this charge, Sir Robert Barker was examined at the bar of the House of Commons. It appeared from his evidence that he had signed that Treaty by which Sujah Dowlah engaged to assist the Rohillas against the Mahrattas. When asked why he had signed that Treaty, he answered, "That if he had not signed it, there would have been no treaty; for that neither of the parties had any confidence in the good faith of the other; and that each of the parties had acceded to the

Treaty relying on the security afforded by his signature; "That he had urged Sujah Dowlah to this Treaty because he thought that if the Mahrattas had possessed themselves of the Rohilla Country, the India Company's territory would have been endangered." When asked whether he thought the Rohillas ever intended to pay the money, he replied, "That he was fully persuaded that they never would pay it, except compelled by force."

It did not appear from the evidence before the House of Commons, whether the evacuation of the country by the Rohilla Army, was an article which had been insisted on by Sujah Dowlah, or had been granted at the request of the Rohilla Chiefs.

This question of the Rohilla War was debated for two nights in the House of Commons; and on the last debate, the House did not divide till after eight o'clock in the morning Mr. Pitt took no part in the de-

bate; though, I believe, he voted for Mr. Hastings. No Treasury letters had been sent out, as is usual when the Minister has formed his opinion on any subject. The Charge had been drawn up by Mr. Burke with great art. The debate was also conducted with much unfairness: for instead of the question proposed to the House, being, that the House should adopt the Charge, the question was put in these terms—That in case the House should ultimately determine to impeach Mr. Hastings, the Rohilla Charge should form part of the Impeachment. By this dexterity in putting the question on which the House was to divide, many Members were brought to vote in the affirmative, who could not otherwise have been persuaded to do it. They voted for the question from a belief, that at the close of the discussion of the various Charges, no Impeachment would be preferred. But all this dexterity failed of success. When it appeared that the two millions of inhabitants remained in the country, and that that which Mr. Burke had stated to be

"the Extirpation of a whole Nation," amounted to nothing more than the evacuation of the Country by an Army of 26,000 men, the House was disgusted with the exaggeration which had been practised; and notwithstanding every exertion of the Foxite party, the question was negatived by a majority of fifty-three votes.

It may not be foreign to this subject to remark, that the Rohillas inhabit the same tract of mountainous country with the Afghans; but that they are considered as the inferior tribe.

Arrian, in his account of India, speaks of two tribes who inhabited the same mountainous country; and says, "that one of these tribes was inferior in rank to the other." It is curious that the same difference of rank which existed in the remote period mentioned by Arrian, should be found to prevail in our time. Arrian wrote in the reign of the Roman Emperor, Adrian. And though he wrote at a

period when the Greek language may be considered to have been on the decline, yet his style has been thought so pure and elegant, that it has obtained him the name of the younger Xenophon.

He compiled his account of India from the papers of Megasthenes, physician to Seleneus, one of Alexander's immediate successors. Alexander never penetrated farther into India than the Penjab. He sailed down one of the five rivers of that country into the Indus, and from thence returned to Babylon. Seleneus certainly reached the Ganges. He resided for some time at a city which the Greek historian calls *Palibothra*. There is very little doubt but that this city is the same which the Moderns call *Patna*, as it is still in the language of the country called *Palipoutre*. Every man acquainted with India, must find much pleasure in reading this work of Arrian, for he will see that India, in those remote times, was nearly the same in point of usages, manners, dress, amusements, division of casts, &c. &c. as it is at present.

I will now speak of the Benares Charge. The Rajah Bulwant-sing held the province of Benares, as a Renter, or *Zemindar*, from Sujah Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude. On the termination of the India Company's War with Sujah Dowlah, Bulwant-sing thought it for his interest to court the protection of the India Company. And as the province of Benares was situated between their territories and the dominions of Oude, the India Company thought it for their interest to afford to Bulwant-sing that protection which he solicited. They did not withdraw him from his subjection to Sujah Dowlah, but they compelled Sujah Dowlah to agree, that while Bulwant-sing paid him annually the sum of £220,000, he should never call on him for any other payments or services; Sujah Dowlah died in 1775. The Government of Bengal was at that time in the hands of Mr. Hastings, General Clavering, General Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis; or, to speak more correctly, it was in the hands of General Clavering, General Monson, and Mr. Francis. For those three gentlemen

had, by confederating together, reduced Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell to be of little importance. The three gentlemen above mentioned proposed that Azoph Ul Dowlah, the son and successor of Sujah Dowlah, should be compelled to resign the sovereignty of Benares with the attendant rent, to the India Company. Mr. Hastings strongly objected to this proposal. He thought that it was for the interest of the Company to set bounds to its desires of aggrandizement. He gave it as his opinion, that the India Company would draw more revenue from the possession of Bengal and Bahar, than it would do if it extended its empire beyond those limits. But the opinion of Mr. Hastings was over-ruled; and the sovereignty of Benares was transferred by Azoph Ul Dowlah to the India Company. It is scarcely worth while to consider, whether the opinion, at that time given by Mr. Hastings, was founded in sound policy or not. It was not only overruled at that time by his colleagues, but an opinion directly contrary to that of Mr. Hastings seems now to be entertained by

the India Company; perhaps, by the majority of the British nation: for the present opinion seems to be, that you must possess the whole of India; and that except you possess the whole, you cannot be secure in the possession of any part. I will only express my wish, *Quod Felix sit faustumque.* In 1779, Hyder Ali invaded the Carnatic. At that time, by the deaths of General Clavering and General Monson, Mr. Hastings had regained his ascendancy in the Bengal Government. In the minutes of the deliberations of the Council on that invasion, it appears that Mr. Francis delivered as his opinion, "that neither soldier nor rupee should be sent to the Carnatic; for that that country was irrecoverably lost; and that every soldier, and every rupee, sent there, would be uselessly expended." Mr. Hastings's opinion was directly the reverse of that of Mr. Francis. His minute is in these terms: "While I have a soldier, or a rupee, I will never abandon the Carnatic; for if we do not fight Hyder Ali in that country, we shall have to fight him here." In pursuance of this opinion, Mr. Hast-

ings put the whole force of the Bengal empire in activity. At the moment that the army which he had collected was about to set out for the Carnatic, Chemnajee, the son of the Rajah of Berar, appeared on the frontiers of Bengal, demanding the *chout*, or tribute, paid in antient times to the Mahrattas. Chemnajee had with him about fifty thousand ill-disciplined followers. They could not have stood before the army collected by Mr. Hastings, but they could have delayed the march of that army, the presence of which was so necessary in the Carnatic. To prevent this delay, Mr. Hastings entered into a treaty with Chemnajee. He agreed to pay him £210,000; in consideration of which payment, Chemnajee engaged not only to relinquish all hostilities against the province of Bengal, but also to grant to the British Army an unmolested passage through the dominions of the Rajah of Berar, and to supply the Army with provisions during its march. This Treaty was faithfully observed on both sides, and the British Army arrived in the Carnatic without the smallest loss. I have mentioned

this transaction, because it was the subject of the second Charge exhibited by Mr. Burke, against Mr. Hastings. Mr. Francis had resisted every proposal of Mr. Hastings for sending relief to the Carnatic. Among others, he had resisted this Treaty with Chemnajee, and had prevailed on Mr. Burke to introduce the subject as one of his Charges; but it was abandoned. Mr. Fox told me, that he did not think it contained ground for Impeachment. Were I to presume to give my opinion on this subject, I should say, that instead of reprehension, Mr. Hastings deserved applause. That his conduct exhibited a master-mind capable of firm decision on a question of great emergency. I have said, that to enable himself to send relief to the Carnatic, Mr. Hastings put every part of the Bengal empire in motion. He called for men and money from every quarter. He did not consider the Rajah of Benares as entitled to exemption from this demand; and he required from Cheyt-sing, who had succeeded his father, Bulwant-sing, in that Zemindary, the assistance of two regiments of cavalry.

Mr. Francis was at that time at the head of the opposition to Mr. Hastings in the Bengal Council; and as he had resisted every effort for sending relief to the Carnatic, he objected to this demand of two regiments from Cheyt-sing. This opposition of Mr. Francis encouraged Cheyt-sing in disobedience, and the repeated demand of Mr. Hastings for assistance, was either wholly evaded, or only in part complied with. Mr. Hastings determined to punish Cheyt-sing for this conduct. He repaired to Benares; he summoned Cheyt-sing before him; he reprimanded him for his conduct, and then ordered him to consider himself as under arrest. Mr. Hastings then commanded an Officer with about two hundred and eighty Sepoys, to escort Cheyt-sing to his own palace, and to guard him there as under arrest. The Officer, who commanded this escort, was guilty of a neglect which produced disastrous consequences. He marched off the escort without providing them with powder and ball. When the dependants of Cheyt-sing had discovered this circumstance, they thought themselves strong

enough to break into the palace, and set the Rajah at liberty. The Sepoys, with their bayonets, if they had acted with firmness, would have been able to repel the attack; but conscious that they were not provided with their usual means of defence they were seized with a panic, they fled, and Cheyt-sing was set at liberty. I believe that the generous character of Mr. Hastings prevented this neglect of the Commander of the escort from being generally known; he felt reluctance at an attempt to excuse himself by throwing blame on another. When the Benares Charge was argued in the House of Commons, Mr. Fox rested his argument solely on this principle, that Cheyt-sing was an independent Prince, no way liable to be called on for succour by the Bengal Government. Mr. Pitt resisted this opinion of Mr. Fox; on the contrary, he said, "Cheyt-sing was a vassal of the Bengal empire, and as he received protection from that empire, he owed to it allegiance; and in consequence of that duty of allegiance, was liable to be called on for extraordinary aids on extraordinary emergencies." He

also assented to an assertion, which had been advanced in the course of the debate, viz. "That Mr. Hastings having only put Cheyt-sing under arrest for the purpose of subjecting his conduct to examination, could not be criminated for having inflicted too harsh a punishment on him." But he said, "that the whole of Mr. Hastings's conduct showed that he intended to punish Cheyt-sing with too much severity; this intention was criminal, and for this criminal intention, he should, though with much reluctance, vote for the Impeachment of M. Hastings." Thus was this Impeachment voted by a majority of the House, although those who voted were not agreed as to the ground of criminality.

A few mornings after the vote, I was with Lord Thurlow. He strongly reprobated Mr. Pitt's conduct; especially his grounding the Impeachment on Mr. Hastings's *intention* to commit a crime. Among other expressions, I recollect he said, "If a girl had talked law in those terms, she might have been excusable." No other Charges against Mr. Hastings were dis-

cussed in the House of Commons that Session. The examination of the remaining nineteen Charges was deferred till the ensuing Session. I had taken part in the debates on the Rohilla and Benares Charges; but as I saw at the commencement of the next Session, that Mr. Pitt had decided that the Impeachment against Mr. Hastings should be voted, I gave myself no further trouble on the subject. There were people who thought that Mr. Pitt had adopted this line of conduct, to prevent the King from employing Mr. Hastings in India affairs. But I do not believe that Mr. Pitt was actuated by so personal and so paltry a motive. I think he consented to the Impeachment, because he saw the controul which he should obtain over the Opposition by such acquiescence; and his expectations were answered.

I will now say a few words on the nature of an Impeachment:—an Impeachment is an accusation preferred by the Commons to be tried by the Peers. It is not *ex debito justitiæ;* it is an extraordinary mode of proceeding. It is not to be consi-

dered as analogous to an Indictment, for an Indictment is an accusation for one definite offence; whereas the Impeachment may be preferred for many offences considered together. Correctly speaking, Impeachment is to be resorted to where an Indictment could not reach the whole of the criminality. It is an accusation preferred against a public Minister: and the question which every Member of the House of Commons ought to consider before he gives his vote, is this :—"On the whole of this public servant's conduct considered together, is it expedient that he should be criminated?" On the Charges against Mr. Hastings, I regulated my conduct by this mode of reasoning; I remembered that wise maxim of the common law, *Actio non est rea nisi mens sit rea.* I asked myself, whether I could find the *mens rea* in Mr. Hastings's conduct on either of the three Charges I have above enumerated; suppose for instance, that he had mistaken the law of nations, in thinking that Sir Robert Barker had pledged the guarantee of the India Company, by signing the Treaty between Sujah

Dowlah, and the Rohillas; and that he had also been misfaken in the opinion which he had formed, that in consequence of this guarantee, the India Company was bound to give assistance to Sujah Dowlah against the Rohillas. Had Mr. Hastings derived any advantage to himself from these mistakes? And if he had derived no advantage to himself, how could I fix on him the *mens rea?* He had given a sum of money to Chemnajee to induce him to relinquish his design of invading Bengal, and to afford assistance to the Army which was passing from Bengal into the Carnatic. What personal advantage accrued to Mr. Hastings from this Treaty? He furthered his design of sending assistance as expeditiously as possible to the Carnatic, and manifestly this was his only object. In respect to the ground on which Mr. Pitt had concurred in the Benares Charge, viz. "That Mr. Hastings had intended to punish Cheyt-sing too severely," the human mind could hardly imagine any thing weaker. Mr. Hastings had never punished him. He had only put him under an arrest with a view to the examination of his conduct,

and for subsequent punishment, if he should be found to have deserved it. The liberation of Cheyt Sing by his dependants precluded all further examination. But neither on the ground taken by Mr. Fox, *viz.* "that he had demanded aid from Cheyt Sing where none was due," nor on that taken by Mr. Pitt, "that he had intended to punish Cheyt Sing too severely," could I see any thing like a criminal mind. If on all these points he had acted erroneously, he had acted from mistake, and not from that criminal mind, which alone is punishable.

In forming my opinion on the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, I took various points into consideration. The British nation had confided the management of its Indian Empire to the India Company. The India Company regulated its Indian concerns through the agency of a Governor General and Council. The Governor General was the efficient person in that Council. If in any instance Mr. Hastings had acted under the influence of corrupt passions, he was punishable by

impeachment. But if on any occasion he had only acted from a mistaken judgement, I thought he ought not to be punished by the impeachment of the House of Commons. On the Rohilla Charge I thought, that Mr. Hastings had acted consonantly to the law of nations. That Sir Robert Barker's signature of the treaty between Sujah Dowlah and the Rohillahs amounted to a guarantee; and that it authorized Sujah Dowlah to call on the India Company to assist him in obtaining the stipulated payment. Here then Mr. Hastings was guilty of no mistake, and the House of Commons concurred in this opinion. The treaty with Chemnajee was said to be disgraceful to the English name. But the advantages gained by it were so great, that I could never bring myself to disapprove of it. On the Benares Charge my opinion still remains the same. Protection and allegiance are reciprocal duties. Wherever protection is received, allegiance is due. Cheyt Sing could not have existed for a single hour if unprotected by the British Government. He would have been devoured by the Nabob

of Oude. He was like a pigeon under the eye of a hawk, who would have pounced on him if unrestrained by a superior power. I therefore could not consider Mr. Hastings as having formed an erroneous opinion, when he said, "Cheyt Sing was the vassal of the India Company, and owes assistance when the Company has occasion for extraordinary aids." I also recollected the very peculiar difficulties which Mr. Hastings was under when he was called on to form an opinion on great political questions. The nature of the British Empire in India was hardly developed. We had scarcely formed an accurate opinion on it ourselves. The policy of the Mogul Government had established two distinct departments in each province. In the military department the Nabob was supreme: in the civil department the Dewan. The English India Company founded its authority in Bengal and Bahar on a real or supposed grant of the Dewanee of those provinces from the Great Mogul. They continued, however, to exhibit to the natives a splendid pageant, which they called a Nabob, and all dis-

cussions with foreign Princes were under the name of this Nabob. Mr. Hastings must certainly have felt much embarassment from the undefined power of his masters.

I thought also, that it was reasonable to take into consideration his situation in India. In England, if the minister is called on to decide on a great political question, he has many men at hand who can assist him with their advice. He has lawyers in every branch of that study. He has men, who have travelled in all parts of the world, and who know the relation which the concerns of other countries bear to British interests. When Mr. Hastings was called on to decide, he had no such assistance near him. I therefore can only wonder that he did not make more mistakes. The three charges which I have taken notice of were the three subjects on which Mr. Francis had opposed the government of Mr. Hastings in Bengal. He had prevailed on Mr. Burke to adopt his opinions on these points; and Mr. Burke's influence over Mr. Fox had

induced that gentleman to bring down the Opposition in full force to support these charges. In truth, the charges exhibited by Mr. Burke in the House of Commons were nothing more than a continuation of that opposition, which Mr. Francis, while in India, had made to the measures of Mr. Hastings's government. I was unacquainted with Mr. Hastings when these charges were laid on the table. When I examined them, I was disgusted with the unfair manner in which they were framed. This led me to take part in the debates; and after the session was ended, I became acquainted with Mr. Hastings. He appeared to me to be a man of a strong, vigorous, decisive mind; well acquainted with the character of the natives of India, and with the views and interests of its various Princes. He seemed to me to be a man capable of extricating himself from difficulties by his great resources and dauntless courage. In one word, he came nearer to the idea which I had formed of an able statesman, than any other man with whom I ever had intercourse. But he was a statesman only for the affairs of India.

He knew nothing of the various parties in England, their interests, their designs, their ability to effectuate those designs, or how far they were likely to be influenced or restrained by moral considerations. These were subjects on which he seemed to me never to have formed any opinion. I have said, that Mr. Hastings was capable of extricating himself from difficulties by his great resources and his dauntless courage. He displayed these qualities in a most remarkable manner, while surrounded by the forces of Cheyt Sing at Benares. Mr. Hastings had with him only four hundred soldiers, Cheyt Sing had forty thousand. If Cheyt Sing had attacked him, Mr. Hastings's situation must have been forced before he could have collected assistance. But instead of an immediate attack, the Rajah sent in a proposal to treat with him. Mr. Hastings knew, that if he opened a treaty, the Indian Prince's courage would be increased, and that he would, most probably, immediately attack him. That, on the contrary, if he refused to treat, Cheyt Sing would suppose, that Mr. Hastings had some resources with

which he was unacquainted. He therefore sent for answer to his proposal, that before he would listen to any excuse for his conduct, Cheyt Sing must come into Benares, and throw himself at his feet. This answer intimidated Cheyt Sing, and allowed time for troops to come to the relief of Mr. Hastings.

I have thus given my opinion on the three first charges exhibited by Mr. Burke against Mr. Hastings. I have entered into the consideration of them with much reluctance. I had taken part in the debates on the first and third charges; and from that circumstance may be thought to have my opinion prejudiced in favour of Mr. Hastings. I was unacquainted with that gentleman when the discussion was first entered on in the House of Commons. But, after the close of that session, I was introduced to him, and gradually admitted to the most intimate and confidential communications. I acknowledge, that I think of his memory with the highest veneration. I think, that he was a man of the most powerful mind I have ever conversed with.

I have said, that the charges, brought forward by Mr. Burke against Mr. Hastings, were on those subjects, which had been matter of discussion between Mr. Francis and Mr Hastings, while the former gentleman was in India; that the impeachment of Mr. Hastings was a continuation of Mr. Francis's opposition to Mr. Hastings's Government. I believe I am correct in this assertion. All the materials for the twenty-two charges, brought forward by Mr. Burke, were furnished by Mr. Francis. And Mr. Burke had sufficient influence to prevail on Mr. Fox to support the charges with the whole strength of Opposition. Mr. Francis was a man of considerable abilities. He was a very superior classical scholar; and he was capable of laborious application. Strong resentment was a leading feature in his character. I have heard him avow this sentiment more openly and more explicitly than I ever heard any other man avow it in the whole course of my life. I have heard him publicly say in the House of Commons, "Sir Elijah Impey is not fit to sit in judgement on any matter where I

am interested, nor am I fit to sit in judgement on him." A relation of the ground of this ill will may be amusing. Mrs. Le Grand, the wife of a gentleman in the Civil Service in Bengal, was admired for her beauty, for the sweetness of her temper, and for her fascinating accomplishments. She attracted the attention of Mr. Francis. This gentleman, by means of a rope-ladder, got into her apartment in the night. After he had remained there about three quarters of an hour, there was an alarm; and Mr. Francis came down from the lady's apartment by the rope-ladder, at the foot of which he was seized by Mr. Le Grand's servants. An action was brought by Mr. Le Grand against Mr. Francis, in the Supreme Court of Justice in Calcutta. The judges in that court assess the damages in civil actions, without the intervention of a jury. The gentlemen who at that time filled this situation, were Sir Elijah Impey, Chief Justice, Sir Robert Chambers, and Mr. Justice Hyde. I was intimate with the first and the third from early life; having lived with them on the Western Circuit.

On the trial of this cause, Sir Robert Chambers thought, that as no criminality had been proved, no damages should be given. But he afterwards proposed to give thirty thousand rupees, which are worth about three thousand pounds sterling. Mr. Justice Hyde was for giving a hundred thousand rupees. I believe, that Mr. Justice Hyde was as upright a judge as ever sat on any bench; but he had an implacable hatred to those, who indulged in the crime imputed to Mr. Francis. Sir Elijah Impey was of opinion, that although no criminal intercourse had been proved, yet that the wrong done by Mr. Francis to Mr. Le Grand in entering his wife's apartment in the night, and thereby destroying her reputation, ought to be compensated with liberal damages. He thought the sum of thirty thousand rupees, proposed by Sir Robert Chambers, too small; and that proposed by Mr. Hyde, of a hundred thousand, too large. He therefore suggested a middle course, of fifty thousand rupees. This proposal was acquiesced in by his two colleagues. When Sir Elijah Impey was delivering the judge-

ment of the Court, my late friend, Mr Justice Hyde, could not conceal his eager zeal on the subject; and when Sir Elijah named the sum of fifty thousand rupees, Mr. Justice Hyde, to the amusement of the bystanders, called out, "Siccas, brother Impey;" which are worth eleven per cent. more than the current rupees. Perhaps this story may not be thought worthy of relation: but it gave occasion to that animosity, which Mr. Francis publicly avowed against Sir Elijah Impey; and the criminal charge, afterwards brought against him in the House of Commons, was the offspring of that animosity. I will follow up this anecdote by mentioning the consequences of the action brought by Mr. Le Grand. The lady was divorced: she was obliged to throw herself under the protection of Mr. Francis for subsistence. After a short time she left him, and went to England. In London she fell into the company of M. Talleyrand Perigord. Captivated by her charms, he prevailed on her to accompany him to Paris, where he married her; and thus the insult, which this lady received from Mr. Francis, and the loss of reputation, which was, perhaps

unjustly, the consequence of that insult, eventually elevated her to the rank of Princess of Benevento.

As I took part in the defence of Mr. Hastings on the two charges which I have mentioned, and was known to interest myself much in the welfare of Sir Elijah Impey, I speak with some reluctance of Mr. Francis; but the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, and the accusation of Sir Elijah Impey, both originated with him.

The first charge brought forward the ensuing session excited so much of the public attention, that although I took no part in the debate while it was depending in the House of Commons, yet it may perhaps not be improper to state the subject. It was called the *Begum* Charge. It grew out of a political discussion between Mr. Francis and Mr. Hastings, while those gentlemen were in India. This charge rested on the following circumstances. Sujah Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, died in 1775. He left a widow, named the *Bhow Begum*; and by her one

only son, Azoph Ul Dowlah, who succeeded him in the sovereignty of Oude. I believe the Mahometan law allows a man to have four wives; but Sujah Dowlah had never availed himself of this permission. The Bhow Begum was the only woman whom he had ever married. For some years he had lived with her on indifferent terms. But when he was in a state of distress, in consequence of his hostilities with the English Government, his wife collected all her treasure, and all the force which she could draw together, and joined him in his hour of need; determined to share with him his good or ill success. This conduct regained her the affections of Sujah Dowlah. From that hour she was the person on whose attachment he placed the most entire confidence. Those, who are not acquainted with the manners of an Asiatic Court, can with difficulty form an idea of the power of a woman locked up in a zenana, and precluded from personal intercourse with men, except such as stand related to her in the character of husband or children. But the power of the Bhow Begum in her hus-

band's court seems to have exceeded that which is commonly allowed to the wives of Sovereigns in Europe. She was his treasurer: no payment was made except authorized by her signature.* At his death all his treasure was in her apartments, and in her possession. Her only son, Azoph Ul Dowlah, admitted his mother's right to retain a portion of this treasure; but contended, that, by the Mahometan law, the greater part of it belonged to himself, as his father's successor in the Sovereignty of Oude. He also urged, that very heavy arrears were due to his father's army, and that if he were deprived of this treasure he should be unable to satisfy their demands. The mother declared, that she would keep the whole. I do not pretend to know enough of the Mahometan law to be able to form an opinion on this question between the mother and her son. The Bengal Government, at that time exercised by General Clavering, General Monson, and Mr. Francis, espoused the cause of the Bhow Begum, in opposition to the opinion of Mr. Hastings. They allowed the lady to retain three parts in four of

the treasure: by which decision the money received by Azoph Ul Dowlah amounted only to about eight hundred thousand pounds. It was generally believed, that the treasure left by Sujah Dowlah much exceeded the sum admitted by the Bhow Begum to be in her possession; and it was so very difficult to prove all the remittances of money, which had been made to the treasury, that the amount of the treasure left by Sujah Dowlah was necessarily estimated almost wholly by the admission of the lady herself. The Bengal Government guaranteed to the Bhow Begum, not only the possession of this treasure, but also of a large *Jaghire*, with the exercise of almost sovereign power within that district. This decision of the Bengal Government compelled Azoph Ul Dowlah to begin the exercise of sovereignty under great difficulties. The discharge of the debts left unpaid by his father was claimed from him; and that treasure, with which they ought to have been paid, was withheld from him. Mr. Hastings considered the Nabob of Oude as a dependant on the Bengal Government; and when the

war with France begun in 1778, and the invasion of the Carnatic by Hyder Ali in the following year made it necessary for him to call forth all the resources of the Bengal Empire, he called for supplies of men and money from Azoph Ul Dowlah. That Prince furnished them cheerfully, and to a great amount; but in the beginning of the year 1782 there was no money in this Prince's treasury; and he was unable to make his payments to the Bengal Government; yet the money was absolutely necessary to enable that Government to continue its exertions against France and Hyder Ali. In this embarassment, the ministers of Azoph Ul Dowlah suggested the propriety of cancelling that division of Sujah Dowlah's treasure between the Bhow Begum and her son; which, as they said, had been unjustly made under the authority of the Bengal Government. Mr. Hastings resisted this proposal: but he thought it equitable, that the mother should come to the assistance of her son; and he therefore consented, that the ministers of Azoph Ul Dowlah should employ such means as they thought

expedient to prevail on her to afford him pecuniary assistance, provided that they most carefully abstained from offering any mark of disrespect to her person, or any violation of the privileges belonging to her place of residence. When Azoph Ul Dowlah's ministers had obtained this permission, they watched the first opportunity of finding the Bhow Begum's two principal ministers, *Johar Ali Cawn*, and *Behar Ali Cawn*, out of the privileged limits of her residence, and seized their persons. These two eunuchs directed all the concerns of the Begum. They were privy to the amount of her wealth, and to all her other secrets; and were believed to be the persons, who had principally advised her to refuse assistance to her son. It was the design of Azoph Ul Dowlah's ministers to intimidate the eunuchs to such a degree, as to induce them to recommend to their mistress to advance money to her son. The design succeeded, and the Begum assisted her son with five hundred thousand pounds.

On this charge Mr. Sheridan made a

speech which both sides of the House professed greatly to admire; for Mr. Pitt now openly approved of the impeachment. I will acknowledge, that I did not admire this speech of Mr. Sheridan. The House was called on to concur with Mr. Burke in accusing Mr. Hastings. Accusatorial functions approach very nearly to judicial functions; and in my opinion ought to be exercised with the same caution, and with equal observance of integrity. Mr. Sheridan's speech was not calculated to inform, but to mislead his hearers. The charge was adopted. The remaining charges occasioned little discussion. The impeachment of Mr. Hastings was voted, and carried up to the House of Lords.

I have thus stated the four political charges brought by Mr. Burke against Mr. Hastings. The remaining charges were of much less importance; they related chiefly to objections to Mr. Hastings's conduct in the details of his government. Although I took no part in the debate on the Begum Charge, I voted against it. Mr. Hastings had derived no advantage

to himself from the permission which he had thus granted to the ministers of Azoph Ul Dowlah. He stood the minister of the British Nation, exercising powers scarcely defined by that Nation which had confided them to him. He was to exercise these powers without being assisted with the advice of others. I looked only to the integrity of his conduct: I could not bring myself to punish him for mistakes, even if I had thought that mistakes had been commited. But, in this Begum Charge, I did not think that Mr. Hastings had made any mistake. I thought it was equitable, that the unjust division of Sujah Dowlah's treasure, which had been made in 1775, should be set aside.

In thus resisting the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, I am not conscious that I was influenced by any improper motive. I had never lived in much intercourse with Mr. Francis, but I had always been impressed with the idea of his being a man of very considerable abilities. I acknowledge, that I had disapproved of his

conduct while he stood, in the Bengal Government, the opponent of those measures, which were recommended by Mr. Hastings. The French and Hyder Ali had attacked our possessions in India. Mr. Hastings thought, that every effort of the British Empire in India should be employed to resist them. Mr. Francis was of a different opinion. He scrupulously examined every exertion that was proposed. He viewed it in all its bearings; and raised every objection, which his abilities and his well-informed mind enabled him to bring forward. My mind had been accustomed to meditate on the misfortunes brought on us by the American War. At the commencement of that war, in 1775, the American Colonies formed the Western branch, and our possessions in India the Eastern branch of our Empire. In the course of that war the American branch was torn from us. What must have been our situation if we had experienced similar misfortunes in India? How should we have treated with France, Spain, Holland, and the United States of

America, at the commencement of the year 1783, if the British Empire in India had been conquered by our enemies? It was preserved to us; and, as I think, its preservation was the result of the energies of that able statesman, Warren Hastings. I had lived in habits of acquaintance with Mr. Edmund Burke. I had no prejudices against him; for he had not at that time involved my country in the crusade against French principles. Before he brought forward the charges against Mr. Hastings, he conversed with me very fully on the subject. I put this question to him: "Can you prove, that Mr. Hastings ever derived any advantage to himself from that misconduct, which you impute to him?" He acknowledged, "that he could not;" but added, "that his whole government of India had been one continued violation of the great principles of justice." Before the charges were laid on the table, I had a second conversation with Mr. Burke on the subject. When he found that I persevered in my opinion, he told me, "that in that case I must relin-

quish the friendship of the Duke of Portland." I replied, "that that would give me pain; but that I would rather relinquish the Duke of Portland's friendship than support an impeachment which I did not approve." We parted, and our intercourse was terminated.

CHAPTER XIV.

On Mr. Edmund Burke.

I MAY perhaps be thought to have spoken in some places with too much severity of Mr. Edmund Burke. My acquaintance with this gentleman began about the year 1780. My intercourse with him impressed me with the highest idea of his political erudition. I say nothing of his abilities: my opinion of him on that head is the same as is generally entertained, *viz.* that he had great powers, with very little judgement. I never had any personal difference with him: at the commencement of our intercourse my admiration of him was great; it gradually diminished into disapprobation of his measures, and disapprobation gradually increased into disesteem. In the autumn, 1781, when it was visible, that the nation was every day becoming more tired of the American War, and that Lord North

would be obliged to relinquish it, I was very anxious to see union established between the friends of the Marquis of Rockingham and those of the Earl of Shelburne. The friends of the Earl of Shelburne professed to wish it, and I firmly believe that they were sincere. This union was prevented by Mr. Burke; the consequences of the continuance of disunion sufficiently appeared on the formation of the Cabinet of Eleven in the ensuing spring. During the three months that Lord Rockingham was minister, in 1782, I saw much in Mr. Burke's conduct which I disapproved; on the death of that noble Marquis, the separation between Mr. Fox and the Earl of Shelburne was effected solely by the efforts of Mr. Burke. Mr. Fox was a man of kindness: malice seemed to me not to enter into his composition; and I am very certain that he had no ill will to the Earl of Shelburne, even down to the hour of the Marquis of Rockingham's death.

When the separation between the friends of the deceased Marquis and the

Earl of Shelburne took place, there was a meeting of the Rockinghams at Earl Fitzwilliam's, and at this meeting, Mr. Burke spoke of the Earl of Shelburne in terms so coarse and unmeasured as to preclude all possibility of reconciliation. When the Rockinghams and Shelburnes had separated, there existed three political parties, *viz.*, Lord North's, the late Lord Rockingham's, and the Earl of Shelburne's. It was obvious, that whichever two of these parties joined, they would be too powerful in the House of Commons for the third. It may therefore be supposed, that when Mr. Burke prevailed on the Rockinghams to separate from Lord Shelburne, he had in view a union between the Rockinghams and Lord North; but I do not believe that he at that time had any such idea. The Duke of Richmond was very earnest, that the Earl of Shelburne should be prime minister, and that he himself should be considered as the head of the Rockingham party. But this was extremely disagreeable to Mr. Burke. He knew, that he had no influence over the Duke of Richmond; and

it was Mr. Burke's wish that the Duke of Portland should be brought from Ireland, and proclaimed chief of the late Marquis's friends. He urged this arrangement, because he knew that the Duke of Portland would be entirely under his guidance; and he sacrificed the political strength of his party to his own personal wishes.

William Eden was the *mezzano*, who effected the coalition between Lord North and Mr. Fox; or, as the late Duke of Norfolk, while Earl of Surrey, expressed it in the House of Commons, "He was the priest who married us." During the nine months in 1783, that the Coalitionists were in possession of the administration, they were wholly under the guidance of Mr. Burke. His arrogance was sufficiently disgusting. He ultimately ruined them by his India Bill. It was much to be regretted, that when the Marquis of Rockingham came into office in 1765, his inexperience in public business should have made it necessary that he should have about him a person who might act as his

guide. I believe Mr. Burke was a very proper person for the situation. For his failings did not perhaps at that time exist. They grew up afterwards gradually, as their growth was encouraged by the occasion. While the Duke of Portland was first Lord of the Treasury, Mr. Burke's influence was more authoritative than it had been during the life of the Marquis of Rockingham For Lord Rockingham, when he would venture to do it, was capable of thinking for himself.

When Mr. Burke brought forward his accusation against Mr. Hastings, he solicited me to support him. In the course of our discussion, he told me, that if I declined supporting him, I must relinquish the friendship of the Duke of Portland; and my connection with Mr. Burke, as well as with the Duke of Portland, was from that hour terminated. While Mr. Burke was the guide of the Marquis of Rockingham and of the Duke of Portland, he inculcated more openly than ever had been done before, "that every man ought to be enlisted in a party: that a member

of the House of Commons ought not to consider the merit of the question immediately before the House: that he should only consider whether he wished the minister to remain in office, or that his rivals should take his place." He inculcated this doctrine both in his speeches and his pamphlets: it always appeared to me a doctrine highly unconstitutional; but it served the views of Mr. Burke, as it recommended him to the leaders of his party; for he accompanied the doctrine with this addition, "that as the ancestors of those leaders had placed the Brunswicks on the throne, they had a right to be the ministers, and to dictate the political measures which should be pursued."

But the great injury, which Mr. Burke did to his country, was by preaching the crusade against French principles. He was emphatically the *Peter the Hermit*, who preached up this holy war. I consider this as the great measure of his life, and if I have ever spoken of him with harshness, my language has been the result of my feelings on this subject. The

French Revolution, at its very commencement, excited great alarm in the minds of princes and nobles, especially of German Princes. It is well known that George III. did not conceal his opinion on this head. Mr. Burke expressed his disapprobation of the French Revolution at an early period: his language gradually became more violent: he professed to wish to excite all parties. Not only all parties, but every religious sect in the British Empire was called on to exert itself. He did not confine himself to the limits of Great Britain and Ireland; he endeavoured to rouse every part of the Continent. His son was sent to a meeting of princes and ministers at Coblentz. The Emperor Leopold and the King of Prussia were excited by Mr. Burke's publications. In a word, he left no means unemployed to inflame the whole of Europe to the adoption of his opinion. The German Princes were the first who were prevailed on to move. I believe that Prince Kaunitz, the prime minister of the Emperor Leopold, dissuaded his master from undertaking a war against France. The Emperor Joseph

had left several parts of his dominions in a state of agitation; particularly the Netherlands, and Hungary. The Empress Maria Theresa had been much beloved in the Netherlands; but the Emperor Joseph, her son, had contrived to set the monastic orders and the nobles in that country against him. Their discontent had led them to take arms; but on the death of the Emperor Joseph, his successor Leopold found means to appease them. Much ill humour however still remained among them. Matters were not much better in Hungary, where the Emperor Joseph had much disgusted the nobles. Prince Kaunitz thought it would be more advantageous to the Emperor Leopold to regain the affections of his discontented subjects, than to embark in a war with France. But this wise minister was overruled: war was resolved on; and the King of Prussia became the ally of the Emperor. Mr. Burke seems to have had more difficulty in England. He at length prevailed on the party of the great Whig families to declare for war. But Mr. Pitt hesitated. He yielded at last with reluct-

ance. But though he consented that war should be undertaken, he does not appear ever to have adopted Mr. Burke's opinion as to the motive for the war. Mr. Burke's opinion was, that war should be undertaken to re-establish France exactly in that state in which it had existed before the commencement of the Revolution; or, according to the technical language of that day, to re-establish the *ancien regime*. Mr. Pitt viewed it as a political war; the object with him was a diminution of the power of France. The two objects were inconsistent with each other. The crusade has lasted nearly thirty years. Europe has already suffered much; and I fear her sufferings are not at an end.

CHAPTER XV.

On the Slave Trade.

I WAS in the House of Commons during the discussions on the Abolition of the Slave Trade; but I never voted on the subject: there were circumstances which led me to hesitate: and where I doubted on which side I ought to vote, I thought it most safe to abstain from voting at all. No man can like the Slave Trade. It is oppressive to the slave; it is more injurious to the master, for it corrupts his morals; accustoming him to believe, that he may live with other human creatures without being subject to the restraint of moral duties.

Perhaps there is no country in Europe in which the proportion of slaves to freemen was at one time greater than it was in England. I apprehend that this was owing to the Heptarchy. The division

of the country into seven kingdoms produced wars: wars occasioned captives, and captives became slaves. *Servi quia servabantur.* The wise decisions of our courts of law, assisted by other circumstances, effectuated enfranchisement. I will mention some of these circumstances. First, the courts of law decided, that an illegitimate child could not be a slave, or, as our law calls him, a *serf*, or *villein*. He could inherit no advantage from his parents; it would therefore have been unreasonable that he should inherit a disadvantage. Secondly, if the female slave, or, as she is called in our law books, a *niefe*, married a freeman, she became enfranchised during the coverture, and her children were free. Thirdly, if the male slave became a monk he became free. It was the same if the female slave became a nun. There were many other decisions of the courts of law, which favoured the enfranchisement of villeins. I will only mention one more, and I shall select that because it was made at so late a period as the reign of Richard II., and in opposition to the wishes of the legislature. If A, the villein of B, brought

an action in a court of law against B, and B *pleaded in bar of his action*, though A failed in his suit, yet A, the villein, became enfranchised; for B, by pleading in bar to his action, had treated A as a freeman; and he could not afterwards falsify his own admission. To prevent this inconvenience, B was under the necessity of *pleading in abatement*, or disability of A's person. His plea therefore would regularly have run in these words, "That he, B, was not bound to answer A's action, because that he, A, was his villein, regardant to B's manor of Wellington in the county of Somerset." To this plea in abatement, A, according to the regular course of pleading, ought to have replied in these words, *viz.*; "That he, A, was free, *without this*: that he, A, was the villein of B, regardant to B's manor of Wellington in the county of Somerset." Then, according to the ordinary rules of pleading, this question, whether A was a villein regardant to B's manor of Wellington in the county of Somerset, ought to have been tried by a jury of Somersetshire. But, in favour of liberty, the courts

of law departed from the ordinary course of pleading, and decided, that A should be allowed to plead in a manner different from what was commonly prescribed: and they allowed A to plead in these words, *viz.* "That he, A, was free," omiting any answer to the other part of B's plea. By this advantage thus allowed to A, the question or issue between A and B was no longer accompanied with any circumstances of locality. The issue or question between the parties was simply *whether A was free*, and was therefore to be tried by a jury of that county in which A had brought his action. In the seventeenth of Richard II. an Act of Parliament was passed, reciting an inconvenience from this mode of pleading, and applying a remedy. The act recited, that it often happened, that a villein fled into a town, where the inhabitants were disposed to favour the claim of freedom. That he then brought a fictitious and colourable action against his lord, with a view to one of these two advantages, *viz.* "That if the lord pleaded in bar of his action, he, the villein, might be enfranchised by his

lord's plea: and if the lord pleaded in disability of his person, and in abatement of his action, that then the plea might be tried by a jury every way disposed to find in the villein's favour." To remedy this mischief, the statute enacted, that the lord might plead in bar of the villein's action; accompanying his plea with a protestation, that the plaintiff was his villein: and that a plea in bar, accompanied with this protestation, should not render the villein free. This statute was written in the French language. It was manifestly intended for the protection of the lord's interest against the ill founded claim of his villein. Sir Edward Coke, in commenting on this statute, translated it incorrectly; and having, from this circumstance, puzzled himself, concludes by saying, "it is a perplexed statute, and that he does not know what to make of it." The words which Sir Edward Coke translated incorrectly are the following. The statute recites, that the villein flies into a town, *ou il est fort a trier envers son seigneur.* Sir Edward Coke translates these words, *Where it is hard to try against his lord.*

Whereas the true translation is, *Where he, the villein, is powerful in trial against his lord.* And thus, by this mistake in the translation, Sir Edward Coke supposes the legislature to have had in view a mischief directly the reverse of that which they really had in view, and which they wished to remedy. But the wise solicitude of our courts of law, to increase the number of freemen, defeated these efforts of the legislature to preserve the character of villeins in England. For the courts decided, that if the plaintiff recovered, his action then could not be deemed fictitious and colourable. It was therefore not a case within the statute. The defendant was not entitled to any benefit under the statute, and the villein was enfranchised by the defendant's plea.

Perhaps one of the circumstances, which the most contributed to the enfranchisement of our villeins, is that which is generally considered as one of the greatest calamities recorded in our history: I mean the long civil war between the houses of York and Lancaster. The

lords enfranchised their villeins, that they might use them as soldiers. It is a common expression in the historians of that period, in speaking of a great lord who took part in the civil wars, *servitia armavit.* And, as an inducement to the villeins to serve as soldiers, they enfranchised them, and granted them lands to be held by copy of court roll. Sir Edward Coke, who wrote in the reign of James I., says, that half the land in England was at that time copyhold. As the proportion of copyhold land is now very much diminished, it is possible that some people may doubt the accuracy of Sir Edward Coke's assertion. But let it be recollected, that a great proportion of the land in the western counties was even so late as in the memory of people now living, held by leases for ninety-nine years determinable on lives. And wherever this practice prevailed, there is great reason to believe, that the lands had antecedently been held by copy of court roll.

Wherever Slavery has prevailed, it has generally been the result of conquest.

On the fall of the Roman Empire, the Northern nations overran France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. They established servitude in all these countries. The Normans conquered England. Whether they reduced any of the Saxons to slavery, or were contented with the slaves whom they found in the island, is a question on which I have not formed any opinion. During the time of the Roman Republic much of the population of Italy consisted of slaves. We know also, that a large proportion of the inhabitants of Athens were slaves. It was probably the same in other states of Greece. We find in the Old Testament, that Joseph was sold to the Midianites passing from Palestine into Egypt. If the practice of carrying slaves into Egypt had not been established, it is not probable, either that Joseph's brethren would have thought of selling him, or that the Midianites would have purchased him. These Midianites were probably a caravan of slave merchants.

Let it not be supposed, that I am a friend to Slavery, because I thus remark

on its antiquity. My only difficulty is about the best means of abolishing Slavery. I doubt whether it ever can be abolished by the means which have been adopted. The inhabitants of the southern and western parts of the United States of America will with great reluctance be brought to relinquish the use of slaves. In Spanish and Portuguese America, all attempts to abolish the Slave Trade will be unsuccessful. I have remarked, that the change of the race of the inhabitants has in most countries been occasioned by conquest. But this will not be the case in respect to the Negroes carried to America. They will be carried there as slaves, but the inhabitants will gradually become a mixed race.

When the Abolition of the Slave Trade was first suggested in the House of Commons, I did not think, that the means, by which it was proposed that the abolition should be effected, were judicious. I had entirely approved of the measures by which it was hoped that the sufferings of the slaves in their passage from Africa to the West Indies might be diminished. The

bounty given to those captains, who transported their slaves with the smallest average loss, appeared likely to produce the most beneficial consequences. I thought this idea should have been farther extended. I thought no slaves should be allowed to be transported from Africa to the islands, except in large ships. In a large ship the number of the crew frees them from apprehension of the insurrection of their slaves. And from this circumstance, they are enabled to allow more indulgence to the Negroes. The number of the slaves on board each ship ought by law to have been regulated, and proportioned to the tonnage. I believe, that since the open exportation of slaves has been prohibited, much misery has been experienced by the slaves, from their being carried by contraband in small ships immoderately crowded.

But my chief hope of an amelioration in the condition of the slaves was from the decisions of the courts of law. I believe, that the courts in the West Indies still persevere in not permitting a Negro

to give evidence in any cause, either civil or criminal. I cannot conceive how this maxim has arisen. It certainly is not drawn from the common law of England. If the veracity of the witness is doubted, from the circumstance of his being a slave, let the objection go to his credit, not to his competency. As the law now stands, the Negro is considered as below the rank of a reasonable being. When the Negroes were brought to the island, the legislature ought to have provided, as far as possible, that every Negro should be annexed to some plantation: that he should become *glebæ ascriptus*, and that he should never afterwards be sold to any other master except with the plantation. As the law now stands, the judgement creditor may levy his debt by the sale of the Negroes on the plantation, and thus break the nearest connections. Privileges might have been granted to such Negroes as were born within the island, for they are not so likely to take part in insurrection as the Negroes newly imported. By these, and other similar regulations, the legislature and the courts of law might

have ameliorated the condition of the Negro, and gradually elevated him to the character of a subject. But this plan was not approved of. The Trade was to be immediately abolished: its abolition was voted by Parliament; but it has not yet been effected. And I doubt whether that abolition ever will be effected by the means pursued.

CHAPTER XVI.

Will Revolution produce an increase of Happiness to Mankind?

THIS is a question, which must frequently recur to every reflecting mind. I have no hesitation in saying, that I think Revolution will add to the happiness of mankind. The only country in which we have yet seen a Revolutionary Government completely established is America: and there the prosperity of the People has been more rapidly increased than it is probable that it would have been under the old Government. Before the independence of the United States of America, the governors sent from Great Britain to its colonies were, for the most part, necessitous courtiers; and the object of Government was to check the growth of the Colonies.

In France the Revolution is not yet completed: for although a Representative Government is established, those who are entrusted with the exercise of that Government are considered by the People as desirous of destroying it. The attention of the People is therefore employed anxiously to watch over the Executive Government, and to defeat its efforts. I will add, that the improvements already derived from the Revolution in France are so great and so visible, that the People will never submit to see the *ancien regime* re-established.

In Spain we at present only see the beginning of a revolution: but the seed is sown, and a Revolutionary Government will be established in that country. Probably Governments will be established in the Spanish Colonies of a character similar to that, which is about to be established in the mother country. This will be fortunate; for similitude of government will promote their intercourse and connection with each other. One circumstance will probably be an imme-

diate consequence of a revolution in Spain. If the Spanish Government remains unaltered, Cuba must very soon belong either to the United States of America or to Great Britain. But if Revolutionary Governments are established in Old Spain and the Spanish Colonies on the Continent, Cuba may adopt a similar Government, and become a member of that confederacy. A revolution in Old Spain, if accompanied by the establishment of free Governments in her Colonies, will produce a most rapid improvement. Her agriculture, her manufactures, her commerce, and her naval power, will soon increase to such an extent as must give her great weight in the affairs of Europe. I have said her naval power; for an unfettered intercourse between Old Spain and the Spanish Colonies will create a marine, equal to that which now exists in any other state in Europe.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the state of Germany, or Italy, to be able to form any opinion how far it is probable, that a Revolutionary Government

may be established in either of those two countries.

In Great Britain we have a Representative Government. Some few abuses have been allowed to creep into it: correct those abuses, and Revolution will not take place. But if those abuses are not corrected, an Oligarchy will be established, which will fetter Royalty, humiliate Aristocracy, and trample on the People. Such an Oligarchy will be removable only by Revolution.

CHAPTER XVII.

On the Consequences of the Revolution in Spain.

Toulouse, March 14, 1820.

An account has been this morning received in this city, that the King of Spain has accepted the Constitution declared by the Cortes in 1812. This circumstance must influence the happiness of many millions. I have already made some remarks on the probability of such an event; but now that the Revolution in Spain is complete, I am unavoidably led to extend my reflections. The first circumstance which will occur to every man is, that there is now a second revolution in Europe, brought about by the standing army of the country. For although the commercial cities and men of education were joined with the army in producing this Revolution, yet

the army was certainly the most efficient instrument. Knowledge had spread itself in the Spanish army, and it rose to rescue its country from wretchedness and ignominy.

The first country in which we have seen a new Government established by Revolution is America. The obstinate perseverance of George III., in his endeavours to compel the inhabitants of the British Colonies to submit to a violation of their rights, has given birth to a new nation, called the United States of America. The Government established in this nation is without King, or Nobles, or political Church: and history does not afford us an example of any nation, in which the happiness of the inhabitants, or the prosperity of the whole, considered collectively, has been more rapidly increased. There were primary causes, which must at some moment or other have produced a change in the French Government: but the Revolution in America certainly accelerated the Revolution in France.

The French Revolution has brought forward the Revolution in Spain. In both these countries revolution has been the work of standing armies. Kings have been accustomed to consider standing armies as that support of their power on which they could most rely: let them ponder on what they have seen in France and in Spain. German Princes have been already led to this reflection by what has taken place in France; and they have entertained a hope, that they should be able to stop the progress of liberty by what they have been pleased to denominate a *Holy Alliance;* for this is the name which Kings have impudently given to their confederacy against the liberties of mankind. This Holy Alliance has not been able to prevent the Revolution in Spain. Whatever may be the wish of the Bourbons in France, they have not dared to send their troops to the assistance of Ferdinand. Had they sent French troops, these would most probably have joined the insurgents; and they hesitated to employ their Swiss corps. They endeavoured to retain in France those Spanish patriots, who had

been obliged to take refuge in that country: but even in this their efforts were ineffectual; for most of the Spanish refugees found means to return to Spain. Austria and Prussia could send no assistance to the King of Spain, because they had no shipping to transport their troops; and although Russia might have sent assistance by sea, it could not have arrived in Spain before the summer. Knowledge has spread itself in the army of the King of Prussia. What sentiments must not he be inspired with by this Spanish Revolution? Can he entertain the hope, that his army will assist him to keep down the general wish of his subjects for a Representative Government? Throughout the Protestant part of Germany this wish is everywhere prevalent; and it does not appear, that there is in any part of Germany much personal attachment from the subjects to their sovereigns. In the Catholic part of Germany knowledge has made less progress: it is probable therefore, that a Revolution will not take place in the Catholic part of Germany, so soon as it will in the Protestant part. The im-

pending downfal of the Papal power will occasion a change in the Government of Italy. I will not pretend to say what effects such a change may produce. There can be little doubt but that Portugal will soon follow the example of Spain. The Braganza family cannot hold both Brazil and Portugal: whichever of these two countries this family may choose to reside in, the other will withdraw itself from its subjection. Whether the animosity which has so long subsisted between the Portuguese and Spaniards will prevent Portugal from uniting itself to Spain, I cannot say; but the union would be advantageous to both countries. Should a Representative Government be established in Spain, a similar constitution in her American Provinces, and the whole united by a Confederacy, the Spanish empire will instantly become of the first importance, both in Europe and in America. The United States of America will probably first feel her influence: she will not consent to the cession of the two Floridas. The province of Mexico is much interested to prevent this cession; and, when supported by the

mother country, Mexico will be able to prevent it.

A Confederacy, such as I have suggested, will create the most formidable barrier to the growth of the United States of America. It will check their growth to the westward: for although the western part of the United States is the richest country, and that from which the greatest improvement may be expected, yet it is at present the least defensible part: the Spanish force would be able to prevent its progress Cuba, likewise, would be preserved from the dominion, either of the United States of America, or of Great Britain. The same language, with similitude of habits, and descent from the same common ancestors, render such a Confederacy probable. It is possible, that the cruelties practised during the late civil war in America may have alienated the inhabitants of that country from Old Spain; but those cruelties are more justly to be attributed to Ferdinand and his ministers, than to the people of Spain. Both hemispheres have been

struggling for the same object; viz. *civil liberty.*

This newly created Spanish empire will have the means of commerce beyond any other nation in the world. Commerce will give her a military marine. Towards the close of the fifteenth century, when Ferdinand united Castile and Arragon by his marriage with Isabella, Spain was more advanced than any other nation of Europe, in science, in literature, in agriculture, in commerce, and, above all, in the love of civil liberty. Is it not possible, that we may soon see the Spanish character renewed in all its strength, the ornament of the human race? But even though such a Confederacy should not take place, Mexico will check the growth of the United States, and prevent them from acquiring either the Floridas or Cuba.

Another consequence of the tranquillity likely to take place in Spanish America will be the increase of her productions, both agricultural and mineral; and new branches of commerce will be opened

both with India and China. The establishment of a free Constitution in Spain will form an epoch in the history of mankind.

We have seen, for some years past, attempts to stop the exportation of Slaves from Africa to America. I have already said, in the course of these reflections, that I always thought that these efforts would be ineffectual. If the Spanish Colonies severally establish Representative Governments, they will not submit to be prohibited from transporting Negroes from Africa to America. Their desire to bring that fertile country into cultivation will induce them to resist the restraint. The arguments, which have been employed to excite an abhorrence of the Slave Trade, have been of two sorts; *viz.* first, that the trade was repugnant to humanity; secondly, that it was repugnant to the Christian religion. Political objections, which perhaps are the strongest, have not been much resorted to. I will acknowledge, that I have never been able to discover any passage, either in the Old or New

Testament, prohibiting such a trade. Joseph was certainly sold by his brethren to a caravan of slave merchants. This was an act of wickedness; but it is censured only as the wicked act of individuals. I do not recollect in the New Testament any reference to the trade in Slaves. In respect to the inhumanity consequent on the Slave Trade, every man must think of it with extreme regret, but there certainly are means, by which the sufferings of the Negroes may be diminished. Nations have most commonly changed their places of abode in the shape of conquering armies: the Negroes change it in the character of slaves: it may be doubtful which mode occasions the greatest loss of human life. As late as the treaty of Utrecht, we bargained for the exclusive privilege of selling Negroes in Spanish America; and we did not relinquish this privilege till the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. If my memory is not incorrect, the negociation for peace between Mr. Pitt and M. Bussy, in 1761, failed of success, because Mr. Pitt demanded a cession of more factories on the western side of Africa, than the French

minister chose to yield. Those factories were only wanted for the purpose of carrying on the Slave Trade more extensively. I mention these circumstances with a view to remind those, who are most zealous for the abolition, to how late a period the Trade in Slaves has not been considered as immoral. If, when fairly contemplated, it is found to increase human misery, every man must wish it to be abolished: but the improvement of those parts of America, which are yet uncultivated, will most probably render its abolition impracticable.

A Representative Government in Spain will render the re-establishment of the *ancien regime* in France impossible. Nobles and fanatics may make the attempt, but it will only occasion their own destruction.

When, in a former place, I spoke of a Revolution in Spain, I spoke of it only as a probable event; but a Revolution has now actually taken place in that country. The Constitution, which the people call for, is that which the Cortes voted in 1812.

and if it should be ultimately adopted, the Government of Spain must be considered as republican. The Spanish Colonies in America are in a different situation now from what they were in 1812. Most probably they will be formed into Independent States, and united with the mother country by a Confederacy. Such an arrangement would give more force to the Confederated States of the Spanish Empire than they could possess if under one government. Portugal will very soon follow her example.

What influence must not the Spanish Revolution have on France? At the commencement of this winter, the object of the French Government was confined to the change of the law of Elections, and of the law for recruiting the Army. By changing the first, they hoped to give to the Noblesse more influence in the election of the Chamber of Deputies: by changing the latter, they hoped to give to the Noblesse the commissions in the army. The assassination of the Duke de Berri induced the French Government to extend

their views; and they have brought forward two other projects; *viz.* a bill for re-establishing *lettres de cachét*, and another bill for establishing a censure on the Press. The first project has been carried into effect: the two Chambers have passed it into a law. The second will most probably be adopted. The pretence for the censure on the Press is, that the minds of men are heated by political publications; and this is true. But Louvel will most probably be found to have been excited to the assassination of the Duke de Berri by those publications, which held out the necessity of re-establishing the *ancien regime;* and these are publications, which the French Government does not wish to repress. *Lettres de cachét* can have very little effect where the bias of the nation is opposed to the wishes of the Government. The army, the commercial interest, and men of reading and reflection, unite in wishing to preserve a Representative Government in France. The noblesse, the fanatics, and the Bourbons, oppose them. The strength of the two parties is so unequal, that there can be little doubt

which must be overpowered. Revolution will probably soon take place in the Protestant part of Germany; perhaps even in the Catholic part.

England may avert Revolution: but it can only avert it by a Reform of the House of Commons. I will acknowledge, that I have accustomed myself to think, that this Reform might be effected by correcting abuses, and repairing on the old foundation; and that I have listened with aversion to the proposal of Universal Suffrage. The new Spanish Constitution seems to hold out something, which approaches very near to Universal Suffrage: it remains to be seen whether it can be carried into effect. But when the People of England see a pure Representative Government established in the United States of America, in Spain, in France, perhaps even in Portugal; can it be supposed, that they will be content with that mutilated and disfigured Representation, which now exists in the House of Commons? They certainly will require a more perfect Representation of the People. They will be

led to call for this, not solely from theoretical reflections, but from their sufferings under that immoderate load of taxes, which has been imposed on them in consequence of the unnecessary wars of George III.

A Question. Will not the hatred excited by Kings against the principles of Liberty excite, in the course of its reaction, hatred to the Magistracy of Royalty?

CHAPTER XVIII.

On the Consequences of the Transition from an Agricultural to a Manufacturing and Commercial Character.

At the commencement of the Rebellion, in 1640, England must be considered as an agricultural nation. The cod fishery on the banks of Newfoundland was scarcely discovered; and the herring fishery, at that time the great fishery of Europe, was in the possession of the Dutch. The Dutch also possessed the carrying trade. The French were the manufacturers of Europe. England possessed scarcely any manufacture, except that of woollen. This she owed to the refuge, which Queen Elizabeth had afforded to the manufacturers driven out of the Low Countries by the Duke of Alva. The Navigation Act, established by Oliver Cromwell, gave the first

spring to English commerce; and from that period to the present day we have gradually relinquished the character of an agricultural, and assumed that of a manufacturing and commercial nation. From the peace of Aix la Chapelle, in 1748, to the commencement of the seven years' war, in 1756, England seems still to have retained its agricultural character. The price of corn was low. The Journals of the House of Commons show, that, during that period, a large sum of money was annually granted to assist the export of our corn.

The wars during the reign of George III. seem to have had the greatest effect in producing the change. I will not presume to state how they have produced this change; but I believe they have produced it. They have changed the nature of the property from real to personal; for the National Debt, as well as the increased moveable, is all personal property. This transition has changed the national character. War has been so advantageous to many individuals, that the people have

been easily deluded into unnecessary wars. From the commencement of the year 1775 to the present time (a space of forty-five years) we can scarcely be said to have had more than ten years of peace. An immense debt has been the consequence. During the war begun in 1793, the opposition concurred with the ministry in the wish for war: taxes were therefore laid with very little consideration of the manner in which they bore upon the people. The only object was to destroy those French principles, on the destruction of which certain great nobles had persuaded themselves that their power depended. Their efforts failed: the principles of the French Revolution have been established; and Great Britain is left with a debt, a great part of which she must either get rid of, or relinquish her station among the other nations of the world. Dividends payable by the public are of the nature of pensions; with this difference, that dividends have been sold by the public, while pensions have been gratuitously granted. But whether sold or gratuitously granted, if they exceed what the public revenue

can pay, they will necessarily be diminished. Whenever the event happens, the distress will be extreme: I think of it with terror: but I know the time will come when Troy must fall!

It is to be hoped, that those men who may be in power when this event shall take place will do every thing they can to diminish the calamity. The most rigorous retrenchment, the abolition of gratuitous Pensions and unnecessary Places, the sale of Crown Lands, perhaps even of Church and Corporation Lands, ought all to be resorted to before a suspension of dividends should take place. Above all, we should avoid embarking in any more unnecessary wars. Let the nations of the world settle themselves as they please, or rather in the manner which chance may occasion. No statesman has sufficient penetration to foresee the effects of that war in which he embarks his country. We began the crusade against French principles in the year 1793. Did those who began that war expect the consequences which have followed from it? For French

principles have most certainly been established in France, and will most probably be established in Spain and her Colonies. I believe, that none of those, who excited us to war in Spain, will venture to say, that they at that time wished to see the principles of Civil Liberty established in that country; yet they will probably live to see those principles established there. Did those ministers, who in April 1806 brought forward the doctrine of blockade, intend to establish manufactures in Germany? Human foresight is too uncertain to justify ministers in risking the happiness of nations by embarking in speculative projects.

There is one class of men, whose character has been remarkably changed by this transition from real to personal property: I mean the Lawyers. I began my attendance in Westminster Hall in January, 1765. Lord Mansfield was at that time Chief Justice of the King's Bench. He was not only a man of great abilities, but he possessed a great store of legal knowledge acquired by patient reading. I am

aware, that this is an opinion not generally entertained of him. Vanity led him to wish to intimate, that he did every thing by genius, and nothing by industry; and perhaps this induced men to believe, that he was not what the lawyers call a *black lettered lawyer:* but he certainly had a great store of knowledge, well treasured up; and, as far as I could observe, he was a very upright judge. Were I to mark the failing, which was most prominent in his character, it would be his want of courage: he seemed to me always to stand in fear of Sir Fletcher Norton; but I very much doubt whether he had any good will to him. On the right hand of Lord Mansfield sat Mr. Justice Wilmot, a very learned judge, formed by much reading and reflection. He tried causes at Nisi Prius with the most commendable patience and the strictest integrity. On the left hand of the Chief Justice sat Sir Joseph Yates, a well-read lawyer, particularly eminent for his knowledge of pleadings. The fourth judge, who took his seat on the bench the day on which I first attended the court, was Sir Richard Aston. He was a man

of a very old family in the North—I believe in Cheshire. I had an opportunity of seeing him several times in the character of judge on the Western Circuit. He tried causes with strict integrity; and though, perhaps, he had not that store of legal learning, which was possessed by his three colleagues, he was a man of sound sense, and his decisions were generally right.

Whoever contemplates the characters of these four judges will, I believe, concur with me in opinion, that no man ought to expect, that the Court of King's Bench should ever be better filled. These judges had all been formed by patient reading and thinking. The books to which they had applied themselves are those, which have handed down to us the law of real property from remote times. These books had given to the lawyer a species of logic peculiar to his profession. It was not the same with the logic of the Schoolmen, but it was more powerful. When employed by Littleton, the mind is kept on the stretch, as it is by the reasoning of Aristotle. In

the hands of Sir Edward Coke, it approaches nearer to the subtlety of Locke.

I have no doubt, but that you will see upon the bench, in future times, men equal in natural abilities to those whom I have mentioned; but they will not have been formed in the same manner: they will have been formed at the desk, not by patient reading. By the old mode of education, the lawyer first acquired science, and afterwards immersed himself in practice. By the modern mode, he begins with that knowledge which is to be acquired by practice, and he must emerge to science, if he ever acquires it. Lawyers, formed according to the modern mode, will perhaps have more dexterity in the application of their knowledge, than lawyers formed according to the old mode: perhaps they may be even more useful advocates for private clients: but it is to be feared, that they will be deficient on great constitutional questions. Lord Somers remarked to King William, that it was of great importance to the crown, that the bench should be filled with Constitutional Lawyers.

I will now mention a few circumstances respecting the characters of those advocates, whom I found in possession of business when I first attended Westminster Hall. Mr. Sergeant Glynn possessed the largest store of legal knowledge. I recollect a conversation, which I had with Mr Serjeant Hill on this subject, towards the latter end of that gentleman's life. I mentioned to him Mr. Dunning, and asked whether he was not equal in legal knowledge to Mr. Serjeant Glynn? He answered, "No, every thing which Dunning knew, he knew accurately; but Glynn knew a great deal more." I need scarcely mention Mr. Serjeant Hill's own character as a lawyer. His death happened so very few years ago, that his legal reputation is known to every one. He was full of knowledge; but, in conversing with him, it was very difficult to keep him from wandering from that subject on which you wished to be informed. He hated the law of tythes: he said, "that the decisions on that branch of the law were founded in folly and injustice. Whenever I conversed with him on this subject, he became in a very short time so heated, that there was

no getting any farther information from him.

I have heard the late Mr. Sergeant Walker say, that Mr. Sergeant Prime was the ablest lawyer he had ever known; and I recollect an anecdote told me by Lord Thurlow respecting this gentleman. Lord Thurlow said, "I drove Mr. Sergeant Prime from the bar, without intending it. I happened to be walking up and down Westminster Hall with him while Dr. Florence Henzey was on his trial in the Court of King's Bench for High Treason. Serjeant Prime was at that time the King's *Prime Sergeant*, and as such had precedence over all lawyers in the King's Service. But the ministers of that day wished to pay court to Sir Fletcher Norton, though at that time he had no other rank than that of King's Counsel: they had therefore entrusted the conduct of the trial to Sir Fletcher Norton. I happened," said Lord Thurlow, "to make this remark to Mr. Sergeant Prime: 'It is a little singular, Sir, that I should be walking up and down Westminster Hall with the

King's *Prime Sergeant*, while a trial at bar for High Treason is going on in that Court.' The expression struck him: he felt the affront which had been put on him; he went the next morning, resigned his office, and retired from the profession."

There are two other men of the profession, on whom I cannot refrain from making a few observations. I knew them both intimately: I loved them both; for both were peculiarly kind to me: I mean Mr. Dunning, afterwards Lord Ashburton; and Mr. Thurlow, afterwards Lord Thurlow. Mr. Dunning was the quickest man I ever knew at the Bar. If an objection was to be taken or answered at Nisi Prius, he did it on the instant; his style of reasoning was sometimes too subtle for his hearers. Mr. Thurlow was not a quick man: I have often heard him make a speech at Nisi Prius, while he was considering what answer he should give to an objection taken by his adversary. He had a *magniloquentia*, which was always imposing; but perhaps neither his style of speaking, nor his legal knowledge, nor the powers

of his mind, were suited to the common run of Nisi Prius practice. He obtained no inconsiderable share of business in the Court of King's Bench at an early period of his life. Lord Mansfield checked his progress; not from ill-will to Mr. Thurlow, but from a wish to pay court to Sir Fletcher Norton. I will give an instance of this, much talked of when I first attended the courts. Mr. Thurlow had to argue against the execution of a power in a marriage settlement: he took three objections: he argued the two first objections with great ability, and closed with telling the court, that he thought the case so clear on the two objections which he had argued, that he would not trouble them with any argument on his third objection. When Lord Mansfield delivered the opinion of the court, two or three days afterwards, he did it in these words: "Mr. Thurlow, we decide against your client on the two objections which you have argued; we decide in his favour on the objection which you have abandoned." No young lawyer could rise while exposed to such unfavourable remarks. I saw him after-

wards for several years in the Court of King's Bench, a King's Counsel, almost without business. Soon after he had begun to obtain some degree of practice at the bar, he was put into the House of Commons for the Borough of Tamworth, by Lord Weymouth. I have been told, that he was at first heard with very little attention: I saw him afterwards the most powerful and the most useful lawyer ever possessed by a minister in that House. He was made Chancellor in 1778: when the Coalition came into power in the spring of 1783, Mr. Fox deprived him of the Great Seal. He accompanied this deprivation with circumstances of harshness; which always surprised me: harshness was not congenial to the natural disposition of Mr. Fox; and there was no personal enmity between them; for Lord Thurlow always spoke of Mr. Fox with partiality, and continued to do so to the day of his death. On Mr. Pitt's return to office, on the 20th December, 1783, Lord Thurlow again received the Great Seal. It is well known, that for some years before Lord Thurlow was a second time deprived of

the Great Seal, he and Mr. Pitt had not lived on pleasant terms. I never could discover the cause of this. I recollect Lord Thurlow's having once said to me, "When Mr. Pitt first became Prime Minister, it was a very unpleasant thing to do business with him; but it afterwards became as pleasant to do business with him as with Lord North." Every one knows, that intercourse with Lord North was peculiarly pleasant. Lord Thurlow strongly disapproved of Mr. Pitt's conduct on the impeachment of Mr. Hastings: how far that contributed to excite ill humour in him I cannot say. Lord North once said to me, "Your friend Lord Thurlow thinks, that his personal influence with the King authorises him to treat Mr. Pitt with *humeur*. Take my word for it, whenever Mr. Pitt says to the King, 'Sir, the Great Seal must be in other hands,' the King will take the Great Seal from Lord Thurlow, and never think any more about him." It turned out exactly as Lord North had said to me: the King took the Great Seal from Lord Thurlow, and never concerned himself about him

afterwards. I have no doubt, that this conduct of the King was wholly unexpected by Lord Thurlow: it mortified him most severely. I recollect his saying to me, "No man has a right to treat another in the way in which the King has treated me: we cannot meet again in the same room." But Lord Thurlow had not read the character of his master with the penetration of Lord North.

CHAPTER XIX.

On the Consequences of a King of Great Britain being a German Sovereign.

THE Brunswick family was selected to wear the Crown of England, as the best means of securing us from the return of popery and despotism. The establishment of this family, on the death of Queen Anne, has preserved us from those evils which we dreaded. But the benefits which we have received have been mixed with some alloy. We have the character of George I. sketched by the hand of the Earl of Chesterfield. He had opportunities of approaching this Monarch, and I believe he has given us a correct character of him. He tells us, that he was a dull German gentleman. That he neither understood, nor concerned himself about the interests of England; but that he was well acquainted with the interests of Hanover. One of his first acts, after his

accession, was to prevail on the British Parliament to purchase for him the Duchies of Bremen and Verden, from the King of Denmark, for the sum of 250,000*l*. This act was unjust, impolitic, and a violation of good faith. During the difficulties of Charles XII. of Sweden, the King of Denmark had seized on these territories. It was evident, that the King of Denmark, who had not a pretence of right, would not be able to keep them. It was therefore a purchase of stolen goods from a thief, who, if we had not purchased, must have abandoned them. It was impolitic; for it rendered Sweden the enemy of Great Britain for very many years. It was also a violation of that treaty of Munster, in 1648, which England had guaranteed. I believe the pretence for calling on England to pay this money was the advantage which she derived from her trade up the river Weser; an advantage which she could not have been deprived of, even if the King of Denmark had kept the territories. During this reign, we were involved in all the mysteries of German politics. We engaged in a war with

Spain in 1718, in support of the views of the Emperor of Germany. It was a subject in which Great Britain was wholly uninterested. Fortunately, the war was short.

Perhaps the character of George II. may be drawn nearly in the same words as that of his father. He was a dull German. Possibly the expression *gentleman*, might be left out; for he was sometimes coarse and brutal. The war of 1741 had originated in a dispute with Spain. It might have been begun for British interests: it was continued in consequence of German connections. The same may be said of the war of 1756. It was begun for the support of British interests in America; but the lavish expenditure and the continuance of this war, were for the support of George the Second's views and interests in Germany.

When George III., in his first address to the British Parliament, made use of these words, "Born and educated in this country, I glory in the name of Briton,"

the expression was hailed with joy. The nation thought, that they had got a British King, and that German interests would not in future be attended to; but they have been mistaken. Though George III. never visited Hanover, yet in the progress of his life he became in character as truly a German Prince as ever his grandfather had been. All his younger sons were sent to Hanover to be educated. They returned to England fashioned after the manner of the younger sons of a German Prince. The enlargement of His Majesty's German dominions seems to have been as much the object of attention in the reign of George III. as it was in the reign of George I. or George II. George I. acquired Bremen and Verden. George II. acquired the Duchy of Saxe Lawenberg. But the acquisitions during the reign of George III. have been more extensive and more important. By the treaty of Amiens he acquired the Bishopric of Osnaburg; and by the late arrangements at Vienna the rich Bishopric of Hildesheim, with the Duchy of Minden and principality of East Friesland, have been

added to his German dominions. The title of Elector has also been changed for that of King of Hanover. What difference was intended to be produced by this change I cannot say. It may perhaps be imagined, that, as the Duke of York was Bishop of Osnaburg, the King, his father, had some right to the acquisition of that Bishopric. But this is a mistake: Osnaburg and Hildesheim have both been obtained by acts of injustice. During the thirty years war, which preceded the treaty of Munster in 1648, every Protestant Prince in Germany took possession of the dominions of those ecclesiastical princes whom he was able to oppress. I believe, that during that period, the Elector of Brandenburg got possession of thirteen ecclesiastical sovereignties, and by the Treaty of Munster he got them annexed to his dominions. A Prince of the House of Brunswick Lunenburg had got possession of the Bishopric of Osnaburg, and wished to have it allotted to him as a temporal fief. The Roman Catholic powers saw that it was necessary to resist the views which the Protestant Princes had formed

of secularizing the different Bishoprics in Germany. They decided to make a stand on the question for secularizing Osnaburg. After much discussion, the matter was compromised: it was agreed, that the Bishop should alternately be Catholic and Lutheran; that the Catholic Bishop should be elected by the chapter, and the Lutheran Bishop named by the Duke of Brunswick Lunenburg. This arrangement was adhered to until the treaty of Amiens in 1802. By that treaty the chapter was deprived of its right of alternately nominating the Bishop, and the whole Bishopric secularized in favour of the Elector of Hanover. Those sovereigns who engaged in the crusade against French principles were, I have no doubt, as they professed, enemies to the violation of established rights; or, to use a fashionable expression, they were enemies to the violation of *la légitimité*. Yet, some how or other, it has so happened, that there is scarcely one German Prince, who has been a party in this crusade, who has not violated the rights of his weaker neighbour for his own immediate benefit.

The British Nation saw with pleasure the probability of the Princess Charlotte succeeding to the throne of Great Britain. Their pleasure arose from this circumstance; that by her succession Great Britain would be disentangled from her connection with Hanover. For as the King's German dominions are male fiefs, the Princess Charlotte was not capable of succeeding to them. Our hopes were that time disappointed. We now flatter ourselves with a similar hope from the succession of the daughter of his late Royal Highness the Duke of Kent and Strathern Should she succeed to the throne, we may have the good fortune to possess in her a Sovereign exclusively British.

I have thus stated the inconveniences which have arisen from the House of Brunswick being possessed of dominions in Germany. I do not mean by this statement to undervalue the advantages which we have obtained from their succession to the Crown of Great Britain. The support of that family on the throne of Great Britain has preserved us from

popery and despotism, and the deliverance is inestimable. By the expression *popery*, I do not mean the religious opinions in which the Catholics differ from the Protestants; I mean papal power considered politically. It was to that power that James II. was bigotedly devoted. Had he succeeded in establishing it, despotism must have followed. But every Englishman must feel the advantage which his country would derive from possessing the Brunswick family unconnected with German dominions. Those dominions are incapable of defence by their own internal strength. Hamelen, the only fortress in the country, was taken and dismantled by Buonaparte. The King of Prussia can at any time take possession of Hanover, if it is not protected either by Russia or by Austria. If Great Britain is interested in its defence, she becomes thereby to a certain degree subservient to the views of Russia or Austria; a subserviency which every Englishman must regret.

CHAPTER XX.

Characters of George II. and Queen Caroline.

I HAVE said in a former place, that the death of George II. did not appear to have occasioned much regret in the nation. I believe, that I am correct in this assertion. He has been reproached with having burnt the will of his father; Mr. Walpole, in his Reminiscences, gives a detailed account of Archbishop Wake's having produced the will at the Council table; of the King's having taken it, and walked out of the room without saying a word; and that neither the Archbishop nor any member of the Council had the courage to demand, that the will should be registered. But the King is unjustly reproached for this conduct. The will was really waste paper: for by the common law, a King of England can dispose

of no property by will. All his property, whether real or personal, is vested in him in his corporate capacity, and devolves on his successor.

During the reign of Queen Anne a circumstance happened, which made it necessary that this question should be discussed. King William had furnished the palace of Hampton Court: he made a will and appointed executors. A question arose, to whom did this furniture belong, to the executors of King William, or to Queen Anne, his successor? Eight of the most eminent lawyers gave their opinion, that the property belonged to the Queen. As the matter is curious, and the opinion short, I will here state the words in which it was given, with the names of the several lawyers who concurred in it.

"We the undersigned declare, that we hold it for undoubted law, that jewels, and other personal property of that nature, have ever been by the law of England denominated catalla, *Anglice*

chattels. We also declare, that by the same law of England, jewels and other personal chattels of that nature, which have been purchased by the King or Queen of England, and not disposed of during his or her life, do not descend on the death of such King or Queen to that person whom such King or Queen may have appointed executor of his will; but that they belong solely to that person who is successor to the Crown; and this law has been established by the opinion of lawyers, and has been ever approved and observed; and this we well know to be the law, from our own experience, from the writings of men learned in the law of England, from the books of the annals of decisions during the reigns of the several Kings of England, and from the records in our courts of justice; and to this opinion we have subscribed our names.

HEN. HATSELL.	THO. POWYS.
JA. MOUNTAGUE.	R. EYRE.
JO. HAWLES.	JO. CONYERS,
CON. PHIPPS.	SAM. DODD.

"Declared and subscribed by the above

named persons, on the 24th December, 1708, Old Style, before me,

Tho. Trevor."

In the year 1800, I had further occasion to consider this subject. Towards the close of the session, Sir John Mitford, at that time Attorney General, brought in a Bill to enable the King to make a will of his personal property. The House was very thin, as it usually is at that season of the year. Sir John Mitford moved, that the bill should be read a second time the next day. I was a little startled at this, as it had the appearance of the bill being a measure, which Sir John Mitford wished to have passed through the House without observation. I pressed, that the second reading might be deferred for two or three days; he yielded at last, though with much reluctance. When the subject was the next time mentioned in the House, I suggested two points for his consideration. First, " whether the King's *personal property*, which was the expression used in the bill, was not too large and too indefinite; and I wished him to consider, secondly, whe-

ther he intended that, if the King should die without having made a will, his personal property should be distributed to his next of kin, according to the statutes of distribution." In consequence of these suggestions, the bill was altered to its present form, *viz;* confined to the power of bequeathing any property that might be accumulated out of certain funds; and enacting, that in case his Majesty made no will, his personal property should descend according to the course of the common law; that is to say, to his successor. I believe I was the only member who made any objections to this bill. I cannot therefore say, that it was discussed in the House; but the objections, which I had taken, made it necessary for me to examine the subject.

His late Majesty, King George III., had acted by his grandfather's will in the same manner as his grandfather had acted by that of George I.; for he considered it as a non-operative instrument, and as such put it into the fire. I knew that William Duke of Cumberland, son of

George II., had applied to the late Mr. Booth, as to the practicability of his recovering a large legacy left him by his father's will. As Mr. Booth's papers were in the possession of a friend of mine, I applied to him to permit me to see Mr. Booth's opinion. He complied with my request. Mr. Booth's opinion was like all the other opinions of that learned lawyer, a most elaborate investigation of the subject; and he closed his opinion with this expression, "that a King of England has, by the common law, no power of bequeathing personal property." When my friend furnished me with this opinion of Mr. Booth, he furnished me at the same time with a copy of George the Second's will of his Hanoverian property, made in 1751; and also with a copy of a codicil to the same will, made in 1759; he also furnished me with copies of two codicils to the will of the King's English property. I had read in Bub Doddington's Memoirs, the late Earl of Chatham's notion as to the immense personal property of George II. When I read it I thought the suggestion wild. But when I read

the will of His Majesty's Hanoverian property, made in 1751, I saw that the Earl of Chatham's opinion was not so void of foundation as I had imagined. In that will the King had left legacies to a prodigious amount. To the Duke of Cumberland alone he had left near four millions of German dollars; with large legacies to his other children and private friends. But in a codicil to this will, made towards the close of the year 1759, he revoked many of these legacies, assigning as a reason, that his personal property was greatly diminished by the expenses of the German war. This codicil contained many very pathetic expressions, denoting his great affection for his Hanoverian subjects; and pointing out the necessity there would be of taking off many of those taxes, which had been imposed on them during the war. I do not know whether the Elector of Hanover is restrained by the laws of that country from disposing of his personal property by will; but I have been told, that William Duke of Cumberland never was paid the more

moderate legacy, which he was entitled to under the codicil.

George II. had always publicly kept a mistress; most certainly with the knowledge of the Queen; and it was generally believed that his mistresses were chosen by the Queen. I believe Mr. Walpole is right when he says, that the Queen was the woman who had the strongest hold of his affections. I recollect a circumstance mentioned to me by my father, which is a proof of this assertion. The morning after the King's death, my father and Sir Edward Wilmot, who were the only two King's physicians then in town, received an order to be present at the opening of the body, and to report their opinion as to the causes of his Majesty's death. A paper of directions left by the King, as to the manner in which his body should be treated, &c., was produced; and in that paper he had directed, that the coffin should be so constructed, that one side of it might be drawn out. The coffin in which the body of Queen Caroline was

placed had been constructed in a similar manner; and his Majesty directed, that one side of each coffin should be drawn out, so that the two bodies might be in one coffin. I believe these directions were very exactly observed.

George II., while Electoral Prince of Hanover, had served in the Duke of Marlborough's army, and had given distinguished proofs of personal courage: but I believe that this was the only military qualification which he possessed. He had neither literature, nor taste, but had a strong sense of decorum. I will mention a little anecdote as a proof of this. The Duke of Richmond of that day was one of the King's chief companions. A Doctor of Divinity of the Duke's acquaintance, eminently learned, had acquired a knack of imitating the various caterwawlings of a cat. The Duke had no taste for his friend's learning; but he took great pleasure in hearing him imitate the cat. He had often talked to the King of this uncommon talent which his friend possessed, and had pressed his Majesty

to allow him to place this gentleman behind his chair, one day at dinner, that he might himself judge of his extraordinary power of imitation. The King at last consented: and this learned man was one day placed behind the King's chair, while he was at dinner. The King was for some time amused with his various imitations; he at last turned round to see the gentleman, when he received a bow from a gentleman full dressed in canonicals. The King was so shocked at the sight, that he could not refrain from saying to the Duke of Richmond, "Do take him away: I cannot bear buffoonery from a man in such a dress." If this may not be mentioned as a proof of the King's good taste, it may at least serve to show that he had a strong sense of decorum.

We have a character of Queen Caroline drawn by the Earl of Chesterfield. He begins with saying, "She was a woman of lively, pretty parts. Her death was regretted by none but the King. She died meditating projects, which must have ended either in her own ruin, or in that of

the country." This is the character given of her by Lord Chesterfield. The latter part of it alludes to an opinion, which some people entertained, that she wished to set aside Frederic Prince of Wales, and place William Duke of Cumberland on the throne. She was remarked for insincerity. It was a common saying among the courtiers, that they wished his Majesty had less sincerity, and her Majesty more. She seems to have had taste. We are indebted to her for the Serpentine River in Hyde Park, and the trees so happily disposed in that Park.

On the accession of George II., Sir Robert Walpole's rival exerted himself to gain the favour of Mrs. Howard, the King's mistress. Sir Robert had the sagacity to discover, that the wife had more influence than the mistress. He often exulted in his superior judgement on this occasion; and used to say, in language somewhat coarse, "I took the right sow by the ear." The Queen knew enough of the King's disposition to be sensible, that he did not choose to part

with his money; and as she never wished to displease his Majesty, Mr. Walpole tells us, that she obtained money from his father without the King's knowledge. I have no doubt that this account was true; but she had probably other ways of supplying herself. It was so generally believed that she sold church preferment, that the clergy, who attended court, usually went by the name of her Majesty's *black game:* she died in consequence of an operation most injudiciously recommended.

Mr. Walpole says, that Lady Sundon's influence with Queen Caroline arose from her being possessed of the secret of her Majesty's being afflicted with a navel rupture. I doubt the accuracy of Mr. Walpole's opinion on this subject. Before her death the circumstance was generally known. Dr. Sands, a man midwife, suggested, that a cure might be effected by the injection of warm water. Though my father was not at that time a court physician, yet he was sufficiently eminent in his profession to have the circumstances

communicated to him by medical men. I have heard him say, that Dr. Mead entered a most positive protest against the experiment; and my father added, that any man, who was acquainted with anatomy, must have known that the proposed remedy could by no possibility be of service, and was likely to produce calamity. I believe, that Sir Edward Hulse was the only court physician who approved of the proposal. At the time that the operation was performed, every wish to keep her Majesty's malady a secret must have been abandoned: for the courtiers both male and female were assembled in the antichamber waiting the event. The intestine was burst in the operation, and Dr. Sands and Sir Edward Hulse saw, that the Queen must inevitably die of a mortification within a few hours. The only question which then remained for the two physicians was to consider how they might get out of the palace before the unfortunate issue was known. They determined to say that the operation had succeeded. As soon as the two physicians came out of the Queen's chamber, and

announced their success, the old Duke of Newcastle, who was among those who waited in the antichamber, ran up to Dr. Sands and hugged him, exclaiming, "You dear creature, the nation can never sufficiently reward you for having saved the life of the most valuable woman in the world!" The doctor struggled to get away, apprehensive that some of the ladies, who had gone in to the Queen after the physicians had left her, might come out and disclose the truth.

CHAPTER XXI.

Reflections on an intended Marriage between Frederic Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer.

AMONG the Reminiscences of Mr. Horace Walpole, he takes notice of a plan, which had been formed by Frederic Prince of Wales to marry Lady Diana Spencer, the granddaughter of the old Duchess of Marlborough, who was to have given him 100,000*l.* with her as a dowry; and that his father, Sir Robert Walpole, had prevented the design from being carried into effect. If this marriage had taken place, would it have been beneficial or injurious to Great Britain?

I have already taken notice of the mischiefs, which have ensued from Frederick Prince of Wales having married a Princess of *Saxe Gotha.* It was natural, that this German Princess should wish that her husband should possess the same sort of

sovereignty as she had seen exercised by her father in Germany. But sovereignty of this character is inconsistent with the principles of the English Constitution. Had the Prince of Wales married Lady Diana Spencer, he would have had a wife not actuated by these sentiments. It may be said, that had the Prince of Wales married this lady, he would have degraded himself by thus forming an inferior connection; but this is rather a German than an English notion. Lady Diana Spencer was of a family eminently noble: it is true, she was not of a princely house, and therefore by the laws of Germany the marriage would have been a *mésalliance*, and the children would not have been entitled to succeed to the Electorate of Hanover. But would not this have been a benefit to Great Britain? We have derived many advantages from the Brunswick family having been placed on the throne of Great Britain; but the possession of German dominions by that family has been a considerable drawback. From the accession of George I. the interests of Great Britain have been too frequently

sacrificed to the interests of the Elector of Hanover.

Of the six wives of Henry VIII. four were the daughters of his English subjects; yet he was never thought degraded by those marriages. King Edward VI., Queen Elizabeth, King James I., Queen Mary, and Queen Anne, were the children of subjects; yet they were never thought of with less respect on that account. They were related by blood to many of their subjects; but this circumstance never occasioned any prejudice to the country. The House of Brunswick has possessed the crown of Great Britain more than one hundred years; but it still remains a German family. Of the King's seven sons, five have been educated in Germany; and with the exception of the Duke of Sussex, whose health rendered such an education impracticable, they have been educated in the same manner as the younger sons of other German Princes; that is to say, as German military. But this is an education not likely to produce those sentiments, which are

suited to an English Prince. Let me suppose that Frederic Prince of Wales had had as many children by an English wife as he had afterwards by his marriage with the Princess of Saxe Gotha, and that he had given his daughters in marriage to British Nobles, and married his sons to British Heiresses. Would this have been a prejudice to the country? I think the contrary. I think it would have been highly beneficial. He would have surrounded the throne with nobles interested to guard its rights: his sons would not have been viewed as men drawing maintenance from the public purse; as unnecessary, but expensive appendages. They would have been ingrafted in the common stock; and while solicitous to guard the prerogatives of royalty, they would have been interested to defend the principles of the Constitution. View the difference which at this time exists between a younger son of the King, and a nobleman of large landed estate, with a power of placing half a score members in the House of Commons. Is such a difference of situation beneficial to the country? King

Henry IV. is said to have been related by blood to every Earl in the kingdom; and that the usage of the King's addressing Earls by the title of Cousin has arisen from this consanguinity. Long may the dynasty of Brunswick remain: but let it be a British family. I am aware, that there are men, who might profess to fear this influence of the crown over great families from consanguinity. Let it however be remembered, that it would be an influence perfectly consistent with the principles of our Constitution. I think it would be advantageous to the country, that a great family should be connected with the crown by the means which I have mentioned, rather than by the possession of great sinecure employments. Under the Plantagenet dynasty, many of our noble families were allied to the crown. Between sixty and seventy members of that family are said to have perished during the contest between the houses of York and Lancaster. This sufficiently shows how much the alliances of the royal family were extended; and it does not appear, that any inconvenience ever arose from

these alliances. On the deposition of Richard II. it is scarcely possible, that the title of Mortimer could have been forgotten; for he had been publicly recognized as the heir and successor to the crown but a little while before. Henry IV. did not choose to define exactly by what title he claimed the crown. He was, by his mother's side, the heir of the Earls of Lancaster, who were descended from a brother of King Edward I. Mr. Hume takes notice of a report that had been propagated, that this brother of Edward I. was really the elder brother; and that he had been postponed in the line of succession by his parents, on account of some personal deformity. Whether such report ever had existed before the accession of Henry IV., or whether it was ever much credited, cannot now be ascertained. Henry IV. did not choose to claim as a King elected by Parliament. He seems to have stated his title to have been that of a King *de facto et de jure*, without further explanation. If the principles, avowed at the Revolution in 1688, had been fully recog-

nized on the deposition of Richard II., most probably Henry IV. would have stated his title in a different manner. For at the Revolution in 1688 the Parliament proceeded on the idea, that James II. had abdicated, or in other words forfeited, not for himself alone, but for all those who might claim as heirs through him; and therefore, after Queen Mary's death, William III. was preferred, in the succession, to the Princess Anne of Denmark. The same principle was observed in the act of settlement, when the Brunswick family, descended from a daughter of James I., was called to the succession before the nearer heirs, descended from Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, daughter of Charles I. Nor is the principle unreasonable. A peer, by the commission of high treason, forfeits not only for himself, but for all who claim through him. I am aware, that this is under an act of Henry VIII.; but, if the subject were fully considered, I think it would be found, that that act of Henry VIII. was only declaratory of the common law. I am also aware, that though the Scottish

Parliament used the word "forfeited," the English Parliament only said, that the King had "abdicated." But the word abdicated was certainly used as synonimous to forfeited. At the accession of Henry IV., how far a King could forfeit, how far a Parliament could elect a new dynasty, were questions not accurately settled. And although discontented nobles sometimes set up the title of Mortimer, during the reign of Henry IV., yet, if the mental derangement of Henry VI., inherited most probably from his maternal grandfather, had not given occasion to the title of Mortimer being brought forward, the same principle of law, which was adopted in 1688, would have been held to have been the law on the deposition of Richard II.; *viz.* that a King, whose conduct has induced a forfeiture of royalty, has forfeited, not for himself alone, but for all who claim the succession as heirs to him. But the dispute between the houses of York and Lancaster did not result from the numerous alliances of the royal family. It was a question, as to the

right of succession, between two branches of the same family. In reference to this doctrine, that a King, by his conduct, may forfeit for his heirs as well as for himself, I may be told perhaps, that, by the common law of England, a King can do no wrong. I admit this doctrine in its fullest extent; it is the doctrine of liberty, not of despotism. The meaning of the principle is, that ministers shall not protect themselves from being punishable for their conduct by saying, that they acted under the immediate orders of the King himself. But since the Norman Conquest, we have four instances of Kings who have suffered for their conduct: *viz.* Edward II., Richard II., Charles I., and James II. The three first were put to death; the latter was deprived of royalty. Upon what principle can the conduct of the nation towards these four Monarchs be justified, except on this principle, that they were punishable for misconduct? Whether we say that James II. had abdicated, or had forfeited, or had been deprived, if we do not use this expression to signify, that the

right of those who were in the line of succession to him was extinguished by the King's misconduct, upon what principle was the Princess Anne of Denmark postponed in the order of succession to William III.?

CHAPTER XXII.

On the Consequences produced by the personal Character of George III.

GEORGE III. is now no more. This circumstance authorizes us to review his character with the same freedom as we may do that of any of those Monarchs who have preceded him. I have already mentioned the character which he displayed at the commencement of his reign; that he was sober—temperate—of domestic habits—addicted to no vice—swayed by no passion.

The whole tenour of his life has justified the impression, which was first received of him. Those who approached him formed another opinion of his character; in which, however, the event has shown, that they have been totally mis-

taken. They thought, that he was a weak man, and that we should probably have a reign of favouritism. These ideas were entertained even by sagacious men; but they were conceived erroneously. George III. was not a weak man. His objects were little, and injudiciously chosen: but no Monarch ever displayed more dexterity in his choice of the means to obtain those objects. So far from his life having been a reign of favouritism, he does not appear ever to have entertained kindness for any minister whom he employed, except for the Earl of Bute: and after he found, that this nobleman wanted the courage necessary for his purposes, he seems to have withdrawn all his favour from him, and never more to have wished to replace him in office. But George III. had been educated by his mother. She had formed her ideas of sovereign power at the court of her father, the Duke of Saxe Gotha; and she could never bring herself to be of opinion, that sovereignty should be exercised in Great Britain in a manner different from that in which she had seen it exercised at

her father's court. In Saxe Gotha, sovereignty is *property:* in Great Britain it is *magistracy.* In Saxe Gotha, the Sovereign's personal wishes and opinions are to be obeyed, and he is his own minister; in Great Britian, the Sovereign is to choose for his ministers those, whom he thinks most qualified to advise measures beneficial to the country. If he does not approve of the measures they recommend, he may remove his ministers and appoint others; but whatever measures are carried into effect, the advisers ought not only to be responsible, but distinctly known and recognized as the advisers. This is not an opinion, which has been only theoretically adopted by those who have treated of the English Constitution; it has been explicitly declared in Parliament. An act once existed, enacting, that every measure recommended by the Privy Council should be signed by those Privy Counsellors who advised it. This law sufficiently declared the principles of our Constitution. It completely negatived the idea of the King being his own minister. But ministers

did not choose to have their names so openly exposed, and the act was repealed. The sentiment, which the Princess Dowager had most anxiously impressed on the King's mind was this, *viz.* that he should be his own minister; that he should vigilantly observe every attempt of his ministers to assume control over him, and use his endeavours to prevent it. The Princess Dowager was led to enforce this sentiment on her son, not only from the manner in which she had seen sovereign power exercised in her father's court, but also from the control which she had seen exercised by the Pelham party over George II. The conduct of that party to her late husband and herself had excited her resentment; and this resentment mingled itself with her political aversion. The wish to be his own minister, and to exercise his power personally, was the leading feature in George the Third's character, through his whole reign. It influenced his domestic, as well as his political conduct. There does not appear any interval, in which this sentiment was suspended. The miseries

occasioned by his reign have all flowed from this source. Like other Monarchs, he was desirous of power. But it was not the desire of becoming a military conqueror, or even of extending his dominions. It was little more than the desire of appearing great in the eyes of his pages and *valets de chambre*—that it might be said "The King gave away such a bishoprick," or "appointed to such an employment." It was the little object of a little mind.

The reign of George III. has from its commencement exhibited a struggle between the King's personal wishes and the opinions of his ostensible ministers. The two first wishes, which he seems to have entertained, were to break the power of the Pelham faction, and to restore peace. These wishes were judicious. But the instrument, which he employed to effectuate his objects, was unfortunately chosen. The Earl of Bute was not qualified to be a minister. He was removed; and from the time of his removal we may date the establishment of the

double cabinet; *viz.* secret advisers and ostensible ministers.

The measure of taxing our American Colonies by the vote of a British Parliament, was brought forward while Mr. Grenville was the ostensible minister. Whether this measure proceeded from the interior cabinet, or from the ostensible minister, is a matter of doubt. From the obstinacy with which the King persevered in it, from the eagerness with which it was proclaimed, that it was personally the King's object; that those who supported it were his friends, while those who opposed it were to be ranked as disloyal, and as his enemies; from this language being held long after the death of Mr. Grenville, when his influence must have ceased, men are induced to suspect, that it was the King's measure rather than that of Mr. Grenville.

There is another circumstance, which leads men to doubt, whether the measure originally proceeded from Mr. Grenville. From the beginning of that gentleman's

administration it was manifestly his object to increase the public revenue. If the only idea which operated on his mind was, that America ought to contribute a portion of the public revenue, he had no occasion to bring forward the Stamp Act. He had the money already collected. He might have employed it in aid of the public service, without affording the Americans a pretence for complaint. I will explain what I mean by this assertion. It had been deemed advisable to encourage the growth of various articles of American produce, by allowing a bounty on their importation into Great Britain. I have been told, that when the Stamp Act was brought forward by Mr. Grenville, the bounties thus payable on American produce amounted to five hundred thousand pounds a year. Mr. Grenville only proposed to raise two hundred thousand pounds a year by the Stamp Act. If revenue alone was his object, it is scarcely credible, that he could have overlooked this sum, which was already in the coffers of the public; and resorted to a mode of taxation, which from its novelty was necessarily uncertain.

But revenue was not the object of those who recommended the Stamp Act. Power and patronage influenced their wishes. I do not pretend to know who were the real advisers of the Stamp Act. Perhaps hereafter it may be ascertained. The King dismissed George Grenville, because he found him not sufficiently subservient to his views; he dismissed the Marquis of Rockingham, because that nobleman had repealed the Stamp Act; he appointed the Duke of Grafton minister, and it was given out that the noble Duke was to act under the guidance of the Earl of Chatham; but soon after the establishment of this ministry, the Earl of Chatham was taken ill; his illness was of very long continuance, and of such a nature as to preclude him from all intercourse with others on any public business. During this interval of Lord Chatham's absence from the cabinet, the King contrived to have the question of taxing the American Colonies again brought forward. By playing man against man, and faction against faction, he at length obtained his wishes, and the American Colonies found themselves reduced to the

alternative of unconditional submission, or explicit and avowed resistance: they chose the latter. While the King was pursuing this object of reviving the dispute with America, he seems to have employed that maxim of the politician, *Divide et impera*, with much dexterity. The late Earl of Shelburne told a friend of mine, "that the King possessed one art beyond any man he had ever known; for that, by the familiarity of his intercourse, he obtained your confidence, procured from you your opinion of different public characters, and then availed himself of this knowledge to sow dissension."

The war began in 1775, and was continued for eight years, when the King, much against his wishes, was compelled to relinquish the contest—he was compelled to relinquish it, because he could find no man, who would consent to be the ostensible minister for carrying on the war. But he still retained so strong a desire to continue the contest, that he could not refrain from employing his household troops to affront the Earl of Shelburne, the minister who had made

the peace. The Earl of Shelburne would not submit to the affront; here signed, and the King found himself under the necessity of appointing the Coalitionists his ministers. These gentlemen came into office strongly impressed with the opinion they had formed of the King's character; *viz.* that nothing could induce him to relinquish the wish he entertained of being his own minister. I recollect the answer which Mr. Fox once made me when I put this question to him; "Whether it was not possible for him to conciliate the King?" He replied, "No, it is impossible: no man can gain the King." And I believe Mr. Fox's answer was just. The King must have seen, that Lord Thurlow was devoted to him; yet he removed Lord Thurlow the moment Mr. Pitt required his dismission. And he did this, not from any regard for Mr. Pitt, for he never had any regard for him: but because Mr. Pitt was more necessary to his immediate views. When the Coalitionists came into office in the early part of the year 1783, they were impressed with the necessity of controlling the King's wishes: and although the Coalition had to a certain

degree rendered Mr. Fox and his friends unpopular, yet I think that the Coalitionists would have retained their power, if they had not been under the guidance of Mr. Burke. But the wrong-headedness, the arrogance, the violence, and the corrupt views of that gentleman, deprived the ministers of the confidence of the country. Mr. Pitt consented to be the King's ostensible minister; and the general election which followed his appointment completed the downfal of the Coalitionists. I have said, that Mr. Pitt consented to be the King's ostensible minister. But I do not mean by this to insinuate, that Mr. Pitt was ready on all occasions to comply with the King's wishes. Neither of them loved the other. It was impossible for Mr. Pitt to forget the King's treatment of his father; and there was too much original integrity in Mr. Pitt's character to allow him to be acceptable to the King. I believe they had many quarrels. There was one in particular, which became generally known. The King had relied, that he could make Mr. William Grenville minister, in case he was compelled to separate himself from

Mr. Pitt. Mr. Pitt determined to deprive the King of this great card. He therefore suggested to his Majesty, that it was necessary that Mr. Grenville should be placed in the House of Lords. The King saw Mr. Pitt's object, and resisted. It was said, that this resistance was carried to such a length, that Mr. Pitt had actually resigned; but that the Queen prevailed on the King to yield to Mr. Pitt's demand. Mr. William Grenville was removed to the house of Lords, and thus the King was deprived of the only man, whom he could have named as successor to Mr. Pitt in the House of Commons.

During the whole of the King's reign much use had been made of his personal and private character. It was industriously propagated, that the moral character of a King was the circumstance the most to be attended to by his subjects. And when the King's eldest son grew up, the contrast between the father and the son was industriously and malevolently remarked by every courtier. This operated two ways. It raised the King's

character, and depressed that of him who was to be looked to as his successor.

The Prince of Wales is now become our Sovereign; posterity will appreciate his merits. I will however mention one or two circumstances in which he has been unfortunate. The King was very happy in the choice of Bishop Markham and Mr. Cyrill Jackson, as the Prince's preceptor and sub-preceptor; I believe also, that the Earl of Holdernesse was a very proper man for the office of Governor to the Prince. Ill health made it necessary for the Earl of Holdernesse to go abroad. On his return, sickliness had probably rendered him peevish. He complained of the ascendancy, which Mr. Jackson had obtained over the mind of the young Prince. Bishop Markham vindicated his assistant; and the King availed himself of the disunion to dismiss them all. I consider the removal of Mr. Jackson as a national calamity. I knew him well. He was a man of a master mind; eminently qualified to educate a young Prince. After he had quitted the office of sub-preceptor to the Prince of Wales he took orders,

was made Dean of Christ Church, and dwindled into the character of a schoolmaster. Those who have only known him while Dean of Christ Church will form a very inadequate idea of the powers of his mind. The Prince was in his fifteenth year when the Earl of Holdernesse, Bishop Markham, and Mr. Jackson, were removed from about his person. If the King could have replaced them even with men better qualified, they would most probably not have possessed the same means of guiding the Prince as were possessed by those who had the care of him from his earliest years. But the men who succeeded were wholly unequal to the charge; and the Prince's education was terminated. The Princess Dowager of Wales had kept the King out of society. The pretence was the preservation of his morals. The King seems to have had the same ideas respecting the Prince of Wales; not recollecting, that, as his preceptors were removed, the remaining part of his education must depend on his companions.

There was another circumstance in

the King's conduct towards the Prince, equally unfortunate. When his Royal Highness came of age, an establishment was assigned to him far beyond what could be supported by the very moderate income which was allowed him. This occasioned him to contract debts; and when it became necessary that those debts should be discharged, very little care was shown to protect the Prince's character from disgrace. The courtiers were everywhere active in contrasting the regularity of the King's life with the indiscretions of the Prince. On the establishment of the Prince's household, every man must have seen, that an expense was created which his income would not be able to discharge. Parental affection, and the political solicitude which the Monarch in possession ought to have for the character of his immediate successor, should both have attracted the King's attention. There was another circumstance also, which ought not to have been overlooked. The Duchy of Cornwall was the Prince's property from the hour of his birth. When he came of age, the Prince was put in possession of the revenues of this Duchy.

But the Prince obtained no part of that revenue, which had been received from the Duchy during his minority. A different treatment was shown to the Duke of York. When he came of age, the whole revenue received from the Bishopric of Osnaburg, during his minority, was paid over to him. There was another circumstance respecting the Duchy of Cornwall, by which a still greater injury was done to the Prince of Wales. The King procured an act of Parliament to be passed, authorizing him to grant leases of the Prince's lands in Cornwall for ninety-nine years, determinable upon lives; for these leases the King received fines during the Prince's minority, to the amount I believe of about two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. What a difference would it have made to the Prince, if, when he came of age, estates in possession had been delivered up to him, instead of reversions expectant on leases for ninety-nine years, with small rents reserved. Even this sum of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds received by the King for the leases which he had granted, though obviously an inadequate compensation, was not paid over to the Prince. It

may be said perhaps, that the King received this power from Parliament. I admit it: but the Parliament had no right to grant this power. It was a gross breach of faith by the guardian of the Prince's estates. I am justified in saying, that the Parliament is as much the guardian of the Prince's estates as it is of the demesnes of the Crown. I am justified in saying this by the conduct of the House of Commons in the reign of Henry IV. Richard II. had granted away many of the estates of the Duchy of Cornwall. The House of Commons took notice of this, and sent up a bill to the House of Lords, requesting their concurrence in a bill for the restoration of these lands to Prince Henry, afterwards King under the name of Henry V. The House of Lords refused to concur; but though they refused to concur with the Commons in the bill, the House of Lords addressed the King, to direct the law officers of the crown to commence suits against the possessors of these lands on behalf of the Prince: the address was complied with, and the lands were recovered for the Prince. In the suit subsequently instituted, in the reign of James I.

by his son Prince Henry, for lands part of the Duchy of Cornwall, which had been improvidently granted away by Queen Elizabeth, though the proceedings were only in a court of law, the same doctrine seems to have been adopted; *viz.* that the estates of the Prince of Wales were as much under the protection of Parliament as the demesnes of the crown. I am aware that it will be said, the Prince of Wales afterwards received a compensation for his rights. He brought a suit against the King, by petition, and, in 1803, received two hundred and twenty thousand pounds for compromising his claim; a sum shamefully inadequate. But what would have been the different situation of the Prince, if he had received even this sum in 1783, when he came of age, instead of receiving it in 1803? In mentioning the subject, one can scarcely refrain from contrasting the conduct of Edward III. with that of George III. When Edward the Third's son was little more than eleven years of age, he gave him an hereditary estate in the Duchy of Cornwall, with the immediate possession of all its revenues. He at the same time invested him for

his life in the Principality of Wales, and the Earldom of Chester, with the immediate possession of their revenues. The reason assigned in our law books for this conduct is, because the King's son *coruscat patris radiis.* Edward III. saw with pleasure the attention of his subjects attracted towards his son and future successor. German sentiments prevented George III. from feeling this delight.

Mr. Pitt was completely established in the situation of prime minister after the general election in 1784; and seems to have had more control over the King than any other ostensible minister, subsequently to the resignation of the Earl of Bute. Mr. Pitt owed this power to the fear in which the King stood of the Coalitionists; and after his Majesty's illness in 1788-9, his apprehensions were probably increased. The French Revolution burst forth in 1789. George III. saw the consequences, which this Revolution was likely to produce on kingly power. It is well known, that he said to every courtier who approached him, "If a stop is not put to French princi-

ples, there will not be a King left in Europe in a few years." But Mr. Pitt had sufficient control over the King to restrain him from embarking in war against France. It was not till the end of the year 1792, that Mr. Pitt's influence on this subject was overruled. At the close of that year, Mr. Burke prevailed on the great Whig families to declare themselves in favour of a war with France. They were received by the King with joy. Mr. Pitt yielded to the King's wishes, and the crusade against French principles was commenced. The contest is not yet terminated. This is my opinion, while resident in France, on the 7th of March, 1820. In the town which I now inhabit, the house formerly occupied by the Inquisition has been purchased for the use of the Missionaries: and it is well known, that a body of men, under the name of *sècrèts*, are still kept in the same town and its neighbourhood. Probably they are not so numerous as they were in 1815. They were then uncontrollable. They openly murdered General Ramel, the Commander of the King's forces in this town. I believe other generals in the service of Louis XVIII.

experienced the same fate in other parts of France. The Missionaries o enly preach the necessity of restoring confiscated property to the church; and their discourses have much influence on the common people. While it is known, that two such bodies of men are kept on foot, can it be believed, that the nobles and fanatics have relinquished their hope of re-establishing the *ancien regime?* They will probably make the attempt, but their efforts will fail. The great body of the French Nation will never consent to the re-establishment of old abuses.

The contest is begun in Spain: the army, the commercial interest, and men of learning, are united in the demand of a Constitution, and the assembly of the Cortes. They are opposed by the King, the priesthood, and a large proportion of the nobles. Most probably a free Constitution will terminate the contest. Kings and nobles ought to recollect, that the United States of America have now acquired that degree of importance, that the opinions of the inhabitants of that country must ne-

cessarily influence the opinions of the inhabitants of Europe. The Spanish Colonies in America will probably soon form a Government similar to that of the United States. Let Kings and Nobles also recollect, that every effort, which has hitherto been made to stop French principles, has only contributed to strengthen their growth.

During five months, in the year 1788-9, Royalty in Great Britain existed only in abeyance. This was a misfortune. Should a long minority take place before the House of Commons is made the representative of the intelligence and opulence of the country, Oligarchy or Revolution will most probably be our lot. There is another circumstance which deserves the consideration of Kings. It has been generally supposed, that standing armies form the surest support of royal power: but this is not always the case: the French Revolution was effected by the army. If Spain succeeds in establishing a free Constitution, she will be indebted for it to her army.

I have said, that George III. had not the wish to be a military conqueror. Some perhaps may think that the acquisitions in India prove this opinion to be erroneous. But let it be remembered, that the acquisitions in India were not the work of the King, or even of the British Nation. The civil and military servants of the India Company derived immediate wealth to themselves from every new conquest. They suggested, that the newly acquired dominion would yield an increase of revenue to the India Company. But this statement was most commonly found to be false. The revenues of the new conquest were almost always found, after a few years possession, to be unequal to the increased expense. The conquests in India are the acquisitions of a trading company, *pirate et boutiquière.*

At the accession of George III. he seemed to pay very little attention to his German dominions. They had been the object of his grandfather's affection; and George III. had been educated to dislike every thing which his grandfather had been fond of. But in the progress of his

reign his attention was drawn to his German sovereignty. His younger sons were sent to Germany, and educated like the sons of other German Princes. There is no proof that George III. was avaricious. There is reason to believe, that he received large presents from Indian Princes; but those presents were in diamonds, and given by him to the Queen. Although he was not avaricious, yet he never displayed any signal marks of generosity. It is possible, that at the commencement of his reign he conferred considerable gifts on the Earl of Bute. But he does not appear ever to have been solicitous to relieve his own sons from their pecuniary embarassments.

In his children George III. was peculiarly fortunate. For of fifteen, only two died in their infancy. Of the remaining thirteen, every man in private life would have been proud.

I will add but one reflection more. Few Kings have ever reigned, whose personal character and personal wishes have operated such important changes.

CHAPTER XXIII.

On the Three Kings of the Brunswick Race.

THREE reigns of Princes of the Brunswick family have passed away. During the reign of George I., the King never seems to have thought of Great Britain, except only as he could make it subservient to his German views. The first act of his reign was to acquire Bremen and Verden. This was a gross act of injustice: and a violation of that guarantee of the treaty of Munster, in 1648, to which England stood pledged. That treaty had settled the rights of the different Princes of Germany. I believe the seizure of Bremen and Verden was the first open violation of that treaty; and it served as a precedent for all those infringements of the rights of German Princes which have

since followed. The British Parliament paid two hundred and fifty thousand pounds for this acquisition. The loss of the friendship of Sweden, which was the consequence of this act of injustice, was an injury to the interests of Great Britain of much more importance. Every year of this King's reign seems to have produced some treaty, which had for its object his own interest as a German Prince. In 1718, Sir George Byng, an English Admiral, destroyed the Spanish Fleet. The gallantry of this achievement was much applauded, but without reason; for the Spanish Fleet was in such a condition as to render it wholly unequal to the contest. It was a violation of the law of nations, for no hostilities had been previously declared between Spain and Great Britain. The measure was adopted to promote the views of the House of Austria in Sicily.

Perhaps George II. was more attentive to the interests of Great Britain than his father had been. But the Continental wars of 1741 and 1756 were undertaken

purely to promote the King's interests as a German Prince.

George III., at his accession, did not appear to have the same partiality for Hanover as had been shown by his predecessors. As he had never been in Hanover, he did not feel that predilection, which is the result of early habits; and he had been educated to dislike the German war, because it was the measure of his grandfather. But he gradually became a German Prince. To that country he sent his younger sons for education. From that country their wives were to be brought; and when the French Revolution broke out, the danger of its example affecting other Governments, must have been more strongly felt by him as a German Prince than as a King of Great Britain. But the calamity, which George III. has brought upon Great Britain, by the pressure of those taxes, which have been imposed to support his unnecessary wars, has almost absorbed every other consideration. Yet the People of England have not abandoned the wish of being

separated from Hanover. This led them to see with pleasure the prospect of the succession of the Princess Charlotte. In that hope they have been disappointed. Should the daughter of the late Duke of Kent succeed to the Crown, their wishes may be realized.

THE END.

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Poppin's Court, Fleet Street, London.


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Nicholls, John.
Recollections and reflections personal and political as connected with public affairs during the reign of George III. 1820.

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